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Summary of thesis 
In this thesis I argue that friendship holds a unique and unusual place in the work 
of Maurice Blanchot (1907-). It traces the appearance of this relation in his essays 
during the period from 1946 to 1962. Key to his work at this time, j argue, is the 
work of his friend Georges Bataille (1897-1960), whom he met in 1940. The 
influence of each writer upon the work of the other, I argue, is inseparable from 
the thought of friendship which both pursue, albeit in different and apparently 
conflicting ways: Bataille figures the relation to the friend as complicity, a term 
which he presents in terms of a quasi-ontological determination 'the labyrinthine 
constitution of beings'; and Blanchot locates friendship in terms of a movement of 
discretion or discontinuity which interrupts being in order for there to be relation 
as such. It is shown how both thinkers reinscribe friendship into their work in 
general through these figures, which allow them to articulate questions of 
memory, death and the 'work'. It is in this sense that friendship, for both writers, 
is 'at work' within their work. Central to this determination of 'the work' is 
G. W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, which had been introduced into French 
intellectual life principally by two commentators, Alexandre Kojeve and Jean 
Hyppolite. The figural differences between complicity and discretion are traced to 
their respective readings of Hegel. Bataille's debt to Kojeve's interpretation forms 
the starting point of this linkage between the question of friendship and the status 
of the work. The pivotal role which Kojeve ascribes to the relation of mastery and 
slavery - the emergence of self-consciousness as the work of recognition 
[Anerkennung] - is used to draw out Hegel's genetic account of intersubjectivity 
(in recognition, love, and friendship). I show that Bataille's conception of 
sovereignty not only seeks to oppose this dialectic of mastery ... Hegelianly ... ; it 
also situates itself within this dialectic at the very moment which Kojeve defines 
in terms of the limited aniniality of friendship and love. As a result, Bataille's 
thought of friendship extends to characterise the impossibility into which this 
dialectic is inevitably collapsed. Yet the question remains as to how far his 
reliance upon Kojeve puts this strategy of collapse under an ever-present threat of 
having to repeat those 'Hegelian' strategies which he claims to have 'undone'. 
The final chapter in the thesis, therefore, sets out a characterisation. of Blanchot's 
reading of Hegel. Against the grain of most Blanchot commentaries, I show that 
Blanchot's reading cannot be derived solely from Kojeve. By linking the pivotal 
function of terms such as 'disquiet' ['Unruhe'l and key passages from Hegel's 
texts, it is argued that he draws extensively upon the commentaries and 
translations of Hyppolite: this approach allows him to amplify the importance of 
language in the Phenomenology of Spirit; and to identify in this text key questions 
of ambiguity - such as the relation of language and negativity; the place of 
memory in the work of art; and the fate of art in the modem world. It is Hegel's 
ambiguous linkage of friendship with the latter which leads to his own effacement 
of Bataille's relation between friendship and art, and to the definition of a ýwork 
of friendship' in the self-effacement of discretion. 
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Abbreviations 
Titles are given alphabetically by abbreviation. Texts by Blanchot have a two- 
letter abbreviation (with the exception of his letters); Bataille's Oeuvres completes 
are indicated by a single Roman numeral; and all other Hegel or secondary texts 
are given a three-letter abbreviation. Footnotes are placed at the end of each 
chapter. 
* Works by Blanchot 
Letters to Bataille 
[All references to this correspondence are preceded by the V symbol, and given 
by their catalogue number in the "Papiers Georges Bataille" at the Biblioth6que 
Nationale, Paris. ] 
Am "L'amitie: Pour Georges Bataille", in Les Lettres nouvelles, 29,1962 
AM LAmitie 
Cl La Communautý inavouable 
ED LEcriture du dýsastre 
EI LEntretien infini 
EL LEspace litteraire 
FP Fauxpas 
FS Friendship, translated by Elizabeth Rottenberg 
ic The Infinite Conversation, translated by Susan Hanson 
PA Le Pas au-delti 
PF La Part dufeu 
SL The Space ofLiterature, translated by Ann Smock 
SB The Step Not Beyond, translated by Lycette Nelson 
WD The Writing of the Disaster, translated by Ann Smock 
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WF The Work ofFire, translated by Charlotte Mandell 
9 Works by Bataille 
I-XII Oeuvres completes, 12 volumes 
All references to Bataille's collected complete works are given as a single roman 
numeral. The relevant contents of those volumes used are listed below: 
V La Somme ath6ologique, I.: Le Coupable; LExperience interieure 
VI La Somme atheologique, II.: Sur Nietzsche, volonte de chance; 
"L'Amitie"; "College socratique"; "Discussion sur la peche" 
VII La Part Maudite, 1: La Part maudite, I. La consumation; Theorie de la 
religion 
VIII La Part maudite, 11: LHistoire de Verotisme; La Souverainte; 
"L'Arnour d'un etre mortel"; "Le paradox de la mort et la pyramide" 
IX Laseaux ou la naissance de Vart 
XI Articles 1945-49: 'Tettre sur les incompatabilites de l'ecrivain"; "De 
l'existentialisme a la primat de l'economie" 
XII Articles 1950-62: "Hegel, la mort et le sacrifice"; "Hegel, Phomme et 
Phistoire"; "Le non-savoif"; "Le souverain"; "L'au-dela du serieux" 
* Works by Hegel and secondary texts 
BEC Leslie Hill, Blanchot: Extreme Contemporary 
GeS Jean Hyppolite, Genýse et structure de la Phenomenologie de Vesprit de 
Hegel, 2 volumes 
HMC Alexandre Kojeve, "Hegel, Marx et le christianisme", in Critique 
ILH Alexandre Koj eve, Introduction a la lecture deHegel 
PhE La Phenom6nologie de Vesprit, 2 volumes, translated by J. Hyppolite 
PhG Werke. Band 3. Phänomenologie des Geistes. 
PhS Hegel'S Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by AN. Miller 
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Y aurait-il, cachee dans VintimW de la parole, une force amie et 
ennemie, une arme jaite pour construire et pour ditruire, qui 
agirait derriere la signification et non sur la signification? Faut-il 
supposer un sens du sens des mots qui, tout en le d6terminant, 
envelopperait cette d6termination d'une ind6termination ambigui 
en instance entre le oui et le non? 
Would there be, hidden within the intimacy of speech, a friendly 
and hostile force, an arm made for constructing and for destroying, 
which would act behind signification and not upon it? Must one 
suppose a meaning of the meaning of words which, whilst 
deterinining it, would envelop this determination with an 
ambiguous indetermination poised between the yes and the no? 
'Ta littýrature et le droit a la mort" 
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Introduction 
Friendship and the work: Blanchot, Bataille, Hegel 
<< Friendship is only given to life itseýf )) 
Maurice Blanchot I 
The subject matter of this thesis is not friendship. Nor does this study provide an 
analysis of the philosophical history of this concept. Instead, the prime concern 
here is the work offriendship in the writings of two friends, Maurice Blanchot and 
Georges Bataille, and of the German philosopher, G. W. F Hegel. The significance 
of this phrase lies in the juxtaposition of two terms which do not appear to be 
commensurate with one another. This incommensurability of 'work' and 
'friendship' is particularly pronounced in the philosophical determination which 
Hegel gives to 'the work' ['das Werk'] in his Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). 
The impact of this book and the dialectical thought it presents can be traced 
throughout the work of Blanchot and Bataille. It will be argued, in fact, that 
Hegel's 'work' - the concept and his body of thought - is the single most 
influential factor in the philosophical development of both writers. Alongside this 
Hegelian legacy in their work there also lies a shared preoccupation with the 
relation of friendship, or 'FamitiC. Not that either writer presents what one could 
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call a coherent theory of friendship, or even undertakes a sustained engagement 
with those conceptions already provided by the philosophical tradition of Plato, 
Aristotle, Cicero, Montaigne, or Kant, for example. On the contrary, both 
Blanchot and Bataille seem to deploy friendship more as a figure of thought in 
their work. A figure for what thought, exactly? What does friendship 'do' in their 
writings? What 'work' does this relation perform there? It is this question of the 
work of friendship which will concern the present study. 
0.1 - Blanchot, Bataille and friendship 
The guiding question of this thesis, however, is addressed to the enigmatic and, 
according to some commentators, the 'exemplary' way in which friendship is 
presented in the work of Blanchot. With Blanchot, the first problem that arises is 
where to start the inquiry. Over a period of more than sixty years, from his early 
forays into political journalism in the early 1930's to the publication of his most 
recent, quasi-biographical LInstant de ma mort (1994), he has not only produced 
a vast quantity of writing, but these works have been as broad in their range of 
concerns as they have been demanding of their own generic limits. 2 Blanchot has 
written novels, narratives, reviews and articles - some subsequently republished in 
their own right, others assembled together into collections -; he has also made 
interventions into contemporary political debates and events - notably the 
"D&claration sur le droit a Finsoumission" during the Algerian war and 'les 
evenements' of May 1968. Yet such a 'public' life in print cannot fail to contrast 
with the persistent and deliberate anonymity of a writer about whom, at the time 
of writing, no biography has been written. As soon as one starts to talk about 
Blanchot, his work or his thought, there is always the silent, quasi-spectral 
presence of a figure whose scant biographical notice appears at the beginning of 
L'Espace litteraire and Le Livre a venir: 
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Maurice Blanchot, novelist and critic, was bom in 1907. His life is entirely 
devoted to literature and to the silence which is proper to it. 
This thesis does not concern itself with a biography of Blanchot, or even speculate 
on reasons why one has not yet been written. 3 Such a task, as we will find out in 
the course of this inquiry, is precarious given that it raises questions about the 
relation of 'life' and 'the work' which Blanchot himself addresses only with the 
utmost care and discretion. 4 Thus,, one needs to take care with this word 
friendship, so as not to reduce it too quickly to a fixed determination or location 
within this work, by making of it either a biographical resource, or the conceptual 
figure of an ethics or a PoliticS. 5 In fact, the greatest danger lies in having already 
decided where to place friendship in Blanchot's work, for upon closer inspection it 
becomes clear that this word does not present an easily encapsulated or readily 
thematised 'face'. Where should we turn? 
This is the 'difficulty' to which the figure of friendship testifies in Blanchot's 
work. Indeed, it may be claimed that some of the texts in which he addresses 
friendship - often indirectly, rather than explicitly or thematically - are among his 
most difficult and enigmatic. This resistance to thematisation is most pronounced 
in those texts where friendship is allowed to ghost a commentary on the work of a 
writer who is a friend. It becomes difficult to maintain a textual distinction with 
regard to the naming of the friend and the naming of friendship: it is uncertain 
whether a general examination of friendship can be separated from the specific 
instantiation of a dedication, a quotation or even an allusion to the work of the 
friend. Consequently, it is difficult to say whether any of these works are actually 
written 'on' friendship, insofar as this form of indirect reference appears to 
indicate that thematising friendship would betray this very relation. 
This problem of the singularity of friendship brings us to a central problem for 
this enquiry. What function, if any, can friendship possess in Blanchot's work? 
Can it tell us anything about the way in which he 'works' in general? Yet as soon 
as one asks about the possibility of addressing friendship or the friend in general, 
10 
there is a conflict with the very thing that this relation names and affirms: the 
singular occurence of this friendship or this friend. This conflict is identifiable 
throughout Blanchot's work, where it arises at every instant of judgment about a 
given work. Nowhere is this conflict more acute than in his treatment of 
friendship; especially if one wishes to ascribe a certain exemplarity to this 
relation. But exemplary of what, exactly? Is the community of friendship 
reducible to the simple fact of 'being-together'? Does not the very attempt to 
deploy friendship as an exemplary philosophical figure both blunt the singularity 
of the former and blur the rigorous specificity demanded of the latter? Denis 
Hollier voices just this suspicion with regard to Blanchot's book, La Communaute' 
inavouable, and Jean-Luc Nancy's La Communaute d6soeuvree (both 1983). He 
suspects that both thinkers 'neutralise' the question of community by raising it to 
an ontological category, and flattening out of it any existing social dynamic of 
differences and conflicts: 
It is true that with what Blanchot calls "friendship, " an androgynous 
element halfway between the political and the sexual, this joining process 
had already begun. In this regard, is it not to be feared that a "vague 
moralism of reconciliation" might divert one from Klossowski's 
countering quest "for the roots of hatred, " especially the reciprocal hatred 
of the political and the sexual? 6 
Does Blanchot's treatment of friendship reduce it to an indifferent 'joining' of 
beings? If it did, Hollier's complaint would be justifiable. Yet he seems to almost 
deliberately misunderstand the level of thought at which Blanchot places 
friendship. It will be shown in that the relation of friendship in his work has 
nothing to do with what Hollier disparages as 'moralism' or 'reconciliation'. So 
how should we read the word, friendship, in Blanchot's work? 
One possible answer is provided by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, in the 
introduction to Quest-ce que la philosophie? (199 1). The general project of their 
book as a whole is to develop the possibility of presenting philosophical problems 
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as figures for the production of thought in general. They call these figures 
(. conceptual characters' ['personnages conceptuels']; and the first 'conceptual 
character' to which they turn is that of thefriend: 'What does friend mean, when it 
becomes a conceptual character, or condition for the exercise of thought? ' 7 Their 
question draws attention to the stakes of considering what it is that friendship 
names when it appears in a philosophical or theoretical text. It lays open a 
fundamental philosophical gesture by which the concept is raised out of and over 
that which is designated as the empirical, or even 'non-philosophical'. They do 
not posit this example of 'the friend' as an insight into the projected 'origin' of 
how the Greek word 'philia' comes to determine the name of philosophy as such. 
Instead, they turn to the work of Blanchot: 
And when today Maurice Blanchot, who belongs to those rare thinkers to 
consider the sense of the word "friend" in philosophy, takes up this 
question internal to the conditions of thought as such, does he not again 
introduce new conceptual characters into the heart of the purest Thought, 
this time hardly Greek, that came from elsewhere, as if they had passed 
through a catastrophe which leads them towards new living relations raised 
to the state of a priori figures [caracteres]: a detour [un detoumement], a 
certain fatigue, a certain distress between friends which converts 
friendship itself to the thought of the concept as infinite mistrust and 
patience? 
This lengthy question appears at the beginning of their discussion of the 
'conceptual characters'; in fact, Blanchot's 'character' of the friend appears to be 
posited as the example of what they call 'the object of philosophy': 'to create 
always new concepts'. 9 What is of interest here for this inquiry is the description 
of this figure in Blanchot's work, the exemplarity given to it, and the constructive 
force that is drawn from this figure of the friend in his work. Moreover, in an 
accompanying footnote, they remark that both LAmitie and LEntretien infini 
bear upon 'the relation of friendship to the possibility of thought in the modem 
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world'. 10 Friendship is not found in a particular branch or discipline of 
philosophical inquiry: it has been placed within 'the conditions of thought as 
such'; and it is through friendship that Blanchot speaks to us of the very 
4 possibility of thought' today. The rhetorical sweep of this question leaves 
unasked many more questions concerning those 'characters' that have 'come from 
elsewhere'; about the fictional 'as if' which qualifies the 'catastrophe' through 
which they have passed into 'new living relations'; and about the task of 
philosophy itself as an 'always new' creation of concepts. Leaving aside a more 
detailed discussion of these individual questions, it must be stressed that it is on 
the basis of this description that Blanchot is claimed to be among 'those rare 
thinkers' who think friendship 'today'. Are they simply claiming that that 
Blanchot's 'rarity' as a thinker is to have given the concept of friendship a new 
lease of life in the present, by drawing on resources that lie 'elsewhere', perhaps 
outside of the philsophical tradition. Indeed, how does friendship come to be the 
concept which, as Deleuze and Guattari phrase it, bears his 'signature'? From 
what resources does he 'create' it? 
This problem of origin returns us again to the question of how to approach 
friendship in Blanchot's work. If we are not to decide in advance what friendship 
means for Blanchot, as Hollier does, it pays to attend to the ways and the places in 
which it is named or presented. Indeed, the 'place' of friendship in Blanchot's 
work is neither constant nor accidental. It is this peculiar infrequency, which we 
should call an economy, perhaps, of where and when friendship is named, that 
seems to have become integral to how friendship is to be thought with Blanchot. 
This topological specificity of this approach to the question of friendship brings us 
to Blanchot's 1962 essay, "L'amitie", and to his friend, Georges Bataille. 12 A 
number commentaries on Blanchot have touched upon the references to Bataille in 
his work, and have drawn attention to the importance that this relation had for 
both writers. Invariably, this kind of biographical detail serves the same purpose: a 
citation from one serving as the ground for an interpretation of the other. A 
concept which is common to both of them allows for it to be explained in the work 
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of one through reference to its meaning in the work of the other. However, this 
temptation to explain the work of one through that of the other has a tendency to 
obliterate differences that can be as fine as they are profound. 13 Even when this 
gesture is undermined by the attribution of a mistinterpretation of one by the 
other, or a deeper incompatibility, there lies the temptation is to resort to the 
proper name of one as an authority over the work of the latter, whether one seeks 
to support or subvert it. 14 We are left without any sense of how Blanchot and 
Bataille could maintain such contradictions between them. 
It is clear that other approaches are needed. When Roger Laporte, for example, 
quotes the words, 'experience cannot be communicated if the bonds of silence, 
effacement, distance, do not change those it puts into play', from Bataille's 
L'Experience int&ieure, he asks: 'how could we not think of his friendship for 
Blanchot, that which Blanchot bore for Bataille - the friend par excellence -, their 
"infinite conversation"T 15 He allows his description of this passage juxtapose 
biographical fact (their friendship) with a concept taken from Blanchot's book, 
L'Entretien infini. This slippage of terms between Bataille and Blanchot, in the 
form of a rhetorical question, at once posits an identity between life and work, and 
draws attention to this positing. Laporte himself is being discreet: he is not 
identifying the work with the life, nor using the one to explicate or authorise the 
other. In fact, all that Laporte posits is the idea that this 'friendship' between 
Blanchot and Bataille refuses the possibility of any such identification whilst 
somehow enacting it at every point. Friendship, it seems, is the name for what 
binds them and their work. Laporte's discreet juxtaposition gives us a glimpse of 
how far friendship might take us in understanding the work of Bataille and 
Blanchot in general. Yet how can we posit the singularity of their relation and 
reserve the right to thernatise or generalise from it? Jacques Derrida poses this 
question on a number of occasions: 
That which binds Blanchot to Bataille is unique and "L'amitie" says it in 
an absolutely singular fashion. [ ... ] Without being able to enter into the 
14 
nil absolute singularity of this relation, without forgetting that Blanchot alone 
was able to write it and thus speak solely of Bataille, without 
comprehending, perhaps, and in any case without knowing, we can think 
what is written there. ' 6 
Derrida's repeated reservations - 'without being able... '; 'without forgetting... ' - 
are similarly sensitive to the singular form of friendship. Like Laporte's discreet 
juxtaposition, they are articulated through a kind of indirect citation of Blanchot's 
syntax of the 'without'. For Derrida, although we cannot take part or enter into 
this relation, but we can always think what it gives to be thought 'in an absolutely 
singular fashion'. But how far is even this thought an act of trespass? By what 
right do we excerpt what is given to be thought from a text which speaks of a 
singular relation? For Derrida, this is the question which Blanchot's "L'amitie" 
asks of us; and it is in this confrontation that it allows us to think it. 
So why persist in reading Bataille alongside Blanchot on the question of 
friendship? It is possible, of course, that any approach to this question rests too 
heavily upon a problematic equivalence of biography and the work; and one 
which Blanchot himself is the first to put into question. Yet when it is a matter of 
the way in which two friends deploy the 'same' relation of friendship in their 
respective work, it is important to remain open to the way in which this 
deployment or presentation takes place. Hence, any parallels and divergences 
which are to be found in Bataille's work are essential to building an understanding 
of the way in which this relation is figured by Blanchot. The 'detour' and the 
'possibility of thought' which Deleuze and Guattari located in Blanchot's figure 
of friendship cannot be simply abstracted from the context in which this relation is 
presented in his work. The problem of biography is not disposed of in this way; 
the question of the singularity of a friendship needs to be negotiated especially 
carefully in the exchange between these two friends because this very relation 
between 'work' and 'friendship' is at stake in it. This thesis sets out to follow this 
exchange or conversation between the two friends as it manifests itself in their 
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respective works. For example, Blanchot's "L'amitie" is written after the death of 
Bataille in 1962, and echoes the title of Bataille's own piece, "L'Amitie", 
published pseudonymously in 1940, the year in which the two first met. The first 
pair of chapters in this thesis will be occupied with drawing out the different ways 
in which friendship is presented in these two pieces, whose chronology brackets 
the duration of their relationship. In the process, these readings will draw upon the 
relation of 'VamitiC (1962) and "L'Amitie" (1940) to the rest of their work: this 
will involve questions about memory, fidelity, communication and transgression; 
and in particular the relation between death and the work. The result of this dual 
reading is delineation of a 'diff6rend' between Blanchot and Bataille over the 
figuration of friendship in terms of either discretion and discontinuity or 
complicity and continuity. This difference is in fact fundamental to their work as a 
whole for it taps into the contrasting ways in which they respond to the 
philosophical concept of 'the work' presented in Hegel's Phenomenology of 
Spirit. 
0.2 - Blanchot, Bataille and Hegel 
The second pair of chapter in this thesis relate these differences in the figuring of 
friendship to their respective readings of Hegel. For both Blanchot and Bataille, 
Hegel's philosophy marks the introduction of the concept of death as negativity, 
or the work, into the heart of all thought. It is here that the question of fhe -work of 
ii-nl'eiU, sný-Hip-(c,, -an--5eFas-k-e-d) what is the relation between the work - the work of art, 
the literary or poetic work, or even the philosophical work - and friendship for 
Blanchot and for Bataille? How might one understand this phrase 'work of 
friendship' in the context of their readings of Hegel? These readings must be 
understood with respect to their proper sources in two contemporary 
commentaries on the Phenomenology of Spirit: Alexandre Kojeve's famous 
lectures from the 1930's, collected as Introduction a la lecture de Hegel (1947); 
and Jean Hyppolite's Genese et structure de la Phenomenologie de Vesprit de 
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Hegel (1946). 17 It is well-recorded that these works introduced a very particular 
'Hegel' to an entire generation of French writers and intellectuals. Along with the 
work of Koyre and Wahl, Kojeve and Hyppolite privileged the Phenomenology as 
their point of access to Hegel, often alongside those Frankfurt and Jena writings 
which prefigured it. 
Bataille's own work in particular testifies to Kojeve's dominant influence in 
French intellectual life at this time. It will be argued, in Chapter 3, that the 
relations of death and friendship are thought only from an antagonistic relation to 
this privleging of the work at a certain 'moment' of the Phenomenology. This 
'moment' links the emergence of self-consciousness (the truth of consciousness) 
to an intersubjective relation, which famously Kojeve will call the 'master-slave 
dialectic', thus giving centre stage, to the concept of recognition first presented 
therein. 18 As we will observe, Kojeve regards this concept, and the 'moment' of 
the master-slave which figures it, not simply as the schematic heart of his reading 
of the Phenomenology, but moreover as the 'key-notion' of Hegel's entire 
philosophy: the concept of recognition marks the emergence and development of 
the human subject into an educated, social and political citizen, whose freedom 
and rights are guaranteed by the modem state. Kojeve portrays this development 
in terms of the conceptual movement from love to recognition and in the structural 
transformation of death into work (the 'work of the negative'). It is this movement 
that forms the schematic heart of his narrative of History, at whose 'end' he 
located Hegel and the Phenomenolog itself - the point at which every possibility 
has been realised or exhausted. Friendship is identified with 'Love' as the 'first 
description' of the existential-anthropogenetic dialectic, and consequently both are 
characterised by a lack of conflict, absence of risk, refusal of socio-political 
activity and actuality. In short, these feelings do not satisfy Man's 'desire for 
Recognition': mere 'love of knowing' is to be supplanted by 'actual knowing'. 
it is this narrative against which Bataille sets himself in a quite unique way. In 
one of the many notebooks in which he worked on his Theorie de la religion, 
17 
Bataille expressed the paradoxical nature of his relation to Hegel with the utmost 
simplicity: 
In a sense, Hegel's thinking is the direct opposite of my own, but I can 
make sense of this only dialectically, to put it another way, "Hegelianly". 19 
In the light of the preceding discussion, one should resist the temptation to read 
this remark as if the two instances of Hegel - 'Hegel's thinking' and the word 
"'Hegelianly"' - were intended to mark an opposition of Kojeve's Hegel and 
another, more accurate or faithful reading of Hegel to which Bataille would have 
independent access. Although Bataille affirms this opposition, 'in one sense', as 
'direct', he also implicitly recognises the Hegelian problematic of such relations 
of immediacy. 20 He does not seek to bypass or overcome the possible gap between 
Hegel and Kojeve's 'Hegel', instead he acknowledges that his only way of 
articulating his opposition to this totality is to force a way in through this gap and 
to exploit it. In order to understand the sense in which Bataille seeks to oppose 
Hegel "'Hegelianly"', we must grasp the universality and totality which Bataille 
finds in 'the (fundamentally Hegelian) thought' of Koj eve. In Chapter 3, therefore, 
it will be a matter of allowing Kojeve's account of Hegel to unfold so that it 
becomes possible to identify those structures which Bataille exploits and 
exascerbates in his characterisations of sovereignty, friendship and the work of art. 
The question of how Blanchot reads Hegel, therefore, is vital to understanding 
the exact nature of his differences with Bataille over the relation of friendship. In 
the final chapter, we will be interested once again in properly differentiating the 
'work of friendship' in Blanchot and Bataille, respectively. What is the Hegelian 
influence on the way that Blanchot relates 'friendship' to the 'work'? Is his 
reading of Hegel at all compatible with Bataille's? Do they in fact read the same 
"Hegel"? In her recent survey of Blanchot's work, Annelise Schulte-Nordholdt 
argues that Blanchot is 'very close to Bataille, in whom one finds a similar 
relativisation of the Hegelian dialectic. ' 21 This similitude finds its root in the 
interpretation of Kojeve: 
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It is Kojeve who provides the amplification of the anthropological 
dimension of negation, that is to say of death, in the Blanchotian 
conception of language. It is through the bias of his interpretation of Hegel 
that Blanchot thinks human actiVity. 22 
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that many accounts of Blanchot's reading of 
Hegel have identified Kojeve (via Bataille) as its sole source. 23 This assumption 
may hold true at an anecdotal level, insofar as one might assume that Bataille 
would have introduced Blanchot to Koj eve's work (there is little or no reference to 
Hegel in his pre-1941 writings). However, this assumption does not mean that 
Kojeve's influence is as determinate for Blanchot as it is for Bataille. Chapter 4 of 
this thesis will therefore present a counter- argument that Blanchot and Bataille do 
not share this dependence upon Kojeve and that, as a result, their respective 
readings of Hegel take quite different paths. It is precisely the nature of this 
difference that interests us. For this reason, the account of Blanchot's relation to 
Hegel will not repeat the kind of linear analysis given in Chapter 3. Instead, it will 
follow a zig-zag course between different texts by Blanchot and Hegel, in order to 
show how Blanchot reads Hegel sometimes with, sometimes against, but 
oftentimes quite apartfrom the readings offered by Kojeve or Hyppolite. 
In fact, as the caveat at the beginning of "La litterature et le droit a la mort" 
makes explicit, the most explicit characteristic of Blanchot's reading is his 
distance from the claims made by Bataille: 
It is understood that the remarks which follow remain quite remote from 
the text of The Phenomenology and do not seek to explain [e'clairer] it. 24 
This is not the kind of comment that one finds in Bataille's Theorie de la religion. 
But why this distance from Hegel's text? How should we understand Blanchot's 
subsequent 'remarks' in the light of his refusal to 'illuminate' it? As we indicated 
in the Introduction, the fact that Blanchot draws upon the work of Hyppolite in 
addition to that of Kojeve has to be taken into account. This means that the text(s) 
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from which he distances himself is more likely to be Hyppolite's translation: his 
'remarks' will not constitute a line-by-line commentary, such as that provided in 
Genese et structure. Nonetheless, in the first half of Chapter 4,1 will contend that 
"La litt6rature et le droit a la mort" bears the mark of Blanchot's familiarity with 
Hyppolite's reading of Hegel; principally, in the word, 'Finquietude'; the citation 
of a passage on the act of naming from the Realphilosophie; and the rendition of 
the 'life of spirit' passage from the Phenomenology. These traces are not all of the 
same order. The latter only shows us that Blanchot has indeed read Hyppolite's 
translation (whereas Bataille read only Kojeve); but the former two deserve more 
sustained treatment because of the claims made by both Hyppolite and Blanchot. 
In each case, however, what interests us is the manner in which Blanchot 
transforms or rewrites his Hegelian sources. These links require that we follow 
closely a double gesture in Blanchot's reading of Hegel, as it commences in "La 
litterature et le droit a la mort": his self-distancing from 'the text' of the 
Phenomenology; and his rewriting of certain Hegelian citations and themes. As we 
shall see, this double gesture manifests itself in his account of relation between 
negativity, language, and literature. 
This doubleness and the centrality of language mark out the specificity of 
Blanchot's reading of Hegel. In common with Koje've and Bataille, Blanchot's 
engagement with Hegel revolves around the idea of death as it is put to work in 
determinate negation. However, he approaches negativity through the question of 
language. He foregrounds the act of naming, the process of writing, the condition 
of ambiguity, and the possibility of dialogue, in place of the Kojevean lexicon of 
'Discourse', 'Desire' and 'Recognition' which Bataille adopts. What difference 
does this approach make? As we will show in Chapter 3, the term 'Discourse' 
does not have any linguistic specificity for Kojeve: although he refers to it as the 
generic term for the realm of concepts and ideas produced through the operation 
of determinate negativity, he presents such discursive activity without reference to 
words or their communication, whether through the relations of speech, the 
ambiguities of meaning, or even the very act of naming. Nothing happens in 
20 
KojCvean 'Discourse', it only 'reveals' or 'reports' the actions of consciousness. 
This is because Koj&ve's entire reading of Hegel revolves around the 'Action' of 
the master-slave dialectic and, above all, the 'key-notion' of 'Recognition': 
actions count, not words, in his rendition of the dialectic. 25 Hence, when Blanchot 
refers to Kojeve's presentation of the act of naming as murder, it is his own 
fundamental concern with language through which he reads. What will be of 
interest in this chapter, therefore, is whether Blanchot simply imposes this concern 
upon the Hegelian text, or whether he draws upon resources that lie within 
Hyppolite's work. 
Unlike Bataille, then, Blanchot does not appear to have a reading of Hegel as 
such. In fact, whereas Bataille's Oeuvres compMtes is peppered with references 
and directives on how Hegel is to be read, Blanchot's only general comments on 
reading Hegel appear in his later fragmentary texts, Le pas au-delý (1973) and 
L'ecriture du d6sastre (1980). A fragment from the latter not only appears to 
answer our question, but does so with a playful irony that amplifies this 
importance of the negative: 'One cannot "read" Hegel, except by not reading 
him. 26 It is no coincidence that these remarks on reading Hegel arrive in a form of 
writing that tends toward impersonality and interruption (in the paradoxical 
'name' of 'le neutre'). Moreover, these fragments disavow any claim to having 
surpassed, stepped outside or 'inverted' Hegel's speculative system, however 
these terms might be construed. Indeed, to speak of Blanchot's work in terms of 
gpost-speculative' or post-Hegelian thought is, in itself, non-sensical and plainly 
wrong. First, speculative thought articulates (itself as) a conception of time which, 
far from being empty and forinalistic, enfolds both the 'before' and the 'after', 
both past and future, into the evanescent movement of the present. Second, 
Blanchot not only acknowledges this condition of the speculative system, but 
constantly attempts to place his own work in a (non-dialectical) relation to it: he 
rewrites Hegel 'off to one side', as Andrzej Warminski describes it. 27 Instead of 
claiming to have stepped beyond or outside dialectical thought, Blanchot steps 
aside, as if alongside the path of the dialectic, as if accompanying it along an 
21 
unforeseeable detour. It is this discreet turning which more than anything comes 
to characterise the specific nature of his reading of Hegel, and which will bind it 
all the more intractably to the thought of discretion at the heart of his work. 
* 
In the first two chapters, then, we will draw closely upon two texts which bear 
the same title - Blanchot's "L'amitie" and Bataille's "L'Amitie" - in order to 
follow the different ways in which each presents us with this word 'friendship'. 
Chapter I will negotiate Blanchot's meditation upon the relation of the work and 
the one who writes, in which he finds already a disturbing relation of discontituity 
between the 'self' and 'its' death, a relation of discretion which inforins the very 
possibility of friendship as such. In Chapter 2, we will contrast the way in which 
friendship takes place, for Bataille, within the 'sovereign operation' of sacrifice 
and communication, resulting in a very different relation of complicity. In the 
final pairing of chapters, we will turn to the Hegelian influence on both writers in 
order to articulate the relation between friendship and the work. By passing 
through a reading of Kojeve's account of the 'master-slave dialectic' in Chapter 
Three, we will show how Bataille's composition of sovereignty, friendship and 
the work of art is founded upon his "'Hegelian" opposition' to Hegel and the 
dialectical 'work' of philosophy. Finally, in Chapter 4, we will return to 
Blanchot's essays of the late 1940's and 1950's in order to bring together the two 
strands of the preceding enquiry - friendship and the 'work' - and to ask, once 
again, about the 'work' of friendship within the more familiar themes of the 
literary language, and the origins of the work of art in 'le desoeuvrement'. 
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Chapter I 
Friendship as discretion: Blanchot's IT'amitie" (1962) 
This is thought's profound grief. That it must 
accompanyfriendship into oblivion. 
Maurice Blanchot 
The purpose of this first chapter is to take up the general problems raised in the 
Introduction, and to explore the way in which friendship is presented in this work. 
In Blanchot's work, addressing friendship will always be a question of naming: 
writing in the name of friendship will not only address a friend, but will also, 
perhaps first of all, name a quite singular friend, Georges Bataille. Evidently this 
involves the question of when this nomination or declaration corresponds with 
writing the word 'friendship', with actually naming friendship itself Therefore, 
what is important for any interrogative approach to 'friendship' is to negotiate and 
articulate the relation of naming friendship with the name of Bataille, even to the 
extent that this relation may appear to be inarticulate, inhabiting a region where 
it's presence can only be registered on a scale where subtility or discretion are the 
only measure. 
In this chapter, therefore, it will be argued that the figure of friendship, and its 
'work', in Blanchot's writings is only accessible through its contiguity with the 
appearance of the proper name of Bataille. lt is with the simultaneous presentation 
of the proper name and the problem (the propriety) of naming such a relation to it 
that it becomes possible to address the difficulties outlined above as integral to the 
presentation and nomination of friendship throughout Blanchot's work. Above all, 
these first two chapters will present an extended study of this contiguity and will 
ask about what is at stake in giving the name of 'friendship' together with that of 
his friend. Only in this way will we be able to discern how far the naming of 
friendship through the work of Bataille can be seen to reemerge throughout 
Blanchot's other texts and concepts: those which do not explicitly bear the name 
of Bataille, nor express any testimony to friendship. Thus, although the present 
study may seek to show that 'friendship' is precisely not reducible to a matter for 
biography, there is no avoiding the need to situate this reading within the general 
'development' or 'itinerary' of Blanchot's work. As we have already remarked, 
Blanchot rarely gives any indication of the events of his life - whether private or 
public - and it seems that his encounters with friends might exemplify the 
determined discretion that he displays on any such questions. Such questions are 
both essential to his own development, yet as such they resist easy encapsulation 
or expression. On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the magazine Le 
Nouvel observateur in 1984, he responds to a questionnaire about the most 
imporatant events since the magazine's first appearance. He diverts the given 
time-frame through remembering his involvement in its predecessor, France- 
Observateur, thus returning him to 'more ancient epochs': 
For me, encounters [les rencontres] are what has mattered, where chance 
becomes necessity. Meeting men, encountering places. This is my share in 
biography. 
Meeting Emmanuel Levinas (Strasbourg 1925). Husserl, Heidegger, 
introduction to Judaism. 
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Meeting Georges Bataille and Rene Char (1940). Call to irregularity. The 
limit-experience. Opposition to the occupants and the Vichy regime. 
Clandestinity. 
Eze-Village (1947-1957). Ten years of solitary writing. Meeting with 
Robert Antelme and his friends (1958). The Algerian war, the declaration 
of the 121, attempt at an international review. 
With the same ones and with everyone 
May 1968 
M. B. 
This telegraphed style presents two quite different sources of information: first, it 
gives us a skeletal chronology of events through which Blanchot acknowledges 
his 'debts' (both the selection of proper names and the deployment of 'weighted 
terms' that resonate in his writings, such as 'irregularity', the 'limit-experience' 
and 'solitary writing'); second, the fact that Blanchot should express his 'share' or 
(part' in the activity of biography through the idea of a 'rencontre' in which 
'chance becomes [se fait] necessity'. How and why do such chance encounters 
take on the force of necessity? Is it plausible, or even possible, to say that this 
transformation marks the genesis of friendship - from an encounter to a 
relationship? Yet perhaps this process has as much to do with the ambiguity and 
the peculiar impersonality of the 'ideal' encounter with 'everyone and anyone' in 
the events of May 1968. This would be the witness borne by Blanchot's comments 
on his own 'inaccessibility': 
Thank you for your letter. But forgive me for not being able to respond as 
you wished. I do not even receive my closest friends, without friendship 
being diminished. 3 
In terrns of biographical fact we can draw upon the testimony of Georges Bataille 
himself, when he records in an autobiographical notice that '[at] the end of 19405 
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he encounters Maurice Blanchot, to whom he is bound without delay by 
admiration and agreement. A The arena of biography, which veers between 
narration, citation and interpretation, will always present itself as the primary 
territory for any discourse on friendship, whether literary, political, public or 
purely 'personal'. 'Bio-graphy' makes its claim in the name of a 'life', so 
friendship takes on a value under this title. Yet it is with this claim that even the 
most careful biography always casts friendship itself under the sign of a certain 
expediency: the depth, endurance or warmth - the quantifiable quality - of any 
friendship will have helped the attentive biographer to reveal something essential 
about the life of the subject (a Bataille or a Blanchot, for example). In this case, 
one can follow the personal details and impressions of Pierre Prevost; or the more 
ambitious breadth of Michel Surya's biography of Bataille, Georges Bataille, la 
mort a loeuvre; or even Pierre Klossowski's seemingly cautious remark 
concerning Bataille - that his 'encounter with Maurice Blanchot, that their 
friendship could not have been more beneficial for himself, that he had recognised 
in total incommunicability the condition from which a true action can thus be 
exercised. ' 5 However, Surya's approach to this friendship gives us the most 
instructive introduction to the ambiguities to be faced in any biographical account 
of Bataille: to write a biography of a writer whose own writing always addresses 
or passes through the question of the biographical, but only in order to deploy and 
exhaust it. It is Surya who warns that there would be 'much (essential) to say' 
about Bataille and Blanchot, 'if the silence of the two men on their friendship did 
not reduce us to conjecture. It is an obvious fact that this encounter was 
determinant for each of them. But on what grounds [a quel titre]? 6 But it is also 
Surya, the steadfast biographer, who cannot resist offering the opinion - in 
response to Klossowski's tentative portrayal of Blanchot as somehow Bataille's 
saviour - that 'it is more than likely that Bataille should be credited with 
7 Blanchot's ideological reversal' . Thus, Surya's previous warning seems to be the 
sign of a reluctant resignation to the insubstantiality of an 'obvious fact', rather 
than its refusal. However much care or discretion the writer of biography displays, 
such a concern to present the true Bataille or the real Blanchot is not so much a 
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misplaced desire as a mendacious distortion: it is, says Blanchot, 'to give i ing 
as spectacle and to create a fictional character [personnage]' without any concern 
for the 'delicatesses de la verit6'. 9 Furthermore, Blanchot goes on to add that this 
is something that can be performed by even 'our closest friends, with the good 
intention of speaking in our place and in order not to abandon us too quickly to 
our absence'. 9 What deserves close attention is the way in which the very naming 
of a friendship - as an event or encounter in the (biographical) subject's life - both 
plays into this biographical 'speculative spectacle' that Surya can only recognise 
in failing to avoid it. Yet it also retains the resources of a certain discretion that 
Blanchot will draw upon when writing "L'amitie" in the event of Bataille's death 
in 1962. The question of how to name friendship will in turn work as a resistance 
to biographical 'spectacle'. Yet Surya's question, 'a quel titreT, always returns: in 
the name of what does this refusal take place? By what 'right' or 'authority' can 
Blanchot demand delicacy and discretion? 
Such demands for delicacy will still challenge when reading some of the 
remnants of Blanchot's correspondence with Bataille, especially to the extent that 
this exchange of letters bears an intermittent meditation upon the conditions and 
demands made by their friendship. Yet with this demand it is not merely a 
question of protecting personal details (as a banal secrecy), but perhaps something 
more delicate still, more discreet. The concern or demand is not for a truth that 
would bear the accuracy of the 'life-lik, e', but for a 'truth' which escapes both 
friends, even as it puts them into relation. This is the only level at which the 
'obviousness' or facticity of such a friendship might be entertained by either of 
them. As Blanchot writes to Bataille, 
If it doesn't tire you out, you would do me the greatest pleasure by telling 
me how you are at present. The thought that you were ill was extremely 
painful for me, and like a threat directed against something which would 
be common to both of us [une menace dirigee contre quelque chose qui 
nous serait commun Fun a I'autre]. I bear it with difficulty. ' 0 
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In a sense writing such as this could not be more personal. Yet at the same time it 
must be acknowledged that this communication takes place quite explicitly at the 
level where 'la pens&e' is likened to 'une menace'. This thought is to be thought 
of as a threat. The 'personal' is already passing through abstraction, the 
impersonality of 'la pensee' :a thinking that addresses - even as it threatens - the 
'something' that is 4 in common' for them. 
if I speak so indiscreetly of these things which concern you, it is only 
because it seems to me that they belong to me also, through friendship, but 
not simply through friendship: something, there, silently, is common to us 
both. ' 
This is the level at which their very communication would become possible. 
Indeed, what emerges from these remnants is the presence of a thinking that both 
engages with, as well as in friendship. It is a thought that immerses itself within a 
thinking of friendship. 
I think of you with an anxious friendship [une amitie inquiete]. This 
thought is not much at all. But it seems to me that, even where there is 
almost no path any more, it opens a power of proximity and a truth of 
attention that no fatigue - the fatigue of life - can suppress. 
12 
I think of you quite constantly and your friendship is also this thought, this 
transparency. 13 
Although this does not mean that these letters reveal some hidden level of the 
'life' behind the writing of the book - that the anonymous younger and older 
interlocutors in Blanchot's "L'Entretien infini" might conceal the identities of 
Bataille and Blanchot himself - it is clear that these letters do not simply attest to 
their friendship at the level of the empirical or 'obvious fact'. 14 Surya himself tries 
to formulate it in the following manner: for Bataille 'the one with whom 
friendship comes to bind him with a feeling little enough different from what in 
his eyes is a communitary feeling, is the one who comes to comfort him in the 
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idea of the impossibility of all community. ' 15 Whilst Surya's claim essentially 
follows the same logic as that made by Klossowski earlier, he explicitly derives 
his formulation from the work of Jean-Luc Nancy. Instead of erasing and 
overcoming the implied gulf between the impersonal realm of thought and the 
personal/public life of the individual, the claims that both Surya and Klossowski 
make simply deepen and extend it. It could be argued that Nancy's debt to 
Blanchot makes the substitution of 'une communaute d6soeuvree' for the name of 
'friendship' plausible. Yet such an identification must also be encountered at the 
level of the manner of thinking which both Nancy and Blanchot demand. This is 
the sentiment expressed by Blanchot's later approach to Bataille's thinking on 
community that marks his recognition of Nancy's work: 
[F]riendship, with the reading in drunkenness, is the very form [la forme 
niýmej of 'communaW d6soeuvree' which Jean-Luc Nancy has called us 
to reflect upon without our being allowed to stop there. 16 
It is in this refusal that the thought of friendship is immersed, thereby breaking 
down any secure identification of the 'personal reading by personal friends' 
through a relation to 'the anonymity of the book which is not addressed to anyone 
[ne s'adresse a personne]'. 17 To speak of the 'life' of friendship will always 
involve the impersonality of a movement such as that which 'la fatigue' names 
when it is not distinguished from 'ma vie', but 'constantly exceeds the limits of 
life'. This process of naming is central to the particular discretion that Blanchot 
will invoke when approaching the question of friendship in response to the event 
of Bataille's death, while writing this response in relation to a body of work that 
presents itself as 'written in the fire of the event'. 18 
It is the question of a relation that takes place through reading which therefore 
presents another kind of correspondence between these two friends who are 
writers: a textual or bibliographical one. To approach Blanchot's writings wherein 
the name of Bataille seems to be concurrent with that of friendship is not to be 
solely guided from Blanchot's side of this epistolary exchange, but is also due to 
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Bataille's own meditations pursued along a trajectory that always passed through 
a thought of friendship. Most notably it is Bataille's essay 'T'Amitie" (first 
published in April 1940, under the pseudonym 'Dianus') that draws attention to 
another fon-n of exchange or relation between them when it provides both the title 
and an epigraph to Blanchot's own LAmitiý. However, neither is it simply a 
matter of a repetition of titles, for it is always Blanchot who discerns the 
maintained presence of 'friendship' throughout Bataille's thinking. In an essay 
that addresses the work of Foucault, Blanchot writes of the impossible task of 
'recapturing the general importance of singular works that culture totally rejects 
by collecting' as a relation to 'works which thus remain solitary, almost 
anonymous, even when one speaks of them'. In fact, it is to Bataille that Blanchot 
addresses this relation to singularity, when he turns and addresses his closing 
remarks to 'one of the most solitary [works], that to which Georges Bataille, as if 
through friendship and play [comme par Famiti& et par jeu],, lent his name'. 19 For 
Blanchot it will be a question of pursuing a 'presentation' of friendship that eludes 
the continuity of a theme and the familiarity of a biographical reference, just as for 
B ataille (reading Un Moment voulu in 195 1) it is a question of a 'feeling of distant 
friendship, of distant complicity' that presents him with 'the paradox of 
Blanchot'. 20 
1.1 - 'In the name of' friendship: politics or poetry? 
To draw attention to the presence of the word 'friendship', therefore, is not an 
empirical or biographical claim, but the opening of a philosophical approach to 
the challenge that, for both Blanchot and Bataille, friendship makes of thought and 
as thinking. In other words, it is not to claim that Bataille is or was Blanchot's 
only friend: he is by no means 'le seul ami'. As we discovered in the Introduction, 
those texts which Blanchot presents 'in friendship' do not address Bataille 
exclusively. Yet what is perhaps most singular about Bataille's name as it appears 
in his work (again not with any remarkable frequency, but consistently) is, as has 
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been shown, the insistence with which it is addressed not just as a friend, but in 
the name of a persistent meditation upon friendship itself It is in this way that the 
naming of friendship takes place as a challenge for Blanchot to think, but 
furthermore this demand is engaged in response to Georges Bataille and can 
therefore only originate in its taking place between the two friends. Furthermore, it 
is with the very ten-ns through which they think this relation that the constitution 
of the 'between' will generate the force of conflict or discordance. How does this 
take place? What happens 'between' them? 
In a letter dated the twenty-fourth of January, yet which does not give the year, 
Blanchot writes to Bataille in a manner - common to a sizeable number of letters 
from their surviving correspondance - that bespeaks both a personal concern and a 
relentless engagement in a philosophical task. It is cited here almost in its entirety: 
I am pleased that you have seen Rene Char and that you might have 
conversed with him. To the extent to which all three of us feel intimately 
close, but perhaps, within this proximity, placed in relation [mise en 
rapport] with certain differences of thinking, these differences must be 
represented as a somewhat divergent response to demands [des exigences] 
that one should be able to explain more clearly. I don't know at all that 
interest or lack of interest in regard to 'politics' is involved; this is only a 
consequence and perhaps only superficial. As far as I'm concerned, I see 
clearly, I see better than I have for some time, to what double movement - 
both necessary and irreconcilable -I must always respond. The one (to 
express myself in an extremely crude and simplifying manner) is the 
passion, the realisation and the speech of the all [la parole du tout], within 
dialectical accomplishment; the other is essentially non-dialectical, it 
concerns itself neither with the all nor with unity and does not tend 
towards power (to the possible). A double language responds to this 
double movement, and for all language there is a double gravity: one is the 
speech of confrontation, of opposition, negation, and finally that of 
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reducing everything opposed and that, in the end, is asserted as the truth in 
its entirety as silent equality (whence appears political exigency); but the 
other is speech which speaks before all and outside of all, always a first 
speech, without agreement, without confrontation and open to welcome 
the unknown, the stranger (whence the poetic exigency). One names the 
possible and desires the possible; the other responds to the impossible. 
There is a constant tension between the two movements,, at once necessary 
and incompatible, often very difficult to sustain and in truth untenable. But 
one cannot, out of prejudice or bias, renounce the one or the other, nor the 
measureless research that their necessity demands of men, the necessity of 
combining the incompatible. 
Forgive me for these out of place reflections. But it seemed to me that I 
owed this effort of clarification (however illconsidered) to your friendship. 
Perhaps your return to Paris and the possibilities for meeting thus brought 
about will allow me to respond, other than by abstract affirmations, to this 
exigency of friendship. 
21 
This 'double movement' to which he refers is more familiar, in various forms, 
throughout Blanchot's work in the 1950's and early 1960's. The essay, "Comment 
decouvrir Fobscur? " (1959), presents it most succinctly: the dual proposal of 
'naming the possible' and 'responding to the impossible'; the demand of politics 
and that of poetry. 22 Such a double gesture is central to Blanchot's pursuit of a 
form of 'research' that works both from within and against those determinations 
already given by the philosophical tradition. Yet it is also clear from the care and 
precision of these texts that it is not a matter of limiting such a 'movement' to a 
strategic ploy, or a defiant gesture, against philosophy as such. First of all, it 
seems that this 'constant tension' between the possible and the impossible is to be 
located in accordance with a different kind of strategy: what he calls a manner of 
cresearch', or more precisely 'le recherche sans mesure'. Perhaps this path of 
research is not even of the order of a 'strategy' - it has no goal as such for it makes 
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no claim to any form of measurement or calibration. For this unavoidable 
'difficulty' of responding to two equally 'necessary' yet 'incompatible' demands 
is never settled into a concordance, nor harmonised into a unity. They are simply 
(. given' as irreducible. 
An irreducible difference, or even discordance, seems to result from this 
state of affairs between political responsibility which is at once a global 
and concrete responsibility, accepting marxism as nature and the dialectic 
as method of truth - and literary responsibility, a responsibility which is a 
response to an exigency that can only take shape [prendre forme] in and 
through literature. 
This discordance does not have to be set from the outset. It is a fact: it 
exists as a problem, not a frivilous problem, but one to be borne with 
difficulty, a problem all the more difficult in that each of its discordant 
terms engages us absolutely and in that their discordance, in a sense, also 
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engages us. 
This 'desaccord',, as a repetition of this relation between the possible and the 
impossible, is an integral component for his formulation of the relations between 
literary/poetic language, political discourse and philosophical task. Thus, however 
crude or 'maladroit' Blanchot claims his letter is, it is this continuity of conceptual 
formation that appears to dominate upon reading it, almost casting aside the 
opening references to the difficulties and differences between himself, Char and 
Bataille -a heated argument for his two friends that took place over the very status 
24 of 'Incompatibilites' - and yet because of this intensity it also returns all the 
more precisely to the heart of their conflict. How to present and work through 
such unbridgeable gulfs without destroying the very difference that keeps them 
rigidly apart? How does one 'combine the incompatible'? 
This is a way of articulating an 'essential' concern for Blanchot within the 
broader context of his published work: to put it quite schematically, it is an 
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attempt to approach that which is irreducibly different without hypostatising this 
difference, either by dividing them absolutely in order to reject one in favour of 
the other, or reconciling them in order to reduce one to the other. Either possibility 
would, for Blanchot, would elide both their incompatibility and their 
inseparability -a perverse dissymmetry which Blanchot designates as the 'plural 
speech' of conversation [Tentretien']. 
Such is the secret sharing of all essential speech in us: naming the possible, 
responding to the impossible. Sharing which must not, however, give way 
to a kind of repartition: as if we had, as our choice, a speech to name and a 
speech to respond, as if, finally, between possibility and impossibility, 
there was a frontier, perhaps moving, but always determinable according 
to the 'essence' of one or the other. 25 
Blanchot names a resistance to the ease with which the conflicts of contraries 
come to be overcome and resolved: he posits a form of 'dissymmetry and 
irreversibility' that does not depend upon a relation of 'equality and inequality' or 
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of 'predominance and subordination' . In other words, it is a relation of conflict 
that is irreducible to the form of contradiction which is ultimately resolved into a 
higher identity, a reconciliation of differences. He stresses the possibility of 
thinking this 'between' of 'discord' as a 'relation of infinity' which is, however, 
always 'implicated as the movement of signification itself. 27 
But what relation does this letter bear to the published works that it almost 
seems to ghost? Is it to be read as an early, tentative development of a formulation 
to be published in the coming years? Such questions, eminently those of the 
biographical-critic, push towards the speculated origins of a given writer's 
thinking: reference to conversations, correspondance, friendships and feuds brings 
biographical authority (i. e., an 'authenticity') to bear upon recalcitrant texts. This 
particular text is a letter, a communication addressed to a friend. Yet, at the same 
time,, it is both more and less than a confidential exchange between individuals, as 
Blanchot makes explicit with his apology - 'Pardonnez-moi ces reflexions 
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deplac6s'. As has been pointed out, the majority of his letter to his friend seems to 
have been taken over or taken up with a displacement, a shift of emphasis: a 
movement has taken place with the introduction into the letter of his 'reflections' 
upon the 'political' and 'poetic' exigencies; a change has occurred in the rules or 
syntax of such a communication. Furthermore, this shift takes place in the guise of 
his 'debt' to Bataille's friendship - 'il m'a semble queje devais a votre amitie cet 
effort ... d'eclaircissement'. Clarification and displacement: a shift of focus (from 
his personal concerns with Bataille and Char to 'des affirmations abstraites') and a 
change of context (from letter-writing to the impromptu essay) are both made in 
the name of friendship. They are both modes in which Blanchot explicitly writes 
in response to Bataille, to that which he owes to his friend, his friendship. 
Not friendship in general, but a friendship that is with a specific other person. 
This is undisputable. An inter-personal register secures the name of friendship to 
the form of the letter: it offers the security of a private, hermetic correspondance, 
as if it were to be valued as just one step away from a face-to-face conversation - 
'Pardonnez-moi ... je devais... '. However, there are gaps in this register that also 
pull this strictly one-to-one correspondance askew. If the elision of a informal or 
personal address is properly noted - 'a votre amitie' - this letter, as much as any 
conversation to come after Bataille's return to Paris, cannot be mapped so 
seamlessly upon the familiar exchange of Je' and 'tu'. It is as though, through the 
presence of a debt and the displacement it incurs, his response to Bataille could 
never be 'direct', 'personal' or 'intimate' in any accepted (or expected) sense of 
these terms. What comes between them seems to be friendship itself, or rather a 
thought of it that seems to broach as much on the impersonal as personal. It is not 
that friendship has lost any sense of relation or proximity, rather that any relation 
of familiarity with the friend that could be called 'personal' or 'impersonal' (in the 
sense of a cold abstraction) must pass through a thinking of friendship as rapport 
that, embracing both 'affirmations abstraites' and 'les possibilites de rencontre', at 
once raises or clarifies its stakes (the urgency of 'un exigence') and displaces its 
expression (the conflict of friendship). In other words, what emerges at the close 
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of this letter delimits the scope of the present enquiry: it is the emergence of a 
completely other demand for Blanchot, the possibility of 'repondre a cette 
exigence de Famitie'. 
What is the relation of this 'exigency' to those attributed to the 'political' or 
4poetic'? Is friendship to be read as another name for 'responding to the 
impossible'? Or is this third exigency to forin an over-arching, perhaps a more 
originary demand for thinking? If so, the accession of friendship to a principle of 
necessity or 'exigency' would negate any emergence of a completely new or 
singular thought of friendship. What relation could possibly pertain between 
singularity and exigency, to maintain the specificity of the former while carrying 
through the necessary urgency of the latter? The force of this exigency will have 
to revolve around its multiplied demands: the necessity of maintaining a certain 
complex singularity, even against the persistent force of necessity in general or the 
demands of the particular and the general, that is to say within and against the 
language and rhetoric of philosophical research itself. 29 The depth of any paradox 
is to be found in the endless conflict of demands: the possible and the impossible. 
1.2 - The doubling of discretion 
This section focusses on the way in which Blanchot responds to the death of 
Bataille in terms of friendship. How does Blanchot write about his friend in the 
wake of his death? To what extent does he seek to keep the work separate from the 
life? In which does he have the greatest investment, and how far would he see the 
distinction between the life and the work as a legitimate one? Such questions are 
particularly compelling with regard to the life and work of Bataille, whose La 
Somme atheologique - conceived as his central work - mixes elements of journal, 
treatise, aphorism, and poetry. 29 What kind of demands are placed upon the writer 
(especially one who is a friend) who writes about another whose work affirms 'the 
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practice of joy before death', a work to which one might give the title of 
thanatography, and a life in which death is, already, 'at work'? 30 
In the few months following the death of Georges Bataille in 1962, Blanchot 
writes two very different, yet interlocking essays: the first called simply 
"L'amitie"; and the other, "L'affinnation et la passion de la pens&e negative". I 
will focus on the former essay, one of his most consummately constructed pieces 
of writing. For reasons that I hope to make clear, it is difficult to say that 
'UamitiC is actually a text written about Bataille; in fact, it is more accurate to 
say that Blanchot comes to write "L'amitie" in the absence of his friend. The 
difficulty of this piece was underlined with its first journal publication, when the 
title was supplemented by a capitalised, underlined heading: 'POUR GEORGES 
BATAILLE'. It strikes one more as an editorial supplement, added for the sake of 
clarification, than as the author's own dedication: first of all, it is erased when the 
essay is republished as the end-piece to Blanchot's collection of the same name; 
and second, because it seems to undermine the entire movement of this piece by 
affixing it to a proper name which is scarcely mentioned in the text. Indeed, 
whether one actually can, or should, read this piece as a eulogy or testimony to the 
life and work of Bataille is a question at the very heart of Blanchot's writing in 
"L'amitie", as it is again in "L'affinnation et la passion". In both pieces, there is 
the staging of a resistance to biography, a discretion when faced with speaking of 
his deceased friend, which seems to structure the impetus and direction of 
Blanchot's thinking. On the one hand, then, Blanchot eschews any claim to be 
talking about Bataille; whilst on the other, Bataille's 'presence' in this piece is 
um-nistakeable. Blanchot begins "L'amitie" by asking how he should begin to 
write of Bataille, whilst his choice of preposition in the opening line of 
"L'affinnation et la passion" accents a reluctance to write about Bataille: 
Permit me, in thinking of Georges Bataille, to think close to an absence, 
rather than claim to set out what everyone should be able to read in his 
books. 31 
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Blanchot states that his aim is to place his own thinking in proximity to, or in the 
vicinity of ['aupres de] the friend who is absent. One might say, for the moment, 
that the name of Bataille persists as a question in both essays. In this way, it 
makes certain demands upon how Blanchot can write "L'amitiF, or how he 
comes to be writing in the name of friendship at all. For it is also this word, 
Tarnitie', that not only links the two pieces to one another, but also to Blanchot's 
work as a whole. Hence, in the course of following the way that Blanchot 
positions himself 'close to an absence', I am particularly interested with the way 
in which he does two things at the same time in "L'amitie". On the one hand, by 
refusing to praise or defend his friend, to divulge secrets in the interest of 
presenting some truth about him, he attempts to communicate the singularity of 
this profound experience of loss; and on the other, in the enactment of this refusal, 
he articulates a thinking of friendship in response to that presented by Bataille in 
La Somme atheologique. 
1.21 -Effacement 
So, if it is difficult to say whether Blanchot's essay is actually about Bataille, can 
one say that it is writtenfor him, or in his memory? From the beginning, this is 
not at all clear, for even with the supplementary heading of 'POUR GEORGES 
BATAILLE% there is already a sense of conflict between the title - "Friendship" - 
and the apparent object of the opening line - 'this friend'. This disparity is retained 
in the 1971 version. Yet Blanchot does not claim to be writing either in the mode 
of the essay ("De FamitiC, for example) or in a more personal mode of a 
reminiscence. An ambiguity remains as to the address of "L'amitie": to what, or to 
whom, is this title directed? If one immediately answers 'Bataille', as did the 
editor who added the supplementary heading, the question reappears as the proper 
name initially is put into question, and by the end completely effaced. Indeed, the 
necessarily conflictual relation between writing on the death of this unique friend 
and the generality of a discourse on friendship as such is at the heart of 
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"L'amitie". This is evident even in the way the opening line is re-written. In 1962, 
Blanchot writes: 
How might I consent to speak of this friend, of the man that he was? 32 
When the essay is republished in LAmitie, this line will read: 
How to consent to speak of this friend? 33 
The passage of time does not by itself account for the rewriting of this line. It 
might be tempting to explain this difference by referring to the completion of a 
work of mouming, where the particularity of the first version - marked by the 
personal register and conditional tense of 'comment j'accepterais de parler', and 
by the temporal specificity of 'Fhomme qu'ilfut' - comes to be replaced by the 
question of the possibility of 'consenting to speak' in general. However, the 
disappearance of the 'I' and the levelling of verb tenses into infinitives - 
4comment accepter de parler... ' - are not necessarily marks of an inevitable 
accession to a level of generality, but perhaps an exacerbation of a tension 
between the deictic and the general already implicit within the first writing. The 
recourse to infinitives can be read as a way of maintaining the opening question in 
the present, to deepen the sense of absence to be faced in such a task. 
This levelling to the infinitive is not the mark of time's removal or erasure 
from the concept, as if friendship was to be apprehended as a purely formal ideal; 
rather, it marks out the persistent presence of a thoroughly temporal event (a 
death) already inscribed within it. In this way, Blanchot's re-writing works to 
unsettle any smooth progression between loss and it's recollection or 
reincorporation in memory. The extent to which this thought bears an essential 
relation to the name of friendship leads inexorably towards a renewed affirmation 
of oblivion and impersonality. In both versions of the text the following lines 
radically dissociate 'this friend' from any possibility of using 'his character', 'his 
life' or 'his existence' to explain the work. All signs of these things are 
obliterated. 
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Neither in order to praise him, nor in the interest of some truth. The traits 
of his character, the forms of his existence, the episodes of his life, even in 
accord with the research for which he felt himself responsible to the point 
of irresponsibility, belong to no-one [n'appartiennent d personne]. There is 
no witness. 34 
Blanchot's immediate concern does not appear to be with providing a definition of 
friendship, nor does it claim to tell us about, or narrate, the events of someone's 
life. Instead, he thernatises the conditions which bring him to write this piece: it is 
written neither as a homage, nor as a critique; and whilst explicitly presenting 
itself as a question of writing about this friend, "L'amitie" does not yet refer to 
Bataille by name. There is only an impersonal designation of a disjunctive relation 
where that which 'belonged' to 'this friend' now belongs to 'no-one'. All of these 
attributes and characteristics no longer belong to someone, to any identifiable 
person. It would be tempting to read this deliberated, double negation as 
obscurantist, as the mark of some ineffable truth in whose name one could lay 
claim to a reserved realm of silence. However, the form of this double negation - 
neither A nor B- is related to the persistent pressure of the opening question: a 
continued re-questioning of friendship itself, whose presentation is henceforth 
marked as the site of an internal conflict (neither homage, nor critique). Indeed, it 
appears that the name of friendship brings with it the presence of conflict, arising 
from the absence of the friend in question: these 'traits', 'forms' or 'episodes' are 
all 'his', yet they all belong to 'no-one'. Who or what does the name of 'this 
friend' now name? The only 'witness', the one who could satisfy any claim to this 
property, this biographical baggage, is absent. In the absence of any 'testimony', it 
belongs solely to this 'anyone' or 'no-one' ['personne']. In this way, friendship 
already is bound up in a relation to that which is impersonal or anonymous, and it 
is with this relation that that friendship comes to be affirmed and articulated 
through forgetting. 
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As a result of the abrupt disappearance of 'this friend', one might conclude 
that to speak of him must involve, as a condition of its possibility, addressing 
onCs remembrance 'to no-one'. But is it the case that, in so far as the first 
paragraph of "L'amitie" seeks to eradicate any possibility of speaking about this 
friend, this lexicon of absence and anonymity is, in fact, an attempt to reserve, 
beyond the reach of biography, the memory of a personal proximity? Whilst this 
strategy would be equivalent to keeping silent, it also entails a mode of fidelity 
that, by speaking in terms of 'no-one' in particular, would attempt to keep back 
the indeterminacy of 'anyone'. What is to be done? To speak or keep silent? It is 
here that the twin poles of refusing and accepting to speak of the friend collapse 
into one another: 'It is in vain that we pretend to maintain, by our words, through 
our writings, that which is absent. ' 35 For Blanchot, such attachment seeks to keep 
the friend in hand ['maintenir'], offering him a 'living' place 'in the day', but 
what this memory forgets is the duplicity of its own project. It is in the very 
'attraction of our memories' that there lies the trap or 'the lure' with which we, the 
living, would hold him to our 'day'. 36 Here, all giving of eulogies, all tributes and 
expressions of debt are implicated: what memory offers is a semblance of life to 
that which disturbs the very order of the living. The attempt to give back to the 
dead that 'prolonged life of a truthful appearance', by being faithful to the truth of 
his memory, is only to bury him all the more completely, to have done with the 
painful thought that remains. What remains is precisely the vaccuum. of 'what is 
absent'. And yet, in writing this, there is always the possibility that by choosing 
not to speak about his friend, Blanchot is seeking to retain a part of this vaccuum, 
for his own. A refusal to speak, which would keep guard over a dedicated silence 
(in the name of friendship, possibly) still marks the author's possibility of 
choosing not to respond to this absence; and more fundamentally, reveals his 
living possibility over it as an expression of his own survival. 
Hence, the refusal 'to speak of this friend', as the choice to withold oneself 
from speaking of him, easily becomes the apparent opposite: an expression of the 
power that the living always hold over the dead, which enables one to speak or not 
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to speak, according to one's will, as if death had finally allowed one to get the 
better of them. It is at this point that the paradox of speaking about the dead is 
revealed in its painful inevitability. In "L'affinnation et la passion", Blanchot 
repeats and extends this thought in an endeavour to avoid those 'epithets' (such as 
I mysticism, 'eroticism', 'atheism') which serve as familiar co-ordinates not only 
for readers of Bataille's work, but also for those who wish to account for the 'life' 
they discern behind it. 
Certainly, as we know, each one of us is menaced by his Golem, a crude 
clay image, our mistaken double, the derisory idol that makes us visible 
and against which, living, we can protest by the discretion of our life; but 
once dead it perpetuates us: how to prevent it from making our 
disappearance, even the most silent, the moment at which, condemned to 
appear, we have to respond precipitately to public interrogation by 
confessing to what we were not? And sometimes it is our closest friends, 
in the good intention of speaking in our place and in order not to abandon 
us too quickly to our absence, who contribute to this benevolent or 
malevolent travesty beneath which, from this moment onwards, we will be 
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But how can one hold off the public tribunal of critics, observers, and readers? 
Blanchot immediately acknowledges that one cannot: 'No, there is no way out for 
the dead, those who die after having written'. 38 How can a life spent writing avoid 
being read in its turn, when the very condition of its reserve - 'the discretion of our 
life' - has receded? Blanchot's response to his own question is not to wish that 
everything could be otherwise, nor to call for a withdrawal into some private 
sphere; rather, it is the realisation and the warning that even the 'most glorious 
posterity' is ultimately indistinguishable from the 'pretentious hell' in which 'all 
of us', every critic, observer, and reader, 'figure as fairly wretched devils'. 39 Even 
friendship fails to provide this protection for the dead, for more often that not it is 
(our closest friends' who contribute to this 'travesty' by trying to speak 'in our 
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place', by trying to set the record straight and secure their friend's reputation. 
Once again, it is an action born of the fear of the absence or void which the friend, 
now dead, represents; and one in which not saying anything also takes its place. 40 
'We' - 'all of us', says Blanchot - are complicit in this trial by opinion, anecdote 
and obituary; and hence, we are all caught within the same double bind of 
speaking/not speaking of our friends. In 'Vamitie", faced with this realisation, 
Blanchot pushes himself and us - note that again it is a question of a 'we' - 
towards a simple observation, in which he discerns a 'truth' to all mourning. 
We only search [, in truthj to fill a void, we do not endure the pain of 
grief. the affirmation of this void. 41 
The ineluctable 'truth' of 'our' relation - which is that of the living - to the such a 
void lies in our desire to 'fill in' or 'compensate for' ['combler'] a deficiency or 
lack, to make up for such an absence by making it present. Any pressure excerted 
by this void is to be extinguished by giving it the presence in memory that it had 
lost in death. Blanchot does not reject this process of mourning, but attempts to 
discern the possibility of another response to the experience of 'grief - an 
affirmation of the void as such. Hence, the naming of an 'affirmation' becomes 
the thought of this relation which is no longer (and perhaps, as we will see, never 
was) a relation of presence. By refusing to speak hastily, or to reserve memory as 
the domain of a privileged and powerful silence, what Blanchot's writing 
4presents' is the thought of a relation that affirms the depth of 'this void'. But 
how? Is it even possible, in so far as the act of affirming such an absence already 
shares in the discursive movement of presence? 
What is affinned, then, is a refusal to stop thinking the question posed in the 
very very first line. From the beginning, this question of how to accept to speak of 
this friend interrupts and postpones the possibility of the memorial measuring up, 
or being proper to the demand of friendship. To affinn the thought of 'this void' 
as such would require an impossibile recognition of its utter absence of meaning. 
It is not a case of a work of remembrance that could actively retrieve some lost - 
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and hence significant - memory. For Blanchot doubts that it is a task for which 
memory could be proper at all, in the face of 'an insignificance so 
disproportionate that we do not have the memory capable of containing it and that 
we would have to slip towards forgetting ourselves in order to bear it'. 42 How is it 
possible to affirm or 'to welcome' such a thought, he asks, when it demands that 
we open 'ourselves' to forgetting, to 'the time of this slippage'? 43 It is this demand 
of forgetting that is affirmed with the thought of 'this void'. All speech, like every 
effort to hold the friend within the protection of memory, only 'veils' the 
movement of forgetting that is already, always underway. This is why the 
affirmation that Blanchot calls for is, in his words, 'unique': 
that everything must be effaced, must efface itself [tout doit s'effacer] and 
that we can remain faithful only by keeping watch over this movement that 
effaces itself, to which something in us that rejects all recollection 
[souvenir] already belongs. 44 
An unease strikes us when we read this injunction, here, in a piece of writing 
whose title seems to announce a reflection on the relation of friendship. What kind 
of relation is being proposed here? A relation with 'that which is absent' is not a 
relation to something which, once written, can be equated with a lack or loss to be 
retrieved through mourning; nor can it be laid to rest and simply put aside. Rather, 
it is the memory of a life that 'belongs to no-one' which, in so far as the past to 
which this absence might be said to belong no longer remains fixed once the 
thought of its representation (its being written), opens us to this temporality of 
4slippage'. It is in the present that we are drawn toward forgetting in a relation of 
vigilance, for it is with our affirmation of forgetting that we aredrawn towards our 
own relation to a shared finitude: the movement 'which effaces itself' puts 'us' 
into relation with the discontinuity which is constitutive of the present - that is, the 
constant interruption of death. 
By affirming this oblivion in terms of 'our' necessary relation to death, 
Blanchot does not draw closer to 'this friend', for there is no lost proximity to be 
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regained. If there is any sense of debt to the friend, it lies in the demand to think 
absence as such, without recourse to a lost presence, by forgetting that which is 
lost. This is perhaps Blanchot's own 'vain' gesture: to maintain a distance in the 
sense of a reserve or discretion, a distance which vanishes with the friend. Has he 
come, therefore, to bury 'this friend' in an act of forgetting which would place 
him deeper than the grave, and to preserve his name more profoundly than the 
tomb of mourning? There is, perhaps, a sense of protective defiance: to preserve 
the singularity of his friend against all those who, already, come to exhume and 
display the truth about Bataille. It could be said that a gap has been opened up 
between 'this friend' and the proper name of Bataille, as if the writer sought to 
rescue the man - or rather, 'the man that he was' - Erom his 'name' or reputation, 
to separate the life from the literature. As we have seen, by the time that this piece 
reappears in 1971, even this reference to 'the man that he was' has been erased. 
No relation, no reference seems to remain between 'this friend' and the proper 
name. Blanchot is unambiguous in his contempt for those who would lay claim to 
an understanding of Bataille's work through a brief glimpse into his biography - 
he writes that his sense of discretion 'does not lie on the simple refusal to reveal 
private details (how vulgar that would be, even to consider it)'. 45 Yet if he seeks to 
undermine the claims made upon Bataille by those who write about him after his 
death - whether they come to criticise or to eulogise, to reveal or to defend the 
'real Bataille' behind the work -, what does he put in their place? 
1.22 - Impersonality 
Literary history presents us with the works of a writer as an 'inheritance'; and as 
such, the seizure of 'what has fallen into heritage' gives this form of history a 
concrete form, 'the moment of the complete works. 46 The possibility of literary 
history - that is, the very 'moment' when the work can be discussed as 'complete' 
- takes place in relation to the singular event of a death. 
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"Everything" has to be published, "everything" has to be said; as though 
there was only one urgency remaining: that everything be said; as if the 
44 everything is said" were finally to allow us to stop a dead speech: to stop 
the pitiful silence which comes from it, and to retain it within a well 
circumscribed horizon that which a questionable posthumous waiting still 
illusively mixes with our living words. 47 
In this haste to speak - that desire to say everything, to leave nothing out, which 
very quickly becomes a desperate need to say anything at all - Blanchot discerns 
the efforts of literary history to incorporate that part of the work which is given as 
'a dead speech', to put an end to that which already comes to us from the end. 
This desire to have done with Bataille, to 'stop', to 'retain', might be read as a 
reluctance to take the responsibility of asking 'how to accept to speak'. In effect, it 
aims to plug the gaps through which that 'pitiful silence' might return to haunt it. 
For when ... everything is said"', there cannot be anything left to say, and one can 
remain secure in the knowledge that it thereby circumscribes. When 'the moment 
of the complete works' comes there can be no more challenge to the work, to the 
idea of what a 'work' might become. The work has arrived at its completion; no 
further work need take place. 
The task of the literary historian is to 'place' Bataille: to document, sift and 
weigh the work as it is assembled into it's definitive shape. What does not seem to 
be required is precisely that which Blanchot identifies as the demand of this work: 
to ask, beyond any simple attribution of epithets like 'scandalous', 'mystical' or 
'a-theological', about the conditions of this judgement. For Blanchot, the central 
concern here is what detennines the possibility of remembrance, and hence the 
very formulation of an 'inheritance' - the relation of the living to the dead. What 
happens between 'a dead speech' ['une parole morte] and 'our living words' 
['nos paroles de vivants']? What is Blanchot asking us to think in this 
4questionable posthumous waiting', which 'still illusively mixes' these two 
worlds, the living and the dead? One might venture that, through this 'illusive' 
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mixture, Blanchot proposes to place 'our living words' as a filter between the 
blind urge of the "'everything is said"' and the disturbing silence of 'a dead 
speech'. What would be at stake in this claim? 
What is at stake is our understanding of the work, it's origin and it's 
constitution. The formulation of the 'complete works' is essentially bound to that 
reaction to 'grief which previously Blanchot had located in the desire to bury the 
'void' under the weighty presence of 'something'. In this way, his argument 
highlights a contradiction that holds up the project of the literary historian or 
biographer: by completing or filling in this void left by 'that which is absent', like 
the mourner who buries grief rather than endure it, the literary historian seeks to 
keep up a familiar and continuous terrain (in the name of 'life', 'art', or 'history'); 
yet such a model of continuity - which is seen as either progressive or static - 
functions only through a discrete series of punctuated events (a death, a work or 
an action). The possibility of such events possessing their own patterns of 
continuity (a dying, working or acting) would not simply invert this model, but 
rather it would complicate it by insisting upon the continuity of the discontinuous. 
This constitution of the event, taking place through an emphasis upon relation and 
its repetition, refuses the possibility of having done with it. Blanchot gradually 
leads us into a thinking which comes to mark the sense of this discretion: the 
quasi-ontological fact that 'we' (already, always) are in the process of removing, 
or effacing ouselves from every relation of presence. This fact of effacement and 
distantiation comes to be thought as constitutive of 'our' relation to the present. 
It is this relation which brings our attention to the reworking of a 'work of 
mouming' in this essay -a work that is itself demanded, as we have already seen, 
by the particular presence of a 'void'. Like Freud's definition of a successful work 
of mourning, literary history can only function in terms of an unquestioned 
completion. In spite of such a clumsy comparison, this centrality of completion 
should not be disregarded: it is the point at which Blanchot reads both conceptions 
of 'the work'. The very concept of a 'work' derives from a determinate relation to 
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an unproblematic, singular event of death. This is not to say that the singularity of 
'this friend' or 'this void' is thereby dissolved. Instead, it is maintained as a 
question. For what is at stake for Blanchot here (as it is throughout his work) is an 
originary non-coincidence of death and its event which removes from death (qua 
event) any possibility of a simple singularity. It is not simply that, like Freud's 
melancholic, Blanchot would refuse to recognise the death of his friend, or even to 
refuse the event of such an absence in the name of a vital presence, which one 
might call 'the mobility of life'. Such 'mobility' matters little to Blanchot. More 
disturbing is the fact that even when 'the one who is close to us' was alive, his 
thinking was only kept open to 'us' through 'the fissure of death', 'the 
unpredictability that the strangeness of the end introduces into his thinking'. 
Blanchot goes on to explain that: 
And this unforeseeable movement, always hidden within its infinite 
imminence - that of dying perhaps - does not derive from the fact that the 
end cannot be given in advance, but from the fact that it never constitutes 
an event that happens [arrive], even when it occurs [survient], and is 
never a reality capable of being grasped: ungraspable and maintaining to 
the end within the ungraspable the one who is destined for it. 48 
Finitude and communication are held together as 'this very relation, as an 
excessive movement between the words of the dead and the living where it is only 
the silent pressure of the dead which 'preserves' the space of opening for the latter 
to think. 
I[... ] know that, in his books, Georges Bataille seems to speak of himself 
with an uninhibited freedom which should free us from all discretion - but 
which does not give us the right to put ourselves in his place, nor give us 
the power to speak in his absence. And is it certain that he speaks of 
himself [de Soi] ? 49 
Hence, it is 'this presence without anybody' which is always 'at stake', as the 
unsettling presence of an essential self-effacement in Bataille's writings - 
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recurring within his most 'personal' writings, even within 'the existence of the 
man who was able to decide to speak of it'. Just as the power of 'preservation' is 
determined by that which already introduces 'unpredictability' into that thinking - 
that is, 'the strangeness of the end' where memory only emerges through the co- 
presence of forgetting - so this 'enigmatic relation' pertains to the opening of 'a 
lacuna' where any biography, or any claim to be speaking in the place of Bataille 
only finds that it cannot locate such a place. The '1' has already become 'Who? ' 
1.23 - Separation 
Now stripped of any unproblematic biographical subject, it is only in the third and 
final section of his essay that Blanchot makes any explicit reference to a 
conceptual formulation of friendship. If his opening question, 'How to consent to 
speak of ... T, 
has informed the first two sections of this piece as a way of holding 
open, even accentuating, the tension or pressure of marking the singularity of 'this 
friend', then this pressure comes to a head in the last section of the essay. Here, 
Blanchot does not so much give a definition of what friendship is, as draw us into 
the space of a 'movement' in which he sketches what is at stake within one's 
relation to a friend. 
Friendship, this relation without dependence, passes through the 
recognition of common strangeness which does not allow us to speak of 
our friends, but only to talk to them, not to make them into a theme of 
conversations (or articles), but the movement of understanding in which, 
speaking to us, they reserve, even within the greatest familiarity, infinite 
distance, this fundamental separation on the basis of which that which 
separates becomes relation. 50 
When we read Blanchot's thematisation of his refusal to thematise the name of 
Bataille, it also becomes evident that he has done nothing but speak around the 
name of Bataille throughout his essay, in an effort to remain, discreetly, in the 
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vicinity of his thought. But what distinguishes making one's friends into 'a theme' 
for discussion from making of them 'the movement of understanding', thereby 
justifying the latter in Blanchot's eyes? This movement is designated as where our 
friends speak to 'us', all the while maintaining or reserving an 'infinite distance'. 
This separation-relation is always there, as a moment of reserve, amongst even the 
most familiar friends; as if Blanchot was tracing out a genesis of friendship (as the 
conversion from 'being-separate' to a form of 'being-in-relation'). It is therefore 
only in terms of separation that Blanchot discerns any relation at all. Does such a 
form of separation therefore of itself give rise to the 'becoming-relation' of 'that 
which separates'? How is a process of putting space between objects, or friends, to 
be converted into what will essentially come to bridge that 'gap'? Here, neither 
separation nor relation admit of easy resolution. In other words, there is something 
about 'this separation', whatever makes it 'fundamental', that conditions the 
process or work of 'that which separates' to become other than what it's action 
denotes; yet it does not become 'that which relates', but rather it 'becomes 
relation'. It is separation itself that becomes relation. It is not transformed into its 
opposite action: it already is the constitutive process of relation. Blanchot adds: 
'That which separates: that which authentically puts into relation, the very abyss 
of relations in which is held, with simplicity, the understanding always maintained 
in friendly affirmation' .51 This authenticity of relation, this movement whereby 
separation is already a becoming-relation is named by Blanchot's qualification 
and repetition of 'discretion'. 
However,, in the midst of Blanchot's compact, complex formulations, surely it 
is incumbent upon us to ask whether this care and discretion is not wholly 
inappropriate to the reading or remembering of Bataille, the very Bataille whose 
work bears witness to the virulence of a self-examination carried to the extreme, a 
thinker whose work seems to demand 'loyalty' least of all. 
52 Should not Blanchot 
feel (to quote Bataille) 'free from all discretion'? What has happened to this word 
'discretion'? Does it signify anything more than the retention of a sense of 
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6propriety' and 'reserve' which Bataille's own work, as it is often claimed, derides 
and destroys? How, then, should we read Blanchot's 'discretion' - as fidelity or 
betrayal? 
Blanchot defines discretion as 'the pure interval which, from myself to this 
other who is a friend, measures everything that there is between us', which also 
means, as he goes on to add, that 'discretion becomes, at a certain moment, the 
fissure of death. ' 53 This relation is ultimately, intimately connected to the way in 
which Blanchot thinks about the event of death, especially in the articulation of 
memory and forgetting in mourning the death of the other. Hence, it is as much 
the way that Blanchot names or presents 'friendship' that is central to his attempt 
to think the emergence and sustenance of this event or this relation in the very 
process of its happening or relating. And alongside this attention to the act of 
naming, and the process of maintaining relation inherent to it, something like an 
ontology has begun to emerge in his work; or an interruption of ontology, an 
ontology of interruption. The presence of questions concerning time, event, 
memory and identity have all indicated this direction, but it is with the doubling of 
sense inherent to the presentation of discretion that this experience can be 
introduced as a central figure within his thinking as a whole: the experience of 
discontinuity. 
It is not surprising that discretion should be central to the presentation of 
friendship. As a mode of conduct or behaviour it could be ascribed to the general 
tone of this essay, a strategic tone nonetheless bearing the mark of circumspection 
and discernment, even a certain prudence. However, as has been observed, 
Blanchot has been quick to mark discretion down as something other than a mere 
reluctance to part with personal insights or secrets. Discretion pertains to 
friendship in its deployment as that movement of distancing which comes to put 
into question the fonnulation of any relation, even that of familiarity or proximity, 
between friends. It pertains to this co-presence of separation and relation with the 
pressure of a specificity -a presence that is in some way insistent, trans- formative, 
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at work - which Blanchot tries to mark as such in order to remove it, rethink and 
relocate it. 
Here, discretion does not lie in the simple refusal to reveal private details 
(how gross that would be even to consider it), but it is the interval, the pure 
interval which, from myself to this other person who is a friend, measures 
all that there is between us, the interruption of being which never 
authorises me to do what I choose with him, or my knowledge of him 
(even in order to praise him), and which, far from preventing all 
communication, relates us to one another in the difference and sometimes 
54 the silence of speech . 
In other words, what Blanchot calls discretion is not merely the conduct of being 
discreet with respect to one's friends; rather, it is a more fundamental expression 
of how one's difference from the friend can be measured as discrete,, as the 
singular being that he or she is. Hence, there may be a relation of discretion 
between friends, but it is discretion in the (mathematical) sense of discontinuity 
and separation which gives friends the very possibility of this 'between' which 
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puts them into relation as such . This is not to conclude that with discretion we 
have unearthed the transcendental condition of possibility for all relations of 
communication or knowledge. It would be more approriate to attempt to trace the 
way in which, for Blanchot, discretion becomes a process or 'work' that names the 
very operation to which it is itself subject. While it's work is to make discrete, to 
distinguish and mark out what is singular, it is nevertheless discreet in this work. 56 
Discretion 'works' in a movement of doubling itself. 
What at first seems to be a contradiction in fact has turned upon a more 
interesting problem of writing about or to the dead. Instead of talking about 
Bataille, Blanchot speaks to him; instead of discussing the importance of his 
work, he takes a word that flows through that work and re-works or re-directs it. 
Blanchot's reticence to mourn or celebrate the death of his friend cannot be 
reduced to a question of fidelity or betrayal - nor their dialectical inversions -; 
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instead, it should be read as an enactment of this 'discretion', which takes place by 
way of a response to Bataille's own thinking of friendship. For Blanchot, then, to 
write in the name of 'friendship' does not mean simply to recount an event, a 
meeting or encounter. On the contrary, it is precisely the effect of this manner of 
accounting, or 'rapporter', for one's rapport to the friend that is under suspicion 
in "L'amiti&". This is why the heading of 'FOR GEORGES BATAILLE' cannot 
be the work of the one who writes this piece: it flattens out the carefully wrought 
expression of the condition of this relation as such. Yet it is not possible to 
divorce the idea of ftiendship from the fact of an encounter, a shared experience: 
everything in that text from 1962 hinges around the thought of an event or an 
encounter through which a relation between friends can emerge: 'that which 
separates becomes relation'. It is, after all, in the wake of Bataille's death that 
Blanchot writes 'UamitiC, even if he does not write it for or about him. 
57 
Notes to Chapter 1 
1 "L'amitiF, AM, 330; FS, 292. 
2, Les Rencontres", in Le Nouvel observateur, 1045, hors s6r1e, November 1984,84. 
3 Excerpt from a letter to Bernard-Henri Uvy, dated 15th Spetember 1989, in Bernard- 
Henri Uvy, Les Aventures de la liberte, Paris, Bernard Grasset, 1991,3 11. 
4 Bataille, from a "fragment d'une notice autobiographique", VI, 486, 
5 Klossowski, 'De <<Contre-Attaque)) a <<Ac6phale))', in Change 7. - Le groupe la rupture 
(Editions de Seuil, 1970), 107, See also Pierre Prevost, Rencontre Georges Bataille, 
Paris, Editions Jean Michel Place, 1987, passim; and Michel Surya, Georges Bataille, 
la mort ti Voeuvre, Paris, Gallimard, 1992,378-84. 
6 Surya, Georges Bataille, la mort Li Voeuvre, op. cit., 379-80. 
7 Ibid., 381. 
8 Elý 301. It is in the context of this refusal of biography that it is possible to discern a 
preliminary force to the question of friendship, where it renders its very presentation as 
questionable - 'Where does this need to look for the true or the real [le vrai] only at the 
level of anecdote and through a false picturesque come fromT 
9 Ibid. 
10 #27 1. 
11 See Georges Bataille, Choix de lettres, 
GalliMard, 1997,592, 
1917-1962, edited by Michel Surya, Pans: 
12 #309. 
13 #284. The importance of this phrase, 'une amitie inqui6te', will become clear in the 
context of Blanchot's reading of Hegel. See the extended analysis of this reading in 
Chapter 4, below. 
14 Compare this letter with "L'entretien infini", the 'conversation' which prefaces the 
book of the same title, in EI, ix-xxvi. 
15 Surya, Georges Bataille, la mortei Voeuvre, op. cit., 282. 
16 Clý 43, emphasis added. 
17 Ibid., 45. 
18 The phrase is Bataille's, from his "Avant-propos" to the first publication of Le Bleu 
du ciel, Paris: Gallimard, 1979 [Jean-Jacques Pauvert, 19571,13. Here Bataille sets out 
to account for the 22 year delay in the publication of his 'recit', adding that: 
I am today far from the state of mind from which the book emerged; but in the end 
with this reason, decisive in its time, no longer applying, I leave the matter to the 
judgment of myfriends. 
19 Blanchot, 'Voubli, la dýraison", EI, 299. 
58 
20 Bataille, "Silence et litt6rature", XII, 173-4, The question of the way in which 
Bataille links 'friendship' to the name of Blanchot In his own work will be pursued in 
Chapter 2. 
21 #262. 
22 El, 46-69. It is possible to trace this double movement to Blanchot's that which 
negates in order to know and communicate, and that which affirms the silent and the 
unknown: the 'two slopes [deux versants]' of literary language, in "La litterature et le 
drolt ý la mort", PF, 291-331,318-9. The questions already raised by such repetition 
and transformation of vocabulary will become central to exploring the resonances 
between these texts and those which name or respond to friendship. 
23 Taken from one of Blanchot's preliminary documents (written around 1959-60? ) 'in 
circulation' for the planned, yet never realised project of a Revue internationale. Later 
published in a special issue of Lignes, n. 11, September 1990,79-91,183, emphasis 
added. 
24 See Bataille, "Lettre sur les incompatibilit6s de 1'6crivain", XII, 16-28. A response to 
an 'open letter' from Char, "Y a-t-11 des incompatibilit6s? ", reprinted in Recherche de 
la base et du sommet, Paris: Gallinlard, 1971,41-2. This exchange, at least, helps us to 
date Blanchot's letter to around 1950-1. 
25 EI, 68-9. 
26 , La pensee et 1'exigence de discontinuite" (1963), EI, 1- 11,9. 
27 Ibid. 
28 It is here that Blanchot's concern with the singularity of a friendship can be related to 
a problem internal to the conditions of language, that of deixis. The conflictual 
requirements of the universal and the deictic utterance - one that relates to its own time 
and place (through the use of demonstrative pronouns or adverbs, such as 'this friend', 
for example) - will be seen to be exascerbated in Blanchot's working through of 
singularity. 
" La Somme athýologique comprises three individual works originally written between 
1939 and 1944 - Le Coupable (1.944); LExpirience int6rieure(1943); Sur Nietzsche, la 
volontý de chance (1945). The first two are collected in volume V, and the third in 
volume VI of Bataille's Oeuvres compl&es (Paris, Gallimard, both volumes 1973). The 
role of friendship in this work will be discussed in Chapter 2, below. 
" The two biographies of Bataille currently available both draw upon this 
preoccupation with death in Bataille's life and work: Michel Surya's Georges Bataille, 
la mortei Voeuvre (Paris, Gallimard, 1987); and Bernd Mattheus' two-volume Georges 
Bataille. Eine Thanatographie (Miinchen, Matthes und Seitz Verlag, 1984 [11,1988 
[11]. For a useful discussion of these two works, which f6cusses on precisely this 
question, see Gilles Ernst, "Georges Bataille: position des oreflets>> (ou Vimpossible 
biographle)", in Revue des Sciences Humaines, vol. LXXXXVIII, n. 224 (October- 
December 199 1), pp. 105-25. 
31 "L'affinnation et ]a passion de la pens6e n6gative" (1962), in EI, 300-13,300; IC, 
202-11,202, emphasis added. 
32 Am, 7. 
59 
" AM, 326; FS, 289. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 EI, 301; IC, 203, translation modified. 
38 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. This question of friendship and betrayal is central to Bataille's thinking of 
6complicit friendship'. 
41 Am ý 326; FS, 289; Am, 7. The parentheses indicate a phrase missing from the 1971 
version of the text. 
42 Am 9 326; FS, 289. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Am 
9 328; FS, 291, translation modified. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Am 
9 327; FS, 290, translation modified. 
49Am, 9. AM, 327. 
AM, 328; FS, 291, translation modified. 
AM, 329; FS, 292, translation modified. 
'2After all, it is Bataille who writes, in Le coupable - 'I don't propose justice. I bring 
complicit friendship. '; 'The saint's friendship is a confidence, a faith knowing itself 
betrayed. It is the friendship that man has for himself, knowing that he will die, 
knowing that he can become intoxicated with dying. ' Oeuvres compl&es, tome V 
(Paris, GalliMard, 1973), p. 278. For a criticism of Blanchot's 'strategy' of discretion, 
see Jane Gallop, "Reading Friend's Corpses", MLN, vol. 95,1017-1022. 
53 Am, 328-9; FS, 291, translation modified. 
54 AM, 328-9; FS, 291, translation modified. 
55 The doubling of the discreet/discrete is rendered without such immediately apparent 
differences in the French language where the adjective 'discret' or 'discr&te' serves to 
convey both the notion of restraint or the unobtrusive and the function of discontinuity 
or separation. As a point of note, this ambiguity can be traced to its Latin root of 
discr6tus, from discern6re, to separate or to perceive. Etymology aside, it is evident 
that discretion enables Blanchot to re-work friendship into more general questions of 
judgment and the possibility of criticism itself 
60 
56 We will return to this double movement in the final chapter, in which we will relate 
this reading of 'UamitiC to Blanchot's practice of the 'work of an accompanying 
discourse'; see Section 4.1, below. 
61 
Chapter 2 
Friendship as complicity: Bataille's I'L'Amitie" (1940) 
My complicitftiendship. - this is all that my temperament brings 
to other men. 
Georges Bataille 1 
The previous chapter demonstrated that, for Blanchot, to write in the name of 
friendship does not mean simply to account for an empirical event, a meeting or 
encounter. On the contrary, it is precisely the effect of this manner of accounting, 
or 'rapportant', for one's relation to the friend that is under suspicion in 
'T'amitiC. This is why the editorial addition of the phrase "pour Georges 
Bataille" seems to trample over the careful thinking of relation expressed therein. 
Yet it is not possible to divorce the idea of friendship from the fact of an 
encounter, a shared experience: everything in that text from 1962 hinges around 
the thought of an event or an encounter through which a relation between friends 
can emerge: 'that which separates becomes relation'. It is, after all, in the wake of 
Bataille's death that Blanchot writes "L'amitie", whether or not he writes itfor 
him. 
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Blanchot defines discretion as 'the pure interval which, from myself to this 
other who is a friend, measures everything that there is between us; which also 
means that 'discretion becomes, at a certain moment, the fissure of death. ' 2 If we 
have been able to conclude that this relation or encounter is intimately connected 
to the way in which Blanchot thinks about the event of death, especially in the 
articulation of memory and forgetting in mourning the death of the other, we still 
do not know what manner or what concept of experience is being called for. The 
very way in which Blanchot names and deploys the term "friendship", through the 
complexities and problems inherent in it, is central to his attempt to think the 
emergence and sustenance of this event or this relation in the very process of its 
'happening' or 'relating'. Alongside this attention to the name, and the process of 
maintaining relation inherent to it, something like an ontology - it's interruption; 
or better, an ontology conceived on the basis of interruption - has begun to emerge 
in his work. Questions of time, memory and identity have all indicated this 
direction, which we have found to be linked to a doubling in the word, discretion. 
It is the presentation of discretion as the very condition for. the experience of 
friendship that allows this it to be seep into the heart of his work. However, before 
we can follow this figure through Blanchot's work, we need to be able to answer a 
number of questions about his relation to Bataille. What does this complex and 
rather elliptical approach to thinking about friendship have to do with the work of 
Georges Bataille? Is there any continuity or shared space in common between 
them? Why does Blanchot insist upon bringing us back to Bataille, his friend, if 
he is so keen to distance his reflections upon friendship from the grasp of the 
biography and the complete works? It is because this desire is impossible to 
achieve. And by tracing this path, following Blanchot back to Bataille, we are 
always in danger of falling prey to those problems which he diagnoses. 
This chapter accounts for the role and importance of friendship in Bataille's 
oeuvre, specifically those texts which go to make up La Somme atheologique, 
focussing in particular upon a short piece called "L'Amitie" (published 
pseudonymously in April 1940) which Bataille will come to characterise as the 
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guiding thread of that work. Therefore, while the method of carefully working 
through a single text will be similar to that employed in the first chapter insofar as 
it attempts to respond to its difficulty and singularity by remaining immanent to it, 
it will become clear that the singular qualities of "L'AmitiC which mark it out 
from Blanchot's 'UamitiC introduce us to some essential, and sometimes quite 
subtle, differences between Bataille and Blanchot around the problems raised by 
figuring relation, by the operation of sacrifice, by the response to determinate 
negativity, and consequently by their respective relations to philosophy and 
tradition. These similarities and differences in thinking are not only recognised by 
Blanchot in his letter to Bataille,, and negotiated in his presentation of Bataille in 
"L'amitie" and "L'affinnation et la passion de la pensee negative", they also run 
throughout La Somme atheologique. 3 Bataille's work as a whole is characterised 
by a conceptual tension in which opposing terms pull against each other and their 
own accepted meanings. Nowhere is this tension and internal conflict more 
apparent than in "L'Amitie". 
2.1 - An 'impossible' friendship 
The relation of "L'Amitie" to La Somme atheologique is a complex one. Strictly 
speaking, in fact, "L'Amitie" is not a part of this 'ensemble', although 
"L'AMITIE" does appear as the heading for the second part when Bataille first 
gave the 'general title' of La Somme atheologique in 1950; 4 and it survives, 
altered and supplemented extensively, as the opening section of Le Coupable. La 
Somme atheologique as a whole is traversed by a great variety of themes, images 
and concepts, often changing over the years of composition (1939-44), and 
certainly undergoing varying degrees of modification during Bataille's constant 
reorganisation and republication of the volumes up until his death. How does 
Bataille's thinking of friendship emerge from out of these themes and the 
conceptual apparatus at work in this 'ensemble'? What runs between "L'Amitie" 
and the other texts which comprise La Somme atheologique is the figure of this 
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communicating thread itself, 'un fil conducteur', or what Bataille himself refers to 
in Le Coupable as 'un fil d'Ariane': 
Like Ariadne's thread these notes link me to my fellow beings [mes 
semblables] and what is left appears to me vain. Yet I could not read them 
to any of my friends. Hence, I have the impression of writing from inside 
the tomb. I would like for them to be published when I will be dead, but it 
is possible that I will live for quite a while, and that publication would 
happen in my lifetime. I suffer at this idea. 5 
The paradoxical nature of this 'thread' - which can 'link' the one who writes to 
others, to his 'semblables', only by removing him from their company - highlights 
Bataille's emphatic and ecstatic formulation of communication,, which runs 
through his central "concepts" of sovereignty, sacrifice and the sacred, and thus 
introduces key themes such as continuity-discontinuity, completion-incompletion, 
possibility-impossibility, rapture-closure. We can find these "themes" and 
"concepts" running through the movement of thought presented in "L'Amitie" and 
then throughout La Somme atheologique. They do not emerge in this short text ex 
nihilo; they can be found already at work in Bataille's pre-war writings, elements 
and passages from which sometimes reappear in the texts which actually comprise 
La Somme atheologique. 6 But this antecedence by no means diminishes the claim 
being made here for the publication of "L'Amitie" in 1940: it marks the 
emergence of a particular use of the word, 'friendship', within Bataille's work. 
Thus, the object of this second chapter is to determine the place, function and 
relative importance of friendship within Bataille's thinking; keeping in mind not 
only the difficult rigour of Blanchot's presentation of "L'amitie", but also series 
of elliptical references to Bataille and friendship in LEntretien infini. How then 
should we approach Bataille's "L'Amitie"? A number of aspects of this text need 
to be explained. It forms part of a 'journal' from which Le Coupable is formed 
('frorn September 1939 to the summer of 1943'). Therefore, if Bataille, in his 
priere d'inserer to the second edition (1961), calls Le Coupable 'the narrative 
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[recit] of a paradoxical "mystical" experience' (V, 493), it would seem that 
"L'Amitie" itself can be thought of in this way. Yet we might also say that it 
marks the beginning of a more or less continuous journal which Bataille 
maintained during the years of the second world war. This begins with opening 
phrase of Le Coupable: 
The date that I begin to write (5 September 1939) is not a coincidence. I 
am beginning because of events, but not in order to speak about them. 7 
,8 It finishes in the third part of Sur Nietzsche, "Journal: February-August 1944' . 
The journal spans the period from the beginning of the war to the liberation of 
France. The continuity of La Somme atheologique as a work lies in this forin of 
writing. 9 It is a form which he seems to have maintained form with some assiduity 
for dates and times are consistently noted in the original manuscripts, even if 
"L'AmitiC is published without dating. 10 Moreover, there is no strict 
chronological continuity between the three volumes. Yet Bataille conceives of La 
Somme atheologique as a collective whole. This 'ensemble' is planned and 
redrafted as a systematic presentation of his thought, albeit one which never 
comes to rest and only attains a definitive form in the year before his death. " How 
should we understand this work as a whole or 'somme'? "L'Amitie" is never 
simply a part of this whole. Bataille does not sees it as subsumed and taken up 
into Le Coupable; rather, there is the sense that the pseudonymous text from 1940 
holds a singular relation with "La Somme atheologique". In the proofs to the first 
edition of LExperience interieure Bataille planned to include passages from 
"L'Amitie" following the reworked versions of "Le labyrinthe" and "La 
communication"; it clearly has a mediating role between these texts from the early 
1930's and his work during the war. Bataille states that 'I introduced what 
preceded above all as an - indirect - description of "states of ecstasy" which I had 
reached. Dianus, in "L'Amitie" makes visible [rend sensible] the links of what 
went before to inner experience. ' 
12 It is in this sense that "L'Amitie" is not written 
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as an introduction or as a preface to La Somme atheologique, but represents 
something like a guiding thread through it's labyrinthine structure. 
"L'Amitie" was published in the journal Mesures (15 April 1940) under the 
pseudonym of Dianus, borrowed from J. G. Frazer's The Golden Bough. 13 In light 
of what we have learned about the form and construction of "La Somme 
ath&logique, it should be emphasised that Bataille sees each of his books as a 
composite entity, each one in turn composing a part of a larger 'ensemble'. And of 
all the "parts" that comprised, at various times, La Somme ath&logique, it seems 
that "L'Amitie" gave Bataille the greatest trouble and anxiety. Blanchot notes this 
fluidity of organisation, and Bataille's unrest, in a note to LEspace litteraire: 
when today Georges Bataille gives the title of Somme atheologique to a 
part of his work, he invites us not to read these words in the tranquility of 
their obvious meaning. 14 
The 'whole' (La Somme ... 
) is not whole. And "L'Amitie" cannot be a 'part' of it. 
It represents both an end and a beginning in his work: he explains that the first 
pages of Le Coupable were written in the midst of his abandonment of a project to 
found a religion, 'at least under a paradoxical form'. 15 "L'Amitie" represents the 
opening blow of an attempt to 'give an account, at the same time, of the error and 
the value of this monstrous intention. ' Yet this account is not simply a refutation, 
nor a rejection of any thought of projects or systems; rather it is presented quite 
differently as the very 'impossibility of a project' -a far more paradoxical 
situation which begins to emerge 'from the instant when everything is at stake'. 
The ambiguous quality that this situation attributes to "L'Amitie" is evident in the 
fact that Bataille immediately evokes its 'religious character', or rather, 'in a 
paradoxical sense, sacred'. All in all this state of affairs is what made it much 
more 'difficult' for him 'to publish as the other books'. However, far ftom 
separating this text from the others, it is this quality of being 'sacred' that ensures 
the centrality of "L'Amitie" to the structure of La Somme atheologique. The 
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former seems to have focussed and condensed the singular qualities which Bataille 
would attribute to his work. It exemplifies what is unique to that work: 
I insist [ ... ] on the fact that La Somme atheologique differs completely 
from other books, and that it entirely differs from them in the same way as 
"L'Amitie" does. 16 
These comments are not, however, the final, authorial judgment on the relation 
between "L'Arnitie" and La Somme ath6ologique: what they give us is an initial 
orientation within the various, yet unified works contained within two volumes of 
his Oeuvres compMtes. This is Bataille's idea of a sacred or sovereign project. In 
the reading of "L'Amitie" which follows we will draw out the way in which he 
presents the sacred, or 'the sovereign operation', in terms of the interarticulation 
of sacrifice and communication. The term which allows for this relation is 
complicity, which places the question of friendship at the core of his thinking. 
2 11 -Sacrifice 
In his quite remarkable book on Bataille Denis Hollier links the the appearance of 
"L'Amitie" to a rare 'suicidal tone' in Bataille's life and work. 17 He supports this 
statement with a contemporaneous unpublished note: 'All that is left for me is to 
die. "8 Hollier then goes on to point out that this feeling is 'certainly not unrelated 
to the chosen pseudonym, so tracing the name of Dianus (linked to Janus) to the 
links between Frazer's theory of primitive kingship and Bataille's concern with 
sovereignty. The rule of the criminal as "king of the woods" is 'limited to waiting 
for death'. This phrase is reminiscent of the first lines to "L'Amitie": 
Love gnaws away at my core and no other way out remains for me than a 
rapid death. What I await is a response in the obscurity in which I am. 19 
It is not clear that Bataille, or 'Dianus', is discussing the act of suicide - let alone 
contemplating it. Is there a necessarily suicidal tone in the idea of waiting for 
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death? If we are to read "L'Amitie" as the notes of a man who 'wrote them and 
then died% then we are reading the journal of one who knows he will be 
sacrificed: ' 
One day, I will stop becoming tragic and I will die: it is this day alone, 
because I have placed myself in its harsh light in advance, which gives its 
meaning to what I am. I have no other hope. 20 
The question of whether it is 'Dianus' who 'expects' or 'awaits' sacrifice, or 
whether it is 'Bataille' who wishes to commit suicide, is not the main concern 
here. Rather, what matters is the relation to death and to dying that permeates 
"L"Amitie", and indeed all of Bataille's work. In SurNietzsche, for example, 
Bataille depicts the act of suicide in contradistinction to that of sacrifice. He 
argues that if suicide is driven by a desire to reach the 'summit' of death, it is 
inevitably characterised by a 'will to act' which, by definition, misses the severity 
of sacrifice. 
[Suicide is] presented to me as an enterprise demanding - certainly with a 
disarming pretension - that I place the concern for future time before that 
21 
of the present moment . 
Even suicide represents a 'project' whose results and effects are planned, 
calculated and envisaged before it can be undertaken. It is a resolutely intentional 
act. This economy of recuperating (in the future) what has been lost (in the 
present) is the constant target of Bataille's venom throughout La Somme 
atheologique. It is part of the temporal specificity of what Bataille calls "sacrifice" 
that it needs to be differentiated from any form of death capable yielding 
satisfaction. As we begin to read "L'Amitie" in relation to La Somme 
atheologique we will pay attention to the way(s) in which sacrifice is constituted 
and constitutive for Bataille; although the processes of constitution and 
composition will always be linked to the forces and drives of de-composition and 
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destruction, not least because the forni of sacrifice would contest precisely that 
'self' or 'soi' which is required for any act of 'sui-cide' to be possible. 
Let us turn now to read Bataille's "L'Amitie" for ourselves, taking care to 
follow the unfolding of his 'argument' in order not to ignore what Blanchot refers 
to as Bataille's invitation 'not to read these words in the tranquility of their 
obvious meaning'. The opening paragraph runs as follows: 
I have hoped for the heavens to tear apart [la dechirure du ciel] (the 
moment when the intelligible order of known - and yet foreign - objects 
gives way to a presence which is no more intelligible than it is heartfelt). I 
hoped for it but the heavens did not open. There is something insoluble in 
this waiting of a beast of prey huddled up and gnawed by hunger. The 
absurdity: "Is it God that you wish to tear apart? " As if I really was some 
beast of prey, but I am sicker still. For I laugh at my own hunger. I don't 
want to eat anything: I should be eaten instead. Love gnaws away at my 
core and no other way out remains for me than a rapid death. What I await 
is a response in the obscurity in which I am. Perhaps, instead of being 
crushed, I might remain like a forgotten scrap! No response to this 
exhausting agitation: everything remains void. Whereas if.. but I do not 
have God to supplicate. 22 
This 'waiting of a beast of prey' does not simply mark the reduction of man to a 
state of animality, nor is it the attaim-nent of animality through the heightening of 
man. In short, it cannot be accounted for by any narrative such as the revelation 
and consequent burden of an inescapable absurdity of existence, or potential 
suicide. Rather, this passage conveys an image. It is the comic failure of the 
suicide, whose "sickness" cannot help but exceed the condition of a starving beast 
of prey precisely because his own situation - the mortal need for sustinence or 
satisfaction - becomes the source of laughter for him. The mere fact of man's 
absurdity is no longer enough to bring him to despair, and suicide will have 
always been still too far ahead for Bataille: his sickness not only exceeds that of a 
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real beast of prey, it does so through the very fact of his insufficiency. He does not 
claim any ontological superiority over the animal, but the prospect of his own 
destruction transforms him precisely insofar as he fails to reach this death. In this 
"failure" something like a lack of sufficiency or satisfaction -a state of 
incompletion - is revealed to man as essential to his being human. The authenticity 
of man lies in his insufficiency or dissatisfaction. 
The development of this idea of dissatisfaction during the first section of 
VAmitie' is clearly forms a response to the philosophy of Hegel. Bataille's use 
of Va d&hirure' here draws upon the standard French translation by Jean 
Hyppolite. It refers to this famous passage from the "Preface" to the 
Phenomenology of Spirit: 
Uesprit conquiert sa verite seulement a condition de se retrouver soi- 
meme dans Fabsolu dechirement. 
Spirit wins its truth only on condition of finding itself again in utter 
23 dismembennent [Zerissenheit] . 
This idea of undergoing a necessary 'd6chirement', a 'tearing apart' or 
'dismemberment' which Hegel called 'Zerissenheit', is the central to the process 
of becoming (the experience of consciousness) in which Spirit is engaged in the 
Phenomenology, and as such it functions as the figure for the operation of 
determinate negation. At this point it is enough to note that Bataille, following 
Alexandre Kojeve (whose lectures had had such an impact upon him during the 
1930's), takes the 'dechirement' of death as his base level: a 'searing vision [une 
vision dechirante] of the unintelligible'. 24 The way in which Bataille reads and 
elaborates upon this word comes to form the crux of his challenge to Hegel. If the 
unfolding experiential development of consciousness is so essentially linked, as 
Spirit, to the determining operation of a terminus ad quem, then the manner of 
one's comportment in the face of death - the very question of the experience of 
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death and its possibility - must be central. Bataille states this claim without any 
ambiguity: 
The sole element which introduces existence into the universe is death; 
when a man represents it to himself, he ceases to belong to rooms, to close 
relations: he is part of the free play of worlds. 25 
Death opens up the field of existence, and as such it exposes 'man' to the 
possibilities of freedom. 26 However, Bataille immediately indicates two possible 
relations to death. Both possibilities address death as something unavoidable yet 
4 unintelligible'; and consequently, both yield a view or 'vision' of that which is 
supposedly unrepresen table. In the first, death is presented alongside or rather 
through the 'reassuring perspective of theology', which seeks to reconcile the 
living "viewer" with his disturbing vision by promising the seduction of another 
'life' (salvation) In the second, there is a vision that brings him into contact with 
the absence of any 'response' whatsoever. There is no reconciliation with the fact 
of his own death: this 'vision' is directly linked to man's perception of his 
'abandonment' in a world without salvation. 
What is the importance of this distinction between a theological world which 
offers the hope for salvation and a world that seems only to deliver one from any 
possibility of repose? It might be claimed that Bataille still retains certain 
elements of a theological discourse in the articulation of this suspension of 
solution: the consuming effect of love; a "vision" which sets itself beyond the 
grasp of comprehension and intelligibility; the transfortnative operation of death. 
However, the rejection of all supplication, and therefore all possibility of salvation 
('Whereas if.. but I do not have God to supplicate. ') does not resultfrom the any 
absence or lack of response to his hope. It produces it, even exascerbates it. 
For if, in the last instance, there exists some immutable satisfaction, why 
have I rejected it? But I know that satisfaction does not satisfy and that 
man's glory draws upon his consciousness of not knowing anything higher 
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than glory and dissatisfaction. [ ... ] Joy and 
love, a relaxed freedom is 
bound within me to the hatred of satisfaction. 27 
Thus, the one who sees only the former thinks he or she will be satisfied (in the 
future); the one who only perceives the latter knows that it never can be. Yet if the 
first 'vision' is obviously a depiction of the satisfactions of theology, where does 
Bataille's irrepressible dissatisaction lead him if not toward melancholia? This 
hostility toward theology marks the origin of Bataille's description of what he 
calls, in "L'Amitie", 'un anthropomorphisme dechirC, an anthropomorphism 
which has been 'shredded' or 'torn apart'. 28 What are the conditions and 
consequences of this 'dechirement' at the heart of 'Man'? 
But it is always a matter of an incomplete discovery [une d6couverte 
inachevee]. When he dies, a man leaves behind him survivors condemned 
to ruin what he believed, to profane that which he venerated. I teach that 
the universe is such but, sure enough, those who follow me will perceive 
29 my error. 
Bataille will characterise this difference in terms of a profane, theological world 
and a sacred, atheological one. In this way, he is already setting out to distance 
himself from any charges of negative theology or atheistic nostalgia. This 
distantiation can be seen in the impulse of an expectant desire for 'la dechirure du 
ciel': an impulse that seems to carve out and feed upon its own 'dissatisfaction'. 
But will not this fact of dissatisfaction inevitably uncover another, deeper, desire 
to be satisfied, to be saved? The answer to this question takes us to the heart of 
Bataille's thinking here. He continues: 
Dissatisfaction is encountered in all forms. Hitler was dissatisfied on the 
day that he entered into war. Such is the vulgar forrn that war represents: 
we imagine that satisfaction demands conquests and glory, we do not 
imagine that satisfaction is impossible. Only beyond, we perceive that 
greatness consists in recognising oneseýf impossible to satisfy. 30 
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The demand for satisfaction,, the demand made by every military conqueror, can 
only originate in a condition of dissatisfaction. This would be the familiar pattern 
of action and desire conceived as 'la volont& d'agir', 'the will to act': 
dissatisfaction would designate a lack of satisfaction which serves as the motor for 
the movement of desire. Desire would be the drive to satisfaction through 
effective action, conquest and possession. But where and when are we 'beyond' 
this desire for satisfaction which warfare characterises? Would we thereby exist 
"beyond desire" itself, outside of any sphere of activity? Let us reconstruct 
Bataille's logic: to know that satisfaction 'does not satisfy"; to be 'beyond' the 
circle of initial dissatisfaction and resultant satisfaction is the mediated result of a 
being recognising it's own satisfaction to be impossible. A being is brought face 
to face with the incompletion of its own being; and yet, at the same time, this 
experience is nothing other than the recognition that it is the very impossibility of 
satisfaction which is constitutive of this being. This difference is an ontological 
one. It describes the very process through which he differentiated himself from the 
beast of prey: by withdrawing himself from the process so as to undermine its 
cohesion and to destroy it by indicating its impossibility; whilst, at the same time, 
identifying with the internal 'fault' or insufficiency of its condition, thus affirming 
it in its very impossibility. The condition of dis-satisfaction is not sought out in 
order for it to be rectified or satisfied; Bataille's desire is only to affirm it, to 
exascerbate it without any possibility of a 'result' or recuperation. 
As this argument continues, incompletion emerges from this determinate 
impossibility into one that radically un-determines, or tears apart, the satisfaction 
of a death which would ultimately condition truth. Why? Bataille sees that if death 
ultimately conditions truth through finitude, in the imposition of a mortal closure 
upon this being as subject, it is only because this inescapable fact of death will 
have always been what pre-determines 'man' in terms of a historical process. 
'Man' becomes nothing more than that very process of his own self-completion. 31 
In taking on this constitution 6f 'man', Bataille does not simply oppose a raw 
indeterminacy or immediacy ('Nature') to this complex 'operation' of 
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determinations and conditioning ('Man): as far as he is concerned, no-one yet has 
pushed far enough into the constitution of this process or operation. 
[A]ccording to its own rule, this truth can only become true on one 
condition, that I die and not only myself [moi], everything that man feels 
inescapably incomplete within him. Now it is clear that if that from which 
I suffer is evaded and if the uncompleted nature of things [Finacheve des 
choses] ceases to ruin human self-importance, it is life itself that will 
become estranged from man; and, with life, its inevitable and distant truth 
(the sole truth which is tied to it and expresses it): that incompletion, 
death, desire, unquenchable, are the never closed wound that belongs to the 
being, without which it would not differ from a void deprived of light. 32 
What is the nature of this 'research"? It is opposed, at first, to science. Science, 
claims Bataille, is defined by the necessity of its completion; and the force of this 
necessity for completion is what marks 'the greatness of Hegel'. More 
specifically, Bataille has in mind the importance of 'science' in the 
Phenomenology, to which Hegel originally gave the subtitle, "Wissenschaft der 
Erfahrung des Bewuptsoins", "Science of the Experience of Consciousness". 
Bataille has taken on board the exemplarity of the completion of knowledge in 
4science' as it is laid out by speculative philosophy. Bataille is drawing upon the 
assumption of absolute knowing in the Phenomenology, wherein Hegel sets out to 
'help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science', to the point or 'goal' where 
it can 'renounce its name love of knowing and be actual knowing'. 33 Philosophy 
must become 'Wissenschaftlich' in order for it to fulfill or actualise its potential: 
nothing less than the laying-out of the necessary path of philosophy's self- 
actualisation as a whole. It is no longer enough for philosophy to remain 
philo-sophia, 'love of knowing' [Teibe zum Wissen']. For the movement and 
accumulation of knowledge through the manifold diversity of 'Experience' 
['Ehrfdhrung'] to be articulated as an interconnected whole, it needs to be thought 
in terms of a system. Hegalian 'Wissenschaft' is the systematic movement which 
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can account for the complete sequence of experiences which consciousness has to 
undergo in this process of becoming 'actual knowing' ['wirkliches Wissen']. 
If there is no solidity to Bataille's position -a fact that he wholeheartedly 
affirms - he even denies that any position is possible for him at all: 'it is not a 
position but a movement maintaining each operation of the mind [Fesprit] 
possible in the interior of particular limits'. 34 It is this opposition of stasis (being' 
qua 'position') and movement ('becoming' qua 'process' or 'operation') which 
forms the fundamental axis of Bataille's differentiation from Hegel and the 
'philosophy of work', or from any position figured through the dialectic of 
'foundation' and 'appearance'. It is this axis which proves to be vital to his 'image 
stripped of existence'. Yet there are a number of problems with Bataille's reading 
of Hegel, which should be sketched out here. First of all, has Bataille 
misunderstood the logic of this completion, which leads him to counterpose the 
destructive dynamics of movement to the conservative stasis which he finds in 
Hegel? This mistake is particularly clear in the context of his cursory depiction of 
the Phenomenology, which presents nothing other than the perpetual movement of 
the process of the becoming of spirit, the continual movement of the 'experience 
of consciousness'. It is in this context that we should understand the word 
'science' for Hegel. But what if Bataille is not saying that Hegel failed to live up 
to this project? Perhaps, on the contrary, in arguing that Hegel's philosophy is 
nothing other than its completion, Bataille is insisting that completion is never 
quite enough, and that the 'failure' of this 'beginning' (as he portrays it) at least 
pertains to another (equal) necessity, perhaps to something that exceeds (or 
precedes) the circularity of the first. In this way, Bataille does not seek to oppose 
himself to Hegel, but seems to be intent on carrying Hegel's thought further into 
those domains that come to be designated as incomplete or impossible: 'laughter', 
'tears', 4ecstasy', 'eroticism' and 'poetry'. 
How does a being, dedicated to the path of research, end up as the waste by- 
product or the 'unexpected residue' of this very process? Bataille does not explain 
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why exactly, he claims that he is only trying to describe or relate the situation as it 
appears to him - 'And as the fixed question was that of being and substance, what 
appears to me with the greatest vivacity, [ ... ] what appears to me 
is that, where 
knowledge [la connaissancel sought being, it has encountered the incomplete. ' 35 
Above all) Bataille's manner or mode of presentation is that of witness. Yet if 
"L'Amitie" is presented as a report or account, 'un recit', of an experience, of a 
path of research, it is not an unproblematic idea of witness. This mode of writing 
is at once intimate and quite personal; yet it always slips away from any 
identifiable person or subject - it seems to matters little whether it is 'Dianus' or 
'Bataille' who writes. Indeed, the experiences which are thereby communicated 
are precisely presented in such a way as to make the process of identification 
untenable in terms of a fixed subject who would possess indivisible duration. It is 
this impersonal sense of writing which qualifies the 'vivacity' of experience, as 
the following parenthetical observation reveals: 
[this] vivacity (which, at the very moment that I write, opens "the depth of 
worlds" before me and makes me no longer feel any difference between 
conscious knowledge and ecstatic "loss of consciousness"). 36 
As his tone suggests Bataille can only celebrate and revel in this 'loss', a gap rent 
open by his desire for destruction, 'la dechirure du ciel'. But now, which means 
here 'at the very moment' of writing, the "'loss of consciousness"' ceases to be 
different from 'la connnaissance' itself- the path of research continues because 
there is always more to say, more to report back. What Bataille finds here is 
almost exactly what Hegel sought to explicate and demonstrate in the self- 
projection of the concept: 
There is identity between the object and the subject (the object which is 
known, the subject that knows) when an incomplete and incompletable 
science admits that its object can be itself incompleted, incompletable. 37 
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If this is, as Bataille says himself, an explicitly 'Hegelian position' - adding that 
this 'proximity' hardly bothers him - how can such an identity become the crux of 
the difference that he puts between Hegel's and his own figure of the 'truth' of 
this relation? 38 How can he square the relation of completion and incompletion 
other than dialectically? The extremity to which Bataille has pushed this position 
of identity - where the relation of identity, and hence difference, is to be 
understood as 'incompletable' - is therefore an act of affirming knowledge and 
consciousness only in so far as it can flip back over into 'ignorance', not as a 
condition to be overcome, but to be 'identified with the extreme state of conscious 
knowledge', an ... ignorance of the future" (the Unwissenheit um die Zukunft that 
Nietzsche loved)'. 39 Yet is this inversion enough, as Bataille seems to claim, to 
dispel the 'malaise' that has plagued man in the guise of the theological 
imperative of divine perfection (the idea that man, the being who defines himself 
as 'Pinacheve', forever strives to reach the perfection of god, 'Facheve')? What is 
at stake in this formulation of 'ignorance' or 'non-knowing' ['Unwissenheit'; 
'non-savoir'] with regard to the future? Bataille goes on to add, in Le Coupable: 
Theology maintains the principle of a complete world, for all time, in 
every place [ ... ] It is necessary to kill God in order to perceive the world in 
the infirmity of its incompletion. 40 
Implicit in this argument, and this recourse to Nietzsche, is the idea that the 
logical result of Hegel's thinking demands that man - in the possession of 
philosophy as the science of its own process of completion - must himself achieve 
the perfection of god, and so become 'everything'. But man's ... ignorance of the 
future"', or rather his "un-knowledge" of it, is revealed to Bataille as the 
impossibility of this completion. This realisation takes place in the face of 'the 
incompletion of worlds', a state of affairs which '<< le fond des mondes W reveals 
to Bataille at the very moment of writing. Once again, the event or experience 
which captivates Bataille's imagination is that before which man is only an 
78 
'incident', without foundation, and as such he can be 'no more than an adequate 
representation (and thus equally inadequate)' of this state of affairs. 
Science, like history, is incomplete: I will die without response to essential 
problems, forever ignorant of results that will change human perspectives 
41 (which would change mine as they will change those of survivors) . 
The depth of this denigration of man is final, absolute and unavoidable. It 
possesses the same force of necessity that Hegel constructs for the idea of 
completion. Without the model of completion, or the theological principle, is there 
anything left to orient humanity within the world in terms of necessity, or even 
obligation? The forrn of the imperative may remain, but there is now within it an 
even more exhorbitant and disorienting demand: 
In this way it imposes itself upon thought that it would be necessary to 
complete this world, at any price, but here lies the impossible, the 
incompleted: every reality [reel] breaks down, is fractured, the illusion of 
an immobile stream is dispersed [se dissipe], the dormant water seeped 
42 away [ecoulee], I hear the noise of the nearby waterfall . 
At this point the incessant, unfounded, but irrefutable movement of Bataille's 
'truth' can only stand on its own (groundless) particularity - it makes its own way. 
In this way, Bataille's path shadows that of Hegel's auto-presentation of the 
concept, and as such it yields a clue about the function of 'la dechirure du ciel'. 
Bataille provokes the question: if his thinking of this immanent self-movement of 
'truth' is governed by the ripping apart of every satisfaction, doesn't it draw its 
power, and therefore its very possibility from the seýflsatisfaction of its own 
project of relentless destruction and dissatisfaction? When he writes that this 
conception 'is an anthropomorphism torn apart', how are we to understand the act 
of rending or tearing ? 43 Is Bataille's thinking of destruction merely reducible to 
the determinate negation of a thing, a negation which would cancel yet maintain 
the content of its action? 
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2.12 - Communication 
In order to respond to this challenge, it is encumbent upon the reader to ask about 
this movement of thought from within its relation to impossibility, to folow up on 
the terms of Bataille's own formulations, and therefore also their peculiar 
anomalies. As opposed to the servility of the incomplete to the completed (of man 
to god), any reduction or assimilation of 'the incompletion of worlds' - that is, 
where the 'incident' of man is equally adequate or inadequate to such task of 
representation - encounters its own unavoidable, but uninhabitable limits: it 'can 
no longer hold itself to them [ne peut pas non plus s'y tenir]'. 44 This situation or 
encounter is at once productive - it marks the logical continuum of his research - 
and yet intolerable as it shatters every hope of coming to a halt or a definitive 
completion. Once again, it is a situation that Bataille affirms in the extreme: 
An Unwissenheit, an ecstatic, beloved ignorance thus becomes the 
accomplished expression of a wisdom that a vain hope no longer obeys. At 
an extreme point of its development, thought aspires to its own "putting- 
to-death" [<< mise a mort >>]: it is precipitated as if by a leap into the sphere 
of sacrifice and, just as an emotion swells as far as the irresistable instant 
of sobbing, its plenitude bears it up to the point where a wind that wears it 
out whistles, the point where the definitive contradiction of minds, raging, 
holds sway. 45 
No obedience is tolerated at this 'extreme point'. Only the precipitate leap into 
sacrifice is offered, but it does not even seem to present the 'way-out, that Bataille 
had once seen in the prospect of a 'sudden death'. As this thought ascends upon 
the coalesence of 'intellectual plenitude' and ecstatic drunkenness, it is still only 
awaiting its own '<< mise a mort W, but it is repeatedly pushed into a place of 
persistent, corrosive contradiction. For thought, the 'definitive contradiction' is a 
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perpetual, violent mobility: this 'extreme point of its development' is not simply 
attained, but is only accessible through repetition. 
I can only, I suppose, broach [toucher a] the extreme in repetition, in that I 
am never sure of having reached it, in that I never will be sure. 46 
It becomes clearer that Bataille's aim, if he has one, is to exhaust the possibilities 
of a solution, to expend the resources of satisfaction and completion. This is the 
force he attributes to repetition: it compels contradiction to 'rage' - the exacting 
'point' of the extreme is nothing without its repeatability. And as repetition it 
unavoidably works against its own completion. 
Communication, then, is not a 'social bond, in the sense that Jean-Luc Nancy 
has referred to as 'the economic bond of recognition. 47 It touches upon a quasi- 
ontological distinction already present in Bataille's thinking. Communication is 
conceived as the rending apart of every such bond, in the exposure to an extreme 
limit. This limit is the fundamental, unsurpassable limit of human finitude. 
Bataille defines friendship in terms of such an 'abandonment' or 'solitude': 
For a man, a dryness of the desert, a suspended state (of everything around 
him) are favourable conditions for a violent detachment. Nudity shows 
itself to the one enclosed by a hostile solitude. It is the hardest, the most 
relieving trial: a state of profound friendship requires that a man be 
abandoned by all his friends, free friendship is detached from close, 
intimate bonds. Far beyond the shortcomings of close friends or readers, I 
now seek friends, readers that a dead man can find and, in advance, I am 
faithful to them, innumerable, mute: stars of the heavens! my laughter, my 
madness reveal you and my death will rejoin you. 48 
If what Bataille seeks to destroy and move beyond is the homogeneous sequence 
of the philosophical project of man's ambition - the accession of the human to the 
perfect completion of god which Kojeve finds in Hegel - he cannot but reallse that 
the unavoidably comic position in which he has placed "man" is the desire to be 
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"bigger than god", or "more perfect than completion". The first section of 
"L'Amitie" therefore bears witness to the development of a comic principle of 
repetition. But what is it that takes place along this scaled relationship between 
disjunction and conjunction upon which Bataille's analyses seem to rely? As a 
path or method of research, however errant, it still seems to presents itself with an 
aim or goal to be reached, and yet this end to which it directs itself is nothing 
other than 'chance'. 49 
Throughout, in every accessible reality and in each being, it is necessary to 
find the sacrificial place, the wound. Each being is touched only at the 
point where it succumbs, a woman beneath her dress, a god at the throat of 
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the sacrificial animal . 
What does Bataille understand by this 'wound'? And should we not be suspicious 
of the uneasy coyness with which the oblique reference to a woman's vagina is 
metonymically reinforced by the slit throat of an animal? Bataille states quite 
clearly that such a 'wound' is to be uncovered in each and every being, condition 
or situation -'in every accessible reality'. One might take this to mean: 'it is 
possible to find the point of accessibility in everything that can be thought'. Yet 
this is not merely a possibility for Bataille, but a demand - 'il faut' - that 
accompanies everything which occurs or takes place. Every event has its fault-line 
or wound - which means every being or thing, every body or system, every act or 
experience. The wound must be sought after because one must locate the 
'sacrificial place' in order to 'touch upon' this reality. That is to say: "in order for 
something to be thought through, it is necessary to seek the place (the 'point') 
where that thing or being gives way or succumbs". What this thought seeks, in 
everything, is a collision with its own limits; and yet this is not to say simply that 
such a search would only ever find its own reflection in whatever it came across. 
On the contrary, if the throat of the sacrificed animal is the 'point at which [a god] 
succumbs', would this mean that the god - having been 'touched' - will give way 
or yield, in the sense of perishing, as a result of this mediated contact. A woman 
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can be touched without any such offering - rather it is this woman who seems to 
touch as the offering without being touched. But offered to whom? 
There is no causal connection between these two events: touching upon a thing 
or being; and 'the point where it succumbs'. It is the rupture represented by their 
relation that attracts Bataille. The sense of 'touch' in thought does not grasp or 
seize the entity through some privileged access to this 'point', but rather finds 
itself in some way subjected to it. 
A naked woman suddenly opens a field of delights (whilst decently 
clothed, she was no more troubling than the wall or a piece of furniture): in 
this way the indefinite expanse tears itself apart and, tom, it is open to the 
ravished mind which loses itself [se perdre] in it in the same way as the 
body [is lost] in the nudity which gives itself to it. 51 
It is worth paying attention to the tortuous formulation of this sentence. Certainly, 
the naked woman is by no means the object of this sundering, but neither does she 
seem to be constituted as the subject of an experience, if the state of 'the ravished 
mind' could be said to be a subject at all. The problem is not that the formulation 
of these two passages is deliberately ambiguous or obscure, but rather that the 
focus of Bataille's attention is at the heart of this obscurity: how much can thought 
accomodate within its limits? to what can it be subjected and what cannot be its 
object? what confronts the mind in its unexplored complicity with the erotic 
charge of the body? To return to Bataille's earlier formulation of the 'extreme 
point of it's development', thought would now think through touching, touching 
upon its very aspiration toward this point, which he describes as the desire for 'its 
own 64putting-to-death"'. Once again, the obstacle of an impossible condition 
seems to dis-orient his analysis as the confrontation of 'the savage impossibility of 
our mind' with its unavoidable, yet unavowable limits. 
The nakedness of the woman is more that which reveals, than what is revealed 
-'the animality in her becomes visible again and the sight of her unleashes my 
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own incompletion within me [sa vue delivre en moi mon propre inachevement]'. 52 
This occurrence disturbs and dissolves the field of experience by opening the 
more delightful and unbound field of eroticism, 'un champ de delices'. 53 As an 
experience it is nothing other than the opening up of the field of communication. 
However, if it takes place as an act of communication, it is only because the 
security of communicating between separate and distinct entities has been 
dissolved: it is this erotic "contact" - the sense of sacred intimacy or continuity, 
that is to say, complicity - which gives rise to the fear of such dissolution in the 
first place. 
To the extent that existences appear perfect, completed, they remain 
separated, enclosed upon themselves. They only open themselves through 
the wound of the incompletion of being within them. But numerous and 
separated beings communicate with one another through that which it is 
possible to call incompletion, animal nudity, wound, and it is in the 
communication of the one to the other that they take life by losing 
themselves. 54 
What would it be to exceed these limits? This is the problem that is researched 
and refigured throughout Bataille's work: 
Even thinking (reflection) is only achieved in us within excess. What does 
the truth signify, outside of the representation of excess, if we don't see 
that whichexceeds the possibility of seeing, that which it is intolerable to 
see, as, in ecstasy, it is intolerable to take pleasure Douir]? If we don't 
think that which exceeds the possibility of thinking ... 
? 55 
However, it must be pointed out that if these two passages merely expressed the 
sense of anxiety in the act of communication, then there would be nothing 
remarkable to them. As it is, Bataille draws upon the familiarity of these images to 
introduce the extremity of his meditation upon incompletion into the experience of 
communication. He argues in the following way: individual existences can appear 
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to be complete or whole in themselves, and yet it is always possible to discern 
their desire or need for others (to share, communicate, possess, dominate or 
serve); but to the extent that this is so, these individuals actually 'remain 
separated' or self-sealed - communication cannot take place because while there 
may be familiarity (as with polite manners) there can be no intimacy -; and 
therefore the intimate nature of communication is in no way divorced from those 
aspects of behaviour or conduct that are deemed to be excessive or too much - the 
perfection of being can only be ruptured by the wound 'in every being' (the 
impossibility of completion). This act of destruction (the sacrifice, the crime) 
draws the individual being into communication with another being, which gives 
rise to the ambiguity of communication itself, to 'take life by losing themselves'. 
One being does not wound another, Bataille does not use the verb, 'to wound' (an 
deed which would require a doer), but the wound in the one and in the other is 
ontological: it is what is shared between them, and opens them up to one another. 
'They only open themselves through the wound of the incompletion of being 
within theni': the wound is being's ['de 1'etre'], but only as it takes place in each 
individual being. Has Bataille thus sketched out the beginnings of an ontology? 
Would it not have to be a thought of such a difference that is not readily reducible 
to a distinction that would be derived from an ontology (in its widest sense of 
separating the essence of what manifests itself and the 'form' in which it presents 
itself)? 
2.2 - The sense of complicity 
Bataille's pseudonymous essay of 1940 presented 'en abyme' the central concerns 
of the work that was to occupy him right up until his death: La Somme 
atheologique. The thematic and conceptual elements of death, desire, chance, 
communication, Terotisme', transgression, sacrifice and the sacred run through it 
and into that body of work. In "La Somme ath6ologique", these themes and 
concepts are related within an attempt to think through the possibilities of 
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experience, one which itself always forces the individual to its limits. What 
remains constant throughout this work is Bataille's research deeper into what he 
intitially defined, borrowing from Blanchot in "College socratique", as 
4 experience interieure negative': an experience that can only 'affirm of itself that it 
is authority (but every authority expiates itselff. 56 By calling into question the 
value of every experience -a contestation necessarily 'without limit' -, the 
individual is pushed outside of "itself', outside of any subsistance of "self' or 
"ego". With no limits, and without salvation, project or possibility, there is 
authority only in this experience, and only in so far as it is this 'limitless 
contestation'. 
Everything would be held, including authority itself, in the movement of a 
limitless putting-into-question. There would only be authority in this 
movement, in this putting-into-question. 57 
Consequently, the question should be raised about the specificity of the word 
friendship - as a relation between more than one such individual - with regard to 
this experience defined as 'the incessant putting into question of existence by 
itseý(' 58 What is the relation between the discontinuous force of discretion which 
figures ftiendship in Blanchot's work and Bataille's idea of friendship as 
complicity? Do they share some common function beyond the purely grammatical 
- that is, as adjectival forms of 'discreet' or 'complicit' friendship? If we now 
attempt to clarify discretion and complicity in relation to one another, how are we 
to conceive this relation? 59 
However, it is quite evident from those texts forming La Somme atheologique 
that Bataille already situates them in terms of a fundamental opposition that 
condenses his pursuit of 'experience sensible' towards 'Fextreme: du possible'. 
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The following sequence is taken from the first section of "Le supplice", in 
L'Experience int&ieure: 
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The voices of good apostles: they have an answer for everything, they 
indicate, discreetly, [discretement] the path to follow, like the master of 
ceremonies at a burial. 
Feeling of complicity in: despair, madness, love, supplication. Inhuman, 
frenzied joy of communication, because of despair, madness, love, not a 
point of empty space which is not despair, madness, love and more: 
laughter, vertigo, nausea, loss of self as far as death [perte de soi jusqu'a la 
Mort]. " 
What could give this possibility of common measure, or further still an 
authenticity, to discretion and complicity when the latter is deployed by Bataille 
as such a hostile dismissal of the former (as a form of ceremonial mastery)? How 
much continuity is there between this passage and the formulation of the 
'complicit friendship' in "L'Amitie"? At first sight, the gulf between a controlled, 
measured discourse ('voices) of answers and a frenzied, desperate 'feeling' of 
joyful communication seems to be constructed around a simple opposition of the 
restricted and the general, which guides the pairings of the reasonable and the 
excessive, or reason and madness. Yet are there further possibilities and problems 
which this approach to Bataillean 'economics' might ignore or conceal in its turn? 
Is there anything which might disturb the construction of this sequence of 
oppositions? 
There may be such a disturbance already embedded within Bataille's approach 
to the question of 'communication'. This passage does not express the apparent 
simplicity of such a opposition without in some way indicating the complexity 
that flows between them and thus constitutes them through disjunction. This 
complex and productive disjunction is further illustrated if we pay close attention 
to the troubling presence of what Bataille calls Blanchot's 'final silence', and 
which Bataille then goes on to characterise as 'a feeling of distant friendship, of 
distant complicity. ' This formulation would seem to express a dispersal and 
mixture of both terms that bears away the rigidity of an opposition: the differential 
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distantiation that emerged in the reading of Blanchot's "L'amitie" is not without 
relation to this action of complicity at a distance. The possibility of a scale of 
complicity at the level of each and every 'point of empty space' - an all-expansive 
dispersal in the name of a 'loss of self as far as death' - will have to draw upon the 
impossibility of any discrete measure, ratio or relation. Would this then measure 
effectively the 'loss' of a discrete self or'being via the same conceptual movement 
within which a 'feeling of complicity' is given its discreet distribution? Such a 
conflict of discrete and complicit relations sits at the (geometrical) heart of any 
distributive network of relations, that is to say, as the question of how the 
relationality of friendship is to be figured. 
Here friendship, as it is informed by a thinking of complicity, might at least 
generate a logic of presentation in an analogous way to that which takes place in 
Blanchot's doubling of discretion. 62 That is to say, an attempt to name that which 
exists only in and as relation: a figuring of relation as that which, stretching 
between those terms which are thereby put into relation, is yet not completely 
accountable in terms of its terms or relata. In short, what has emerged with 
Blanchot is an attempt to think a relation which remains external to its relata; a 
relation that is strictly outside its own terms. This leads to two connected 
problems. First of all, if we grant that both 'discretion' and 'complicity' are 
attempts at naming the same 'thing' - that is, the exact same relation -, how far is 
it possible to maintain two conflicting versions at the same time? Furthermore, we 
then have to ask whether both "acts" of naming name what they name in the same 
manner, insofar as it is possible that each act itself takes place within a conflicting 
thinking of the relation between the name and what is named? Do they perhaps 
give us two quite different and irreconcilable ways of naming this 'relation? To 
what extent can either discretion or complicity be said to accelerate the conceptual 
slippage of processes such as those of naming or relation that are imbricated 
within friendship, as this word soaks through into the main body of a writer's 
work? 
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The discordance between discretion and complicity can be seen to slide most 
violently in Bataille's work, in particular his work which begin to appear with the 
onset of the second world war and eventually go to make up La Somme 
Ath6ologique. In Le Coupable, LExp6rience int&ieure and Sur Nietzsche they are 
present in a more expansive conflict between claims for the primacy of 
discontinuous or continuous figures of relation. This slippage is at the heart of his 
quasi-ontological formulation of .. being in relation... ['<< etre en rapport W]. 63 
Once again, the principal method for inquiring into this state of affairs will be 
derived immanently by following the manner in which this naming takes place in 
a single work - Bataille's "L'AmitiC - which will then help us to see the manner 
which friendship runs through the La Somme atheologique as a whole. To show 
how Bataille presents or names friendship is therefore invaluable for deepening 
the condition of conflict inherent in Blanchot's own figuring of relations; and, as a 
result, it can illuminate the nature of the debt to Bataille within the complexities 
inherent to his later formulation of discretion. 
How then is 'complicity' to be read or understood in this context? Is it 
conveyed by a similar secretive tone to that inherent in Blanchot's 'discretion'? If 
so, we might begin by speculating that whoever is complicit in an act or event is 
thereby held by an "experience" which would exclude (or prohibit) any revelation, 
expression or communication at the same time as it includes or absorbs the one 
who undergoes it in a crime. To put it another way, complicity would express an 
communal experience which necessitates both the reservation of what is 
unavailable or inaccessible to others,, whilst conspiring with others in its 
possession: to possess and to belong through this possession - this is the principle 
of a shared experience which underlies the formation of a community. Complicity 
would be formulated as the communication, or putting-in-common, of an 
experience that binds those to whom it is addressed: not only the common 
assumption of an experience, but perhaps also the shared assumption of what 
constitutes experience per se. Yet to whom is such a communication addressed? 
Who are these friends? How will "friends" or accomplices be identified, and thus 
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differentiated from those others to whom such confidences must remain 
inaccessible? Are these 'others' necessarily 'enemies' to these 'friends'? 
Friendship, for Bataille, is not open to us as a value, but exposes us to this sense 
of communication as complicity: it is an experience which 'awakens' us to the 
impossibility of ever closing off or limiting such exposure. Yet there is nothing 
despairing in this impossibility of community: 
The awakening to the impossible is not misfortune (no more than it is good 
fortune). Beyond the rage of unleashing [dechamement] there is the calm 
of the dawning where, at the conclusion of the tearing to pieces [des 
dechirements] which it willed, thefriendship of manfor himseýf begins. 64 
Therefore, it would mean not only grasping an experience and fully 
comprehending it, but also to be grasped and held by this event itself, to allow 
oneself to be determined by it: 'etre complice de quelque chose' means to be party 
to something; or one might say, to take or be part in what takes place: to be 
complicit is to be a part (of something). Complicity is then an ambiguous 
occurrence: it is an event that only ever takes place through acting in collusion 
under an law. To be 'in complicity' is always to be the accomplice, being in 
relation to another who is in some way the same, another accomplice, someone 
who always acts in collusion with another, and so on. There is no numerical limit 
to those who are complicit. Hence complicity is a potentially infinite self- 
replicating series of relations. Yet at the same time what this multiplication of 
parts within a relation of complicity demands above all is that each part remain 
silent, secret and alone in this relation. But what is the nature of the act or event 
required to generate this 'with' or 'in' of parts in the first place? How does 
Bataille's 'complicity' generate or figure itself as relation? 
It is at this point that we must break off our reading of "L'Amitie", in order to 
formulate precisely what is at stake in this sense of complicity through its 
ambiguous relation to Hegelian recognition. Bataille himself signals this 
ambiguity in his thinking of sovereignty: 
90 
But: there is no extreme either without recognition - on the part of other 
men (if it is not the extreme pointfor others: I am referring to the Hegelian 
principle of Anerkennen). The possibility of being recognised by a 
significant minority (Nietzsche) is itself already in the night. Towards 
65 which in the end every extreme point is directed . 
In the following chapter, therefore, we will explore the way in which the 
complicity of friendship, together with the concepts of death and the work, can be 
traced back to Bataille's response to Kojeve's Hegel. Furthermore, insofar as we 
have arrived at the work of Bataille through Blanchot, our present enquiry will be 
concerned with two key questions, the answers to which will lead us back to the 
place of friendship in Blanchot. First, how do the concepts of death and the work 
structure the privileging of 'Recognition' ['Anerkennung'] in Kojeve's reading of 
the Phenomenology? Second, in what way does Bataille's thinking of friendship 
draw upon and against Koj eve's reading of Hegel? 
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Notes to Chapter 2 
I Bataille, "L'Amitie" (1940), VI, 303. When Blanchot cites this line as one of the two 
epigraphs to LAmitij, he uses this 1940 text, rather than the changed 1944 version 
which appears in Le Coupable ('I bring complicit friendship. ' V, 278). 
2 AM, 328-9. 
3 See letter #262 cited in Chapter 1, Section 1.1. 
4 Bataille's original letter to Raymond Queneau concerning Ta Somme atUologique' 
(dated 29 March 1950) outlined three volumes - 1. 'LE MOMENT SOUVERAIN'; 11. 
'L'AMITIt'; 111. 'LA MORT' -, the contents of which would have outstripped the final 
form of this series (VI, 360). 
Therefore, it is worth taking time to note the reciprocal investment in this word 
'friendship' within Bataille's work. For what is at stake is the enigma of this particular 
reciprocity between Blanchot and Bataille 'in the name of friendship. If Bataille 
covertly publishes "L'AmitiC in April 1940 at least half a year before his 'rencontre' 
with Blanchot, and the latter only writes under this title after the death of his friend, it 
could equally be said that these are only events that suspend a shared thinking. In one 
of his many plans or 'aphorisms' (written during the 'Fifties) for the 'La Somme 
ath&1ogique', Bataille inscribes the name of his friend beneath that of 'FRIENDSHIP': 
Somme atheologique: 
1. LE MOMENT [L'Existence; La Solitude] SOUVERAIN 
L'atheologie 
L'Experience inteneure 
Methode de meditation 
Etudes [sur les moments souverains] 
11. L'AMITIE 
Le Coupable (appendices en partie supprimes) 
Histoire d'une soci&te secrete 
Maurice Blanchot 
111. LA MORT [et la morale] DE NIETZSCHE 
Comment Nietzsche est-11 mort? 
Sur Nietzsche 
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La Saintete du mal 
Memorandum 
See VI, 360-74,361. Only eight years later Bataille wonders whether to 'Join 
L'Alleluiah to Coupable at t he same time as Les r6cits de Maurice Blanchot a 
title given to a planned collection of reviews (such as that cited above) published in 
Critique - once again in the name of redeploying the general title of 'La Somme 
atheologique'. Yet this is much more than a title given as a 'general heading' for his 
work: it seems that at one time or another during the 1950's Bataille seems to have seen 
nearly all of his work cascading from this playful, yet privative relation to the Judeo- 
Christian tradition; and alongside his other (unfinished) project of 'an-economics' - the 
three volumes of 'La Part mauditeand the accompanying Theorie de la religion. Thus, 
while he attempts to rewrite the preface to Le Coupable as the introduction to another 
plan for the publication of these varied works, Bataille notes the task of an impossible 
4project' in such plans: the '[dlevelopment of the work which has withdrawn from 
work [Foeuvre qui est retrait de Foeuvre]' that seems to name both the assembled texts 
of 'Somme ath6ologique' and those of 'La Part maudite'. (ibid., 363) Evidently, the 
doubling of the 'work' as it withdraws from 'itself is inherent to this movement of a 
"retrait ": Bataille sees that the 'work' of La Somme ath6ologique or La Part maudite 
can only undergo the process of development (the 'becoming-work') by repeating and 
distancing 'Itself from its own completion, just as his numerous plans (for a 'project' 
that will refuse such a name) continuously go over (or retrace) the same ground, the 
same texts, the same names (Nietzsche, Hegel, Blanchot) without allowing their 
relations with each other to become fixed. Throughout this time, when these conflicts 
between 'work' and 'project' are regularly published in successive re-editions and new 
volumes, friendship maintains a certain centrality that belles its eventual disappearance 
as a principal branch ('L'AMITIE') in the above plan. Only the year before, Bataille 
had written that 'the first part of Coupable (sic. ) ['L'Amitie' adapted from its 1940 
publication] has remained no less [than LExp6rience int&ieure (1943)] the most 
significant in my eyes. '(ibid., p. 368) The extent to which it will be possible to speak of 
a 'work' developed in the name of friendship - that is to say through an engagement 
with friendship at multiple levels - might involve approaching this 'retreat' of the 
'work' from itself as the possibility of a 'rencontre': the point at which the 'work' must 
keep going back over itself continually in order to develop against itself - the sense of a 
retrait as both withdrawal and a return that traces what takes place there. But what is to 
be encountered in this continual, auto-conflictual movement? and to what extent could 
this encounter be located in relation to the very different work of Blanchot? 
5 V, 251-2. 
6 For example, 'Le labyrinthe' (1935-6) appears, after extensive alterations, in 
L'Exp&ience int6rieure under the section heading of 'Le labyrinthe (ou la composition 
des &res)' (V, 97-109; see also Bataille's note, V, 421). 
7 V, 245. 
8 See VI, 65-182. 
9 By way of supplementing Blanchot's complication of the relation between the life and 
the work of a writer in VamitiC, we should note that when he writes about having 'a 
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presentiment of what the journal of the creative experience could be' in reading Kafka, 
he indicates other examples: Rilke, Ringer, and 'perhaps LExp6rience int6rieure and 
Le Coupable, by Georges Bataille. ' As if to extend the ambiguity of this 'perhaps', he 
adds: 'One of the secret laws of these works is that the more the movement is 
deepened, the more it tends to approach the impersonality of abstraction. [ ... ] [I]t is the 
abstract work which is closest to impassioned experience about which it only speaks 
impersonally and indirectly. ' (LV, 258-9). 
10 See the copious notes assembled by the editors of volumes V and VI of the Oeuvres 
compl&es. 
11 See VI, 365 and VII, 601. Pierre Pr6vost records that, for Bataille, 'revision could 
never be finished'; see Rencontre Georges Bataille, op. cit., 103. 
12 V, 455. Also see, on 'Dianus', VI, 369,373-4. 
13 The first edition of Le Coupable (1944) was prefaced by the following words: 
One named Dianus wrote these notes and died. He referred to himself (ironically? ) 
under the name of the guilty [le coupable]. The collection published under this title is 
a complete book. A letter and the fragments of a work begun go to make up an 
appendix. (V, 239. ) 
14 Blanchot, EL, 371. 
15 VI, 373. 
16 VI, 374. 
17 Denis Hollier, Against Architecture, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1989, p. 63. 
18 V, 523. 
19 VI, 292. 
20 Ibid. 
21 VI, 58. 
22 VI, 292. 
23 PhG, 36; PhS, §32. Note that Kojeve's translation (ILH, 540-1) differs significantly 
from that of Hyppolite (PhE 1,29), and that the version given by Bataille in "Hegel, la 
mort et le sacrifice" varies again (XII, 331). In short there arefive different forms of 
this passage in Bataille's text, as indicated by Jacques Derrida, "De 1'6conomie 
restreinte a 1'&conomie gen6rale. Un hegelianisme sans reserve", in Ltcriture et la 
diffirence, Paris: Editions de seuil, 1967,374, n. l. Hegel's rhetoicisation of death in 
this passage, and its various translations, will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4, below. 
24 V19 292. Bataille recalls that he attended these courses from 1933-39. He writes: 'At 
this very time, through innumerable lectures, I was well up on the movement of the 
sciences. But Kojeve's course left me burst, crushed, killed ten times over. ' (VI, 416) 
25 V19 305. 
26 At points like this the parallel between Bataille and Heidegger seems glaringly 
obvious. The extent of this awkward similarity -given both the mediating figure of 
Koj&ve's Heideggerean reading of Hegel, and the relative superficiality of Bataille's 
94 
knowledge of Heidegger - is, however, far more complex than it at first appears and 
inary excursion into these possibilities would merit a separate study of own. A prelim' I 
is sketched out by Rebecca Comay, 'Gifts Without Presents: Economies of 
"Experience" in Bataille and Heidegger', in A. StoekI (ed. ), Yale French Studies - On 
Bataille, n. 78,1990. 
27 VI, 292. 
28 VI, 295. 
29 Ibid. 
30 VI, 292-3, emphasis added. 
31 See further the discussion and interpretation of Bataille's 'Hegel, Fhomine et 
Phistoire' and 'Hegel, la mort et le sacrifice' (both 1955) in chapter three. 
32 Vlý 294, emphasis added. The end of the same passage in Le Coupable supplements 
the sense conveyed by this 'void': without which inertia - absorbing death in death 
[1a mort absorbant dans la mort], and no longer changing anything - would enclose it. ' 
(V, 260) Note that the verb absorber also carries the sense of 'to exhaust' and 'to take 
over': we will see that the concept of 'inertia' plays an ambiguous role is Bataille's 
own adoption of Hegelian/Koj&vean negation, as it bears strong links to the sacred 
sphere of 'intimacy' or 'immanence 
33 PhG, 14; PhS, §4. 
34 VI, 294. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
39 VI, 295. 
39 VI, 294. 
40 V, 262. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 VI, 295. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 This citation from Bataille can be found as the epigraph to Roger Laporte's Suite 
(Paris: POL/Hachette, 1979), which also bears a dedication to Maurice Blanchot. 
47 INC, 29. 
48 Bataille, "Solitude" (1941), the second part of "Les malheurs du temps present", in 
Le Coupable, V, 299. 
49 See VI, 161. 
50 VI, 295. 
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Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 It should be noted that, in the context of the passage, this phrase draws together the 
sense of "an exquisite taste" [dilice] with the movement of an experience that both 
"releases" or "unties" fdMer] and risks "delirium", "frenzy" and "madness" [dMre]. 
This matrix recurs throughout Bataille's writings, particularly in works like Madame 
Edwarda: 
The delirium of being nude possessed her: again this time, she spread her legs apart 
and opened herself up [s'ouvrir: also "to cut oneself open"]; the acrid nudity of our 
two bodies plunged us into the same exhaustion of the heart. 
Madame Edwarda - Le mort - Histoire de Voeil, Paris: Editions 10/18,1979,39. This 
string of terms can also be found throughout Bataille's discussions that touch upon 
cerotisme': first of all in Ta Somme atheologique'; and then in his theories of energy 
and apathy as (general) economic principles in La Part maudite and LErotisme. 
54 VI, 296. 
55 Ibid., 16-17. See also the note to this passage (VI, 20- 1) 
56 VII 286. 
57 VI, 289. 
58 Ibid. 
59 See VIII, 633. Bataille makes it clear exactly who lies on what side of this divide 
between the continuum of complicity and the discontinuity of discretion: 
Of the relation of Nietzsche to Hegel (Hegel more destructive, but discreet): one must 
maintain from it the movement opposing morality and the accomplishment of man, 
but it is necessary to go all the way to the end of the movement (Sade inasmuch as he 
is already Kafka) instead of remaining in the equivocal. 
We will ask about the possible meaning of Hegel's discretion, and its implications for 
Blanchot after Bataille, in Chapter 4. 
60 V, 45; 48. 
61 V, 49. 
62 See Dionys Mascolo, "Parler de Blanchot", in his A la recherche d'un communisme 
depens6e, Paris: tditions fourbis, 1993,409. 
63 V, 99. 
64 VII, 457. 
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Chapter 3 
Complicity contra recognition: Bataille's 'Hegel' 
Yet we already possess this concrete concept offreedom 
in theform offeeling, for example infriendship and love. 
G. W. F. Hegel 1 
The content of this chapter breaks with the opening investigations in which we 
drew out the figures of discretion and complicity from the works of Blanchot and 
Bataille respectively. In this present chapter we will draw out the relation between 
Bataille's thinking of complicity and Hegel's concept of 'recognition' 
['Anerkennung'], in order to grasp the scope and context of Bataille's 'complicit 
friendship'. We will continue to focus upon two concepts: death and the work, 'la 
mort' and Toeuvre'. In the first half of this thesis, it was shown that in the work 
of both writers these two concepts were essential to the articulation of an 
experience of friendship, orienting it with relation to questions concerning the 
event of death, memory and forgetting, the finitude of communication, and the 
nature of the work. As a result, it was through their respective differences over the 
relation of friendship to death and the work that we arrived at the divergent figures 
of discretion and 'complicit friendship'. However, while we have mapped 
discretion and complicity through the theme of the death of the friend and the 
97 
relation between 'the work' and 'friendship', we have not yet determined the exact 
sense and weight of 'la mort' and Toeuvre'. It is for this reason that we must now 
turn to the philosophy of Hegel. 
Bataille's reading of Hegel is wholly determined by the work of Kojeve. In the 
first half of this chapter, we will show how KOJevc, in his lectures and other 
philosophical texts both before and after the war, presents Hegel as the thinker of 
recognition. Then, in the second half, when we return to Bataille's thinking of 
friendship as complicity, we will be able to see more clearly how this figure of 
impossibility and dissatisfaction arises from Bataille's exploitation of gaps and 
fissures produced by Kojeve's privileging of recognition. The structure of this 
argument does not rest upon a contrary thinking of friendship on the part of 
Kqj eve, for he does not make friendship an explicit object of discussion. However, 
friendship is assigned a place in his account of an earlier stage in the development 
of Hegel's thinking - 'Love'-, and this placement sheds considerable light upon its 
role in Bataille's work as a whole. In brief, friendship is presented and thematised 
in the progression of spirit, together with the concepts of love and the family, as 
the social relation of feeling, as a particular 'aufgehoben' moment of the concept. 
Friendship appears only within the context of (familial) love, or at most as the 
manifestation of the restricted community of an elite, and so it is incorporated and 
surpassed in the course of human social, historical and political development. 
By beginning with Kojeve in this way, it becomes possible to observe how 
Bataille's opposition to Hegel - the distancing of his thinking of sovereignty from 
the slavery of the master-slave dialectic, and the attempt to rethink 
intersubjectivity without subjects, outside of recognition, as a relation of 
complicity - hinges upon concepts which are radically overdetermined in KqJ eve's 
reading: the concepts of 'Love, 'Recognition, ' death, and the work. The fact that 
Kojeve's reading of Hegel is problematic, therefore, does not immediately 
invalidate it, nor those interpretations (such as Bataille's) which follow from it. 
Instead of condemning Bataille's reading of Hegel on the basis of his undeniable 
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reliance upon Kojeve, we will use the latter to lay open the basis and context of 
Bataille's claims about death,, work, complicity and friendship. This will allow the 
relation of Bataille's thinking of friendship to Kojeve's account of Hegelian self- 
consciousness to appear through the conceptual limits that the former inherits 
from the latter. Most important, these limits will include both those which Bataille 
has identified and exploited, and those which may have passed unnoticed into his 
own work. As Bataille himself recognised, one can neither pass over nor pass 
beneath Hegel's work; one cannot oppose it without confronting it, and coming up 
against the way in which its concepts and categories are linked and stratified. 2 We 
will see that this realisation comes to Bataille only because of the particular path 
traced out by Kojeve's reading of self-consciousness in the Phenomenology, and 
the schematic importance of the relation of recognition which he finds there. So 
by granting Kojeve's 'Hegel' its due, whilst taking care to mark out the limits and 
problems of this interpretation, we will be in a position to trace Bataille's 
treatment of the negativity in the work, which lies at the heart of his own theories 
of expenditure, the sacred, and the 'sovereign operation'. In particular, we will be 
able to trace the relation between his thinking of friendship and the presentation of 
Koj evean 'Recognition'. 
3.1 - Kojeve and 'the final analysis' 
In this section, we will examine critically Kojeve's presentation of the 
development of 'Recognition' [Anerkennung], and the place of this concept in his 
reading of Hegelian philosophy as a whole. The concept of recognition first 
appears in Hegel's Jena philosophy, 3 but it reaches its most complete formulation 
in Chapter IV of the Phenomenology - initially, but not definitively, in the relation 
of the master and the slave. For Kojeve, however, this master-slave figure is 
synonymous with the concept of recognition. Both relation and concept are 
interchangeable. Indeed, this levelling-off of conceptual and structural differences 
is characteristic of Kojeve's reading as a whole - he does not hesitate to identify 
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'self-consciousness' with the concept of 'Man'; and 'natural life' with the idea of 
4 animality'. Nowhere is this tendency more apparent, nor more crucial for his 
reading in general, than in his account of "A. Selbstdndigkcit und 
Unselbstdndigkeit des SelbstbewuBtseins: Herrschaft und Knechtschaft", the first 
part of the fourth chapter ("IV. Wahrheit der GewiBheit seiner selbst"), which 
forms the second division ("B. SELBSTBEWUSSTSEfN") of the Phenomenology. 
(We shall abbreviate it according to the designated sections as B-IV-A. ) Kojeve 
will refer to this section, without apparent discrimination, sometimes as 'the 
Master-Slave dialectic'; at other times as 'the dialectic of Recognition'; and even 
as the 'dialectic of Self-consciousness'. 4 What is at stake in this levelling? 
In accordance with the general structure of the Phenomenology, the relation of 
master and slave figures a moment in the experience of consciousness. The 
moment when, through the fear of death and work, the slave gains 'his own mind', 
his own 'sense of himself or 'direction' ['eigene Sinn']. This moment brings the 
realisation 'that it belongs to consciousness to be in and for itself: the fact that it 
is properly consciousness only when it is seý(Iconsciousness. 5 This generative 
relation in turn comprises the moments of mortal risk, the life and death struggle, 
fear in the face of the 'absolute master' (death), labour ['die Arbeit'] and the 
formation of the work ['das Werk']. However, it is far from clear that this relation 
is recognition. Hegel explicitly states, at the beginning of B-IV-A, that this 
'movement' by which self-consciousness comes to be what it is as such is called 
6recognition'. 
Self-consciousness is in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it is in 
and for itself for an other [Mr ein Anderes]; that is, only as it is recognised 
[als Anerkanntes]. 6 
In this way, self-consciousness is truly what it is only insofar as it has been 
recognised as such by other self-consciousness(es). As such, this relation is 
necessarily reciprocal: every individual is born in and through it's relation to 
others; consciousness of self arrives by way of a primary sense of community or 
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shared existence. Hence, 'recognition' is the name for the 'process' or 
, movement' by which this mutual development of seýflconsciousness and inter- 
subjectivity takes place as such. 
The detailed exposition [Auseinanderlegung] of the concept of this 
spiritual unity in its duplication [Verdopplung] will present us with the 
process [Bewegung] of recognition. 7 
This 'exposition' is a laying open of the relation(s) of doubling which are inherent 
to this 'spiritual unity' in its concept; these relations between the 'one' and the 
'other' unfold the 'movement' of recognition; yet all this is done for 'our' benefit 
- it is only presented to us ['stellt uns... dar], the philosophical readers of this text. 
This problem arises from the fundamental, structural distinction of what happens 
'for consciousness' [ffir es'] in the course of it's manifold experiences, and what 
takes place 'for us' [fzWr uns'], or 'in itself [ffir sich'], ftom the vantage-point of 
apprehending the place of this particular experience or 'Moment' in the context of 
the pure formal movement of a becoming. 'Ours' is an understanding denied to 
the consciousness undergoing this experience: the understanding of how what 
happens takes place, which goes on 'for us, as it were, behind the back of 
consciousness. ' 8 What Hegel writes about recognition (§§178-85), then, takes 
place as if 'behind the back' of the (self-)consciousness whose doubling is figured 
in the master-slave relation (§§186-96). This phenomenological distinction 
between what appears and the appearing as such is decisive for the movement of 
the Phenomenology. What is the status of this distinction for Koj eve? 
At the end of the Introduction, Koj eve provides a third appendix, "Structure de 
la Phenomenologie de FEsprit", in which he gives his sole account of this dual 
structure. 9 On Kojeve's reading too, these 'dialectical articulations' are of central 
importance to the Phenomenology; yet this distinction of 'fUr es' and 'ffir uns' is 
formalised in such a way that it will have distorted this reading of the right from 
the beginning. For Kojeve this text is phenomenological because it is a 
'description of human existence': 
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Man being called in the Phenomenology - "Consciousness" (Bewusstsein), 
Hegel indicates that it is a matter of a phenomenological description, in 
saying that it describes the attitude in question such as it exists "for 
consciousness itself' (ffir das Bewusstsein selbst). 1 0 
This text is so called because it sets out to describe this existence such as it 
appears 'to the very one who lives it'. For 'phenomenological', read 'empirical'. 
Kojeve points out, however, that it is also that case that 'Hegel himself writes the 
Phenomenology after having thought'. To have thought before writing this 
'description' is, therefore, to have 'known the totality of human existence'; to 
possess ... absolute knowing"', the wisdom to see the fragmentary and partial 
nature of any 'given, partial or historically conditioned attitude'. 11 For Kojeve, 
then, those moments 'for us' ['a nous'] are written 'from the point of view of 
"absolute knowing", which is the point of view of Hegel himself, [ ... ] this "us" 
being Hegel himself and the reader who comprehends him'. 12 The Phenomenology 
is both more and less than what it's title proclaims it to be: it is split between the 
point of view' of 'a philosophical or scientific analysis', which comprehends the 
truth of that which only appears to be true in 'phenomenological description'. 
What was a phenomenological distinction, immanent to the fluid movement of 
consciousness' experience, has becomes calcified into an intransigent bifurcation 
of empirical phenomenology and true science, to be reunited as the 'coincidence' 
of description and analysis in the final chapter, "Das absolute Wissen" (C-(DD)- 
Vill). 
The 'dialectic of Recognition' therefore exposes the entire logical schema of 
Hegelian absolute knowing. Indeed, the orbit with which this concept 
circumscribes Kojeve's philosophical work is so expansive that we need to divide 
our analysis into two further stages. First: From love to recognition. An analysis 
of the presentation of 'Recognition' as the 'key notion' of Hegel's entire 
philosophy: first, an account of the initial importance of 'Love' as the 
anthropo genetic figure of the relation to death; and second, the transformation of 
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death into the teleological function of the work in the master-slave dialectic. 
Second: From the end of History. A demonstration of the way in which this 
relation of self-consciousness and intersubjectivity forms the possibility of 
community: the political and historical centrality of recognition allows Kojeve to 
read Hegel as the philosopher of the 'end of History', and to think the present as 
the time when all work has been completed and 'Man' is a 'satisfied Citizen'. 
Kojeve bases the development of Hegel's Phenomenology upon this transition 
from the dialectic of 'Love' to that of 'Recognition', so it is by no means an 
exaggeration to state that the whole of his reading of Hegel is founded in this 
movement from the former (as a relation of the possibility of death) to the latter 
(as the 'labour of the negative'). Kojeve's narrative of this transition will inscribe 
a series of oppositions in its progressive movement from family to state, from 
private to public relations, from the erotic to the political, from particular to 
universal individuality. This sequence is historical, then, only in a schematic 
fashion: it sets out to show how the entire movement of the Phenomenology rests 
upon the accession to self-consciousness in 'Recognition, which in turn requires 
that 'Love' remains at the level of the mere self-feeling, excluded from the final, 
totalising perspective of the 'End of History'. 
Kojeve"s not immodest claim for this schematisation of recognition is that the 
movement of the Phenomenology reveals to us the entirety of human existence 
and history. This in fact follows necessarily from Kojeve's grasp of the 'fitir 
es'/'ftir uns' distinction: the idea that Hegel writes the Phenomenology 'after 
having thought' to its conclusion every particular, 'historically conditioned' 
perspective; as if this act placed Hegel himself outside or 'after' history as such. 
Hence, the present in which Hegel writes this book is nothing other than the end, 
finally presented in and for itself in the final chapter: Hegel himself is revealed to 
be 'the self-consciousness of the Wiseman possessing absolute Knowing'. 13 
Without doubt, this is a fundamentally ambiguous, not to say problematic, 'end'. 
In the final stage of Kojeve's anthropological and historical dialectic there is 
nothing more to be done, everything (that is, 'History' as the totality of human 
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possibilities) will have been accomplished, every possibility will have been 
realised and thus exhausted. It is no accident that Kojeve's most persistent 
rhetorical trait is a phrase of conclusion and summation: Kojeve's Hegel is one 
who's writing takes place, always already 'having thought' of everything, 'in the 
final analysis', 'en demiere analyse'. 
Kojeve's reading of the progression of spirit as the development of 'Man' 
through 'History' aims to encapsulate in this way both the Phenomenology and 
Hegel's work as a whole. For him, the former consists in the presentation of the 
process of 'anthropogenesis', the generation and birth of the human. Hegelian 
'Geist' is resolutely human, appearing through the development of Kojeve's 
THomme'. In the second appendix to the Introduction, "L'idee de la mort dans la 
philosophie de Hegel", we can find Kojeve definition of Hegelian philosophy: 
Hegel's "dialectical" or anthropological philosophy is, in the final 
analysis, a philosophy of death (or what amounts to the same thing: of 
atheism). 14 
It is clear from this parenthetical qualification that Kojeve focusses upon death 
with the goal of expunging any theological or ... divine... content from Hegel's 
concept of 'Geist'. In the Phenomenology, God is supplanted by 'Man': 
Hegelian Spirit is therefore really not a "divine" Spirit (for there are no 
mortal gods): it is human in this sense that it is a Discourse which is 
immanent to the natural World and which has for a "support" a natural 
being, limited in its existence by space and time. 15 
For Koj eve, everything here revolves around the question of 'Man': his lectures 
have the express aim of (re-)organising every element and every 'Moment' of 
Hegel's text under the heading of anthropogenesis. In this way, the 'Spirit' that is 
'human' cannot be transcendent (at least not in the sense that Kojeve understands 
the absolute transcendence of the divine) for it is rooted in the relation to death 
and mortality; which is to say that, given this 'limited' spatio-temporal existence, 
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the human exists as a being in the world. Whence there arises Kojeve's reliance 
upon the central, yet ultimately paradoxical distinction between human and 
animal: the formation of the historical and political existence of 'Man' is 
presented in opposition to all other natural or animal life, yet at every moment this 
process is founded in relation to the latter as its ontologically constitutive 
substratum, or ... support"'. Every aspect of Kojeve's Hegel can be traced back to 
this formulation of the animal-human dualism, and in the analysis which follows, 
we will examine the function and the effects of this dualism. 
'Man' is defined as an individual, and is understood as a discursive, dialectical 
existence. For Koj eve, every animal, plant, or 'inanimate thing' can be regarded as 
a 'simple "example... ['<< exemplaire W], fully interchangeable with any other 
member of the ... natural" species' to which it belongs. A human being, on the 
other hand, is always ... unique of its kind"', '<< unique en son genre W. 16 Rather 
than characterising every strata of life, this dialectical movement of universality 
(differentiating itself into particulars to be reassembled in the singular) is 
embodied in the growth of human individuality alone. Anthropogenesis consists in 
the dialectical movement by which such singularity comes to reveal itself to itself. 
For Kojeve, 'Man' thus appears in and as 'Discourse', a term which he uses to 
encapsulate the entire operation of human thought and language, but which is in 
fact given no linguistic specificity. In other words, this discursive existence is 
nothing other than the movement of 'universalising negation'; it is this ability to 
pass from the particularity of its 'innate' or 'natural' being (which KojeVe equates 
with 'animality'), whilst 'preserving and sublimating' the identity of this 
464nature ... , to the appearance of 'Man' as a 
'free and historical Individual'. Indeed, 
as Kojeve himself makes clear, this movement is possible only because 'Man' qua 
'Discourse' is spatially and temporally determined by the "'support... of his 
'natural' being: his individuality is the result of the 'conserving (universalising) 
negation of himself taken as given (particular). ' 17 The individual, therefore, only 
appears with the demise of this animality; that is, only through the relation to its 
own death. 
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Death is for 'Man' in the sense that death is in him as the (transformative) 
'end' of the natural, animal being which is his material existence, his 'body', and 
thus can be known by him as such. As the universal motor of all dialectical 
becoming, death becomes synonymous with the very processes of discursive 
thought: what Hegel calls the 'subject', or 'being-for-itself [Tarsiclisein'], is 
nothing other than this 'labour of the negative' ['Arbeit des Negativen']. 18 In his 
own way, Kojeve erects his anthropologised 'ontological difference' over Hegel's 
pivotal distinction of the death of 'natural life' and the negativity of 
'consciousness',, drawing heavily upon Heidegger's separation of the existential 
orientedness towards death that is proper to 'Dasein' from the mere "'perishing... 
['Verenden'] or ... demise... ['Ableben'l of something that lives. 19 He emphasises 
the necessary, structural, and existential relation of death and thought: death is no 
longer just the demise of a particular being - it is universal, determinate negativity: 
the pure possibility of change, action and transformation. In the form of the 
negativity of the 'ffir sich' death is no longer an event delivered upon 'Man' from 
outside or from above; it is his 'immanent law' of 'auto-suppression', in the sense 
that this movement does not come through the intervention of an other; rather it is 
'his death, that is to say something which is proper to him and belongs to him 
exclusively [lui appartient en propre], and which consequently can be known of 
him, willed or denied by him. 20 Now the originary 'magic power' of determinate 
negativity, death is the property of 'Man': it belongs to him alone and constitutes 
what is proper to his being. 
3.11 - From Love to Recognition 
In the Introduction and "Hegel, Marx et le christianisme", Kojeve portrays Hegel 
as having 'discovered' the concept of recognition through his work on another 
dialectic: 'Recognition' is introduced as a substitute for Tove. ' What Kojeve sees 
in Hegel's analysis of love is an initial attempt to account for the development and 
birth of 'Man'. Hence, in Hegel's 1797-8 fragment on love 21 , and by extension in 
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all those writings from this period which treat of the systematic relations of 
religion, morality and spirit, Koj&ve identifies the 'dialectic of love' as the process 
through which 'Man' differentiates himself qua 'Individual' from all other life, 
especially the animality of his own 'given-Being'. He claims that in this text 
Hegel had thought 'for a moment' that he had found 'the specifically human 
content of Man's existence, ' and that it was in 'analysing the amorous relation that 
he described, for thefirst time, the Dialectic of this existence, which distinguishes 
it from purely natural existence. ' 22 It is the identification of 'Love' as a 'first' 
description of this existential dialectic which seals the fate of friendship in his 
explication of the Phenomenology. But what specificity, if any, is there to this 
word love, for Hegel or Koj eve? At this level of generality, it would seem that any 
term could serve this same function: if it is a case of analysing a 'specifically 
human' feeling or emotion, would not envy, hatred or revenge expose this 
essential, structural differentiation of the humanjust as well? 
So what is it about the concept of love that, according to Kojeve, destines it 
for this work? 23 First, he reads this fragment on love as Hegel's first 'sketch' for a 
phenomenological analysis of 'Man', so making love a pivotal concept in the 
development of Hegel's thinking. Indeed, the fragment on love first presents the 
interarticulation of finitude and the infinite, the thinking of difference in unity, 
aswell as the inseparability of intersubjectivity and self-consciousness; all of 
which will be central to the progress of absolute spirit in the Phenomenology; and 
which is introduced with the accession to self-consciousness in B-IV-A: 
[T]his absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent 
self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and 
independence: I that is We and We that is L24 
Hegelian 'spirit' - as that which is both subject (or Tilrsichsein') and substance 
(or 'Ansichsein') at the same time - cannot be grasped as such without this 
unifying relation between a plurality of selves, who are, in turn, conscious of 
themselves only through their differences from one another. Hyppolite echoes this 
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definition as well as Kojeve's observation when he remarks that this doubling, 
which Hegel will locate at the heart of the movement of recognition, can already 
be seen in 'the dialectic of love': 
Love is this miracle by which what is two becomes one, yet without 
ending up in the complete suppression of duality. Love is what overflows 
the categories of objectivity and actualises [realise effectivement] the 
essence of life in maintaining difference in union. 25 
Spirit emerges as this dynamic movement of differentiation in unity 'for the first 
time' in Hegel's 'sketch' or 'outline' of the 'amorous relation. ' Both Koieve and 
Hyppolite present love as the origin for Hegel's concept of spirit, because it is 
with the relationality of love that the question of community as 'being-together' 
['Gemeinwesen'] is introduced. It is with the ftagment on love that Hegel's 
thinking of dialectic comes to be manifested as an experience of dialogue and 
26 interaction between subjects . For both interpreters, then, the movement of 
dialectical experience figured in terms of intersubjectivity is a movement towards 
the fusion of differences through the formation of a greater unity. From love as the 
union of two separate lovers actualised in the conception and birth of the child, to 
the confrontational structure of the master-slave relation in the Phenomenology, 
the growth of self-consciousness is manifested as a relation of inter-subjectivity in 
which union emerges from diversity, identification through differentiation. 
Second, there is the matter of what love qua feeling does in this text, for 
Hegel's presentation of love immediately distances itself from the problem of 
selecting one feeling from among many other particular feelings. Love is defined 
as the 'feeling' ['Gefiihl'] of life as it touches upon itself as an organic whole, 
through its own infinitely mediated essence. Hence, it is not a question of an 
exemplary feeling, but of thinking life itself as a living whole: love in this case is 
not part of a spectrum of the many particular feelings into which life might be 
divided; rather, it is to be thought as life feeling itself to be alive, as a unified 
whole. Thus, Hegel writes: 'in love life finds itself, as a redoubling [eine 
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Verdoppelung] of itself, and self-same unity. [ ... ] In 
love the separate still remains, 
yet not as separate, [but] as unified; and the living touches the living [das 
Lebendige fiffilt das Lebendige]. 27 This feeling of life as a living whole is as 
irreducible to the causal laws of reason ['Vemunft'] as it is to the oppositions of 
the understanding ['Verstand']. 
Kojeve is interested in Hegel's concept of love only insofar as its dialectical 
structure already uncovers the dialectical structure of that which is 'specifically 
human'. He extracts Hegel's first 'existential dialectic' of the 'Individual' as a 
unified, yet radically finite whole from a single passage of the 1797-8 fragment: 
It being given that Love is a feeling (Geftihl) of the living (Lebendigen), 
the Lovers can only distinguish themselves Ifrom one anotherl inasmuch 
as they are mortal, fthat is to say inasmuch asl they think this possibility 
of separation, {andj not to the extent that something would be really 
separated, where the possible reunion with a given being (Sein) would be a 
real-entity (Wirkliches). There is no fraw or givenj matter in the Lovers 
jas Loversj, they are a living for spiritual, for at this time Hegel identified 
Life and Spiritj Whole; fthatj the Lovers have an independence-or- 
autonomy (Selbstdndigkeit), fal proper-or-autonomous (eigenes) vital- 
principle, f thisl simply means: they can die [sie k6nnen sterben]. 28 
The 'Lovers' are in this sense 'properly' mortal ['sterblich']. Their individual 
differentiation ['sich... unterscheiden'] consists in the thought of death as their 
possible separation ['Trennung']; in other words, the very possibility of death 
forms their 'ownmost life-principle' ['eigenes Lebensprinzip'] and relates them 
one to the other as mortal beings. As Hegel makes clear earlier in this passage, 
what is central to this movement is the ability to think death as a possible event 
for oneself and for the other: 'True union, love proper exists only between living 
beings who are alike in power [Macht] and thus in every sense living beings for- 
another [fareinanderl; in no respect is either one dead for the other [gegeneinander 
Tote]. ' 29 The possibility of separation is not the arrival of death, but the relation of 
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the living to the horizon which it forms. Hence, what takes place in this passage, 
for Kojeve, is the fundamental anthropogenetic distinction between the kind of 
death faced by human beings as the horizon of possibility, and the 'end' which 
befalls every other form of 'purely natural existence. ' 30 He formalises this passage 
in the following way: first, each being in this union exists in his or her particular 
6exclusive unicity'; yet this difference is only revealed to them through the 
universal thought of death, hence their only relation is one between 'two 
"separated" beings, essentially autonomous or different, ' each constituted by the 
negativity of their finitude, and as such each is 'attributed an absolute (= 
universal) value' by the other; ultimately then, the whole or 'Totality' which they 
can form together qua mortal beings is precisely their synthesis in a separate 
individual -a child who exists in its own right, unique and distinct from its 
parents. 31 
If the fragment on love uncovers the 'existential dialectic' of 'Man', it is 
because the union of the lovers in the birth of the child reveals this 'primordial 
role' played by death as the dialectical movement of the 'Aufhebung'. The 
movement of love is one of 'striving to dialectically suppress' (as Kojeve 
translates the verb 'aufheben') this mortal separation or differentiation of the 
lovers, 'this possibility [taken] as pure (blosse) possibility, and to reunite the 
mortal (Sterbliche) itself, to make it immortal [unsterblich zu machen]. ' 32 
Separation is both produced and overcome through the living power of death qua 
negativity: not only is it 'thanks to death' that each lover has a separate, and 
therefore free and independent, existence; but it is again 'on account of mortality' 
that love can be realised through its act, the 'dialectical "re-union... of their 
separated existences in the child. 33 The process of reproduction as the synthesis of 
two fundamentally separated beings is thus circumscribed by the desire for the 
4re-union' of the lovers; a "'manifestation... of the desire on the part of each lover 
to be desired in his or her own right; and in this way to overcome the mortal 
34 limitations, which give rise to this desire, through the life of the child . This 
process is quite literally 'anthropogenetic'; yet it is precisely in marking this place 
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of the birth of 'Man' that the analysis of love serves as a mere placeholder for a 
more authentic and comprehensive phenomenological analysis of 'Recognition'. 
Love presents 'only a secondary "manifestation" of Man'. 35 The impulse or 
desire which it manifests is limited in both scope and ambition. As we have 
already remarked, Kojeve's presentation of desire as the relation of pure 
'FUrsichsein' originates in his reading of 'Desire' ['Begierde'] in B-IV-A. Hence, 
as a relation between individual subjects, this 'feeling of living beings' is qualified 
and determined, from the beginning, as desirefor recognition. In retrospect, love 
will have turned out to be unsatisfactory for Hegel's analysis of the 
interdependence of self-consciousness and intersubjectivity precisely because, as 
'Geftihl[e] des Lebendigen', they are ultimately restricted by a residual animality 
or 'natural given-being'. Love is refigured, retroactively, under the matrix of 
recognition: it is now simply 'amorous Recognition': 
(Human) Love is also a desire for Recognition: the lover wants to be loved, 
that is to say recognised as an absolute or universal value in his or her very 
particularity, which distinguishes it from all the others. Love thus realises 
(to a certain extent) Individuality, and this is why it can give (to a certain 
extent) Satisfaction. 36 
The relation of 'Love' becomes a partial and insufficient determination of a more 
'total, universal dialectic. As desire, it is not aimed at the other as an object (for 
example, the 'given-being' of someone or something), but rather at another desire: 
love is not a desire for an other, but a desire for the reciprocated desire of an other 
- one loves in order to be loved in return. In this way, Kojeve preserves the sense 
of 'Love' as a relation of reciprocity or doubling, which was expressed in Hegel's 
original definition of love as 'a feeling of the living', but now it is no longer this 
'feeling' for it has been drawn up into a more universal economy of relations. 
'Recognition' is the second birth of the human individual, but it is the origin 
of what is 'specifically human in Man'. It is the 'Aufhebung' of love. Yet it is 
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exactly at this point, when love becomes 'amorous Recognition', that the concept 
of love begins to oscillate between the orbit of political and historical 
'Recognition' and the gravity of its adherence to the level of 'natural, given- 
Being'; between what is 'specifically human' and what remains within the sphere 
of animality. Even when it is recast as both lovers' desire to be recognised as 'an 
absolute or universal value in his or her very particularit ', it remains at some Y 
remove from the realm proper to 'Recognition', from the 'wirklich' existence of 
'Man' in the political, historical and social realm of action, conflict and work. 
Struggle and Work [le Travail] (born of the Desire for Recognition proper) 
alone produce a specifically human objective-reality (Wirklichkeit) (a 
technological and social, that is historical, World); the objective-reality of 
Love is purely natural (sexual act, birth of the child): its human content 
always remains purely internal-or-intimate (innerlich). 37 
Love remains a 'purely natural' actualisation of the human insofar as this relation 
does not appear to place any value on action, and therefore its content is 
withdrawn into its own intimacy. This relation exteriorises nothing, neither in the 
risk of the 'Struggle' nor in the productivity of 'Work'. Merely uncovering the 
possibility of death is no longer 'specifically human', for the lovers do not appear 
to have to face this possibility through their own actions. The actuality of 'Love' 
is necessarily and inseparably connected to the 'given-being' of animal life; yet, at 
the same time, it is still a 'specifically human phenomenon', if only insofar as it is 
determined by the more universal 'schema' of the desire for recognition. Hence, at 
first,, love is a point of ambiguity, as it appears to be neither simply natural nor 
wholly human, but an uneasy combination of both. 
If Kojeve presents 'Recognition' as the 'Aufhebung' of love, then no such 
ambiguity about the latter should remain; yet the problem runs deeper than the 
need to suppress a subordinate determination of a more universal concept. For 
Kojeve presents 'Recognition' as Hegel's 'key-notion', the matrix of his 
philosophy as a whole, The movement of this concept stands for that of the 
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concept as such. As a result, 'Recognition' becomes simply another name for 
'Aufhebung' (and vice versa). So what happens to the concept of love? Kojeve 
defines it by the absence of separation from animality, the lack of deten-ninate 
negation, the refusal of action - everything that recognition is not. In other words, 
the relation of love is inactive and unsatisfactory because it lacks 'the seriousness, 
the suffering, the patience, and the labour of the negative'. 38 Indeed, by drawing 
upon love and recognition in order to discuss the dialectical processes of the 
Phenomenology as a whole, Kojeve is attentive to Hegel's own contrast of the 
positivity of 'Liebe' and the negativity of 'Arbeit'. This distinction is, of course, 
figured by Hegel in ternis of the practice of thought and, especially, in the 
systernaticity of philosophy: 
To help [mitzuarbeiten] bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to 
the goal where it can cast off [ablegen] its name of Love of Knowing and 
be actual Knowing - this is what I have set myself to do. 
39 
This transition from 'philo-sophia' to 'actual' or 'absolute Wissen' is familiar to 
us already from Bataille's "L'Amitie" as well as Kojeve's account of the 
development from love to recognition. Koj eve invokes the seriousness and rigour, 
the systematicity and actualisation of scientific knowing against the 'feeling' of 
the living whole. But how is this distinction incorporated within the 
Phenomenology? Hegel does not present an explicit comparision of the two 
concepts - recognition and love -, so Kojeve must reconstruct an implicit critique 
of the latter on the basis of his reading. 40 He writes: 
In the Phenomenology, what Hegel (implicitly) criticises Love for is, on 
the one hand, its "private" character (one can only be loved by very few 
people, whilst one can be universally recognised), and on the other hand, 
its "lack of seriousness, " given the absence of the Risk of life (this Risk 
alone is a truly objective realisation of the specifically human content 
which essentially distinguishes Man from the animal). 41 
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Two criticisms determine 'Love' as an incomplete actualisation of 'human 
reality'. First, the lack of truly universal recognition: love does not satisfy the 
fundamental desire to be recognised as 'an absolute or universal value' by each 
and every other such individual. Second, the "'lack of seriousness... of this 
relation marks the absence of conflict: the very existence of the individual is not 
put at risk, and so does not have to do anything to prove its worth. As a result, 
those who are in love do not recognise 'Action' or 'the Work' [TOeuvre'] as 
'absolute values', but only the mere fact of the other's 'given-Being'; what is 
valued is, says Kojeve, 'precisely what is not truly human in Man' - the aniniality 
of his 'given-Being, ' or the natural, living identity of the body ['der Leib']. 42 Love 
['das Liebe'] is irreducibly 'leiblich': it is 'bodily' and 'physical'; it is not 
spiritual in Kojeve's revised understanding of the word, and so belongs solely to 
the family, to blood relations and to natural 'given-Being'. Hence, this twin lack 
with regard to the politico-historical schema of recognition draws together love, 
the family and friendship. 
Friendship may not be implicated directly in the 'natural' determinations of 
the sexual act, gestation and birth, but it is identified as an impoverished extension 
of this determination. By closing off the relation of love from action, and therefore 
from any 'truly active (= negating) comportment', Kojeve finds that it 'remains 
essentially passive, even ineffective or inoperative. ' Furthermore, this situation 
does not change, for this relation is restricted by the fact that it does not manifest 
itself through the negativity of action: 'it remains eternally limited by the static 
limits of the being to which it is related. ' As a result, friendship is as far as this 
form of intersubjectivity can reach. 
This is why love, at the very most, can found a human Family on a limited 
natural base (hardly enlarged by a "circle offriends') which, in the course 
of history, evolves by growing smaller. 43 
In fact, not only do love and friendship remain separate from 'specifically human, 
activity and work by remaining 'eternally limited' to the recognition of a 
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particular loved one, or 'at the very most, [that ofl the necessarily restricted group' 
of friends; they also run counter to human evolution conceived as the universal 
progress of history. But what precisely does Kojeve mean by the idea of love 
evolving through 'shrinking' or 'contracting' ['en se r&tr6cissant']? The phrase 
conveys two senses which Kojeve has already set in play: a group of friends may 
grow smaller, diminish in number (or 'dwindle') over time; but an individual can 
also 'grow narrow', in the sense of a diminishing mental acuity or scope of 
interest. So friendship is introduced as a relation of entropy, an irreversible 
movement of dissolution: in Koj6ve's schema it does not, and cannot, work: it is 
cast as an unproductive, purposeless remainder of energy which cannot be 
reabsorbed in the operation of a teleological structure or system. 44 This much is 
clear from the index of tenns which Kojeve employs: 'purely natural', 'restricted' 
or 'limited', 'passive', 'inoperative'. Kojeve finds justification in opposition to 
Goethe's dictum that one loves someone for what they are, rather than for what 
they do. 
[T]his is why one can love a dead man, for the man who truly would do 
nothing would be as if he were already dead; it is also why one can love an 
animal, without being able to "recognise" it: let us recall that there never 
has been a duel between a man and an animal,, - or a woman; let us recall 
also that it is "unworthy of man" to devote himself entirely to love: 
legends of Hercules, of Samson, etc. 45 
These three examples illuminate the dialectical insufficiency of love and 
friendship, which Kojeve must demonstrate in order to stage the necessity and 
universality of his 'key-notion of Recognition. ' In the first place, love is revealed 
actually to be no longer a necessarily reciprocal relation: it is for this reason that 
one can love someone even when they are dead. In fact, in contrast to universal 
recognition, love is a relation to another being in which one relates to the other 'as 
if he were already dead', the position of inactive consumption which defines the 
master in Kojeve's reading of the dialectic of recognition: 'the Master is actually 
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humanly dead in the Struggle: he no longer acts, properly speaking, since he 
remains idle [oisifl; he lives therefore as if he were dead'. 46 To love someone is 
merely to love them in their given, natural being; not to recognise them as a 
I radically mortal' human being; and therefore, they are as good as dead already. 
Second, and as a result, it is equally possible to love an animaL for there is 
nothing at stake between human and animal, yet it is impossible for there to be 
recognition for precisely this reason. There may indeed be death and servitude, but 
this is not manifested in a struggle to the death 'for pure prestige': there is no 
'duel between man and animal. 47 Finally, as is clear from his inclusion of 
4womaW as an afterthought, Kojeve also locates the turn from love to recognition, 
from natural to human, in terms of sexual differentiation: 'the animal desires the 
female (sexuality), the man desires the desire of the woman (eroticism). ' 48 Love 
will always fall short of its own desire, because the lover always falls back into 
passivity and inoperativity, content to limit itself to the merely particular 
individuality of an other (the loved one), or a small group of others (the family or 
friends), instead of struggling and working for the 'universal recognition of the 
absolute value of its particularity. ' The concept of love is the concept of afeeling, 
the stage at which the concept is manifested as mere feeling, limited by this 
"'support"' of natural 'given-Being' and thus restricted and "'mediated"' within 
the 'total' or universal revelation of 'human reality' through 'the labour of the 
negative'. 
3.12 - At the End of History 
It is with Kojeve's presentation of 'the concept of Recognition', in the master- 
slave dialectic, that the emphasis switches to the historical re-birth of 'Man' 
through risking his own life in the 'struggle for pure prestige'. The ontological 
primordality of this rebirth is Kojeve's prime reason in placing his 'annotated 
translation' of the master-slave dialectic 'in place of an introduction to his 
reading of Hegel. He traces the development of self-consciousness as 'being-in- 
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and-for-itself through this narrative: from the initial struggle between two 
separate self-consciousnesses, the outcome of which proves one to be the victor, 
the other the vanquished; through the institution of this relation as one of mastery 
and slavery, and the failure of the master to be satisfied; and finally, to the 
emergence of the slave as the productive being whose work mediates his 
recognition by others. In the present analysis, the events of this narrative are less 
important than the concepts that they introduce and set to work: recognition, risk, 
struggle, and the work. 
With the concept of recognition, the 'faculty' of desire is thus divided by an 
axiological turn, for it is at this stage that Kojeve turns to the question of value. 
Kojeve's phenomenological and anthropological reduction of desire determines 
satisfaction as the accomplishment of an intentional act in relation to the desired 
object: the object of desire is sought, or desired, as the instance of a value. 
According to Koj&ve's dualism, therefore, the value sought in any given act of 
desire will be either that of a particular 'natural or animal' life (that is, its 
preservation), or that of the autonomous universality present in this particularity 
(that is, its recognition). This axiological turn gives content to the schema of 
desire, for animal or natural desire, 'in thefinal analysis', is always determined by 
'the desire to conserve its life' - the instinct for self-survival which manifests the 
6supreme value for the animal', its own 'animal life' -; whilst that desire which is 
exclusively human finds satisfaction only in a value that is ... non-natural"', which 
'exceeds the given reality' of the former. 49 
Animal desire is the necessary, but not the sufficient condition of self- 
consciousness. The bifurcation of human and animal desire has become a matter 
of power and the dominion of the one over the other, for human desire manifests 
itself only to the extent that it manages to 'prevail over [Vemporter sur]' its 
necessary condition in the former. 50 Although Kojeve holds that 'human reality' 
comes into existence and is maintained as such only 'within a biological reality, 
an animal life', his key point is that 'Man' is able to demonstrate his fundamental 
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difference from this animality by showing himself to be ready to sacrifice his own 
life for the sake of the 'pure prestige' of being recognised. In order to manifest 
itself as self-consciousness, the (human) desire for recognition must triumph over 
the desire for preservation of its (animal) life, and dominate this life, by risking 
it's own death. As a consequence, the ... origin"' of self-consciousness is 
inextricable from the idea of a struggle between similar, competing desires, each 
willing to risk their '(animal) life' in a 'struggle to the death with a view to 
"recognition... as properly human. 51 In order to be recognised as the value which it 
takes itself to be (as an individual human subject), this desire requires the presence 
of another similar desire. What makes human desire 'specifically human' is the 
fact that it wants for the other subject to desire the value that it takes itself to be: it 
desires recognition. 
To desire the desire of another is therefore, in the final analysis, to desire 
that the value that I am or that I "represent" to be the value desired by this 
other: I want for him to "recognise" my value as his value, I want for him 
to "recognise" me as an autonomous value. 52 
On the one hand, self-consciousness is born of the power to say 'F, which is, at 
first, the empty form of the sheer motivity of desire qua negativity (as pure 
Ffirsichsein); yet on the other hand, it only truly emerges with the desire to be 
recognised as such an 'F. The distinction between a desiring consciousness 
(which reveals the object and itself) and a passive 'contemplation' (which is 
merely absorbed in its object) has become the ontological division of properly 
human 'desire for recognition' from the animal 'desire for preservation. ' 53 In the 
relation of love, this idea of a 'desire for desire' was limited to the sexual, 
biological, and natural process by which a self-consciousness is bom; as the desire 
for recognition, however, this reflective relation marks a second, historical 'birth' 
into the struggles of a wider social and political world. All things 'human' finally 
come through this second, thoroughly universal, 're-birth' in this other desire: 
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In other words, every human, anthropogenetic Desire, generator of Self- 
consciousness, of human reality, is, in the end, a function of the desire for 
"recognition. , 54 
If the 'desire for recognition', akin to the dialectic of love, is a 'desire of desire', 
this means that it names the necessarily reciprocal nature of inter-subjectivity, the 
mutual relatedness which is constitutive for all social intercourse and community. 
Yet what Kojeve underlines in this transition from love to recognition is the 
change in this dimension of relatedness. Like love, recognition entails two distinct 
yet fundamentally similar beings with the same desire, yet now this desire is not 
directed at the love of the other for the being that one is; it is the desire for one's 
actions to be recognised as those of a being possessing 'autonomous value'. Like 
love, recognition involves two beings, each of whom have this same desire; yet in 
the case of recognition, this common desire can only bring conflict, for in order to 
recognise the actions of the other a being would have to surrender his own 
satisfaction. Hence, each being enters this relation holding recognition to be its 
absolute value, so each is prepared to 'go all the way in pursuit of its satisfaction, 
if needs be to force the other, on pain of death, to recognise him as this value. 
Recognition is a relation of reciprocity as much as a relation to death. A 
human being is what it is only insofar as it can satisfy its desire to be recognised 
as a free, human individual; that is, only insofar as 'at least two' such subjects 
actively confront one another in pursuit of the same aim, or for the sake of 'pure 
prestige'. Thus, each subject is 'ready to risk its life' or, conversely, 'to imperil 
that of the other' in order to prove itself to be such a subject. 55 What Kojeve calls 
'human reality' is posited in its essential difference from 'animal-life' through 
desire and action; yet this desire must transcend the general form of desire (the 
'desire for preservation') in order to be recognised by a like being as such a 
distinct and autonomous value; and it can only exceed this sphere by risking it, to 
show that this value takes precedence over the value of its own life. Kojeve draws 
out of the dialectical relationship of the master and the slave the co-originary 
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status offinitude, conflict, and community. All three elements are bound together 
in the figure of the 'struggle to the death for the sake of recognition'. KOjeve adds 
repeatedly, in what is almost a mantra, that 'there would never have been human 
beings on the earth' without either the 'struggle to the death for pure prestige'; or 
without the originary fact of a 'radical mortality'; or if they hadn't evolved from 
'within a herd'. Sheer numbers, however, are not sufficient for the appearance of a 
truly social being: 
[I]n order that the herd become a society, the multiplicity of beings alone 
is not enough; again it is necessary that the Desires of each every member 
of the herd focus on [porter sur] - or can focus on - the Desires of the other 
members. If human reality is a social reality, society is only human as an 
ensemble of Desires mutually desiring one another as Desires. 56 
In this brief passage, Kojeve proceeds straight from the bifurcation of animal and 
human desire, or the herd and the society, to deducing the essence of community 
from the master-slave relation. As many commentators have noted, and objected, 
Kojeve's emphasis upon conflict in the figure of the life and death struggle results 
57 in 'the first political community' . 
The transition from 'Love' to 'Recognition' in 
Hegel's writings marks the arrival of a truly social, political and historical 
dimension to his work. Let us briefly recount the events of this narrative, for it is 
here that the possibility of Bataille's ... Hegelian... critique of Hegel arises. 
Hegel's earlier writings on love and religion are still too bound up with the 
particularity of the 'purely natural' sphere of sexual reproduction and biological 
necessity - the limitations of the family and the privacy of friendship. Such kinds 
of human interrelation may disclose the anthropogenetic structure of the dialectic 
through the basic finitude of individuality and intersubjectivity, but they do not 
measure up to the progressive universality of the desire for recognition. In fact, 
they are retro-gressive, or entropic, in relation to the historical evolution of the 
humanity of 'Man; as the inverse proportion of waste, passivity and inoperativity 
which 'remains eternally' limited as such; and from which the teleological 
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determination of the 'Work' must separate itself. But as limited fonns of human 
interrelation they are caught up within this movement. Love is universalised 
through the need to 'account for the phenomena of history and of historical man': 
on the one hand, this is a simple matter of substitution or replacement - 'it is 
necessary to replace the limited and passive dialectic of love by an universal 
dialectic of action'; yet, on the other, it is precisely this value of negativity as 
action which has determined Kojeve's depiction of this 'first amorous dialectic' as 
its reverse ("'natural ... ) side. 58 As if there were a separate dialectic of history and 
animality, a greater and a lesser form of dialectic; as if the movement of negativity 
as such could be either stronger or weaker. 
This matrix of the activity-passivity of the negative and of death is inextricable 
from the political fate of friendship in Kojeve's work. The emphasis upon the 
4virile negativity' of doing, acting and working condemns 'Famitie' to the 
idleness, incompletion and unsatisfaction of simple, non-dynamic being; for this 
originary status of activity, qua dialectical negativity, entails that 'not doing', or 
cnot acting, or 'not working' are already determined, even made possible by this 
prior operation. This is the very lesson which Kojeve drew from the master-slave 
dialectic: the master's domination of the slave ensured that his own relation to 
things and to the world was mediated by the labour of the latter; hence, although 
he is not part of the process by which the world of 'human reality' is produced, all 
the same he 'lives in a historical, technological world, humanised by work'. His 
idleness does not contribute to this process, but the fact of his mere existence 
does. 
There is no denying that processes of history and politics in the 
Phenomenology are bound up with relations of conflict, violence and passion. But 
Kojeve's thesis runs a peculiar course through these moments because of the way 
it frames these moments within his own historical narrative. Indeed, this tendency 
is inseparable from his express pedagogical intentions in the lectures. His aim is to 
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read Hegel as a contemporary by bringing this work to bear upon the present in 
which he himself is writing. 
Indeed, Individuality can be full realised, the desire for Recognition can be 
completely satisfied, only in and by the universal and homogeneous State. 
[ ... ] And this recognition is truly universal, for, by definition, the State 
encapsulates the whole of the human species [genre] (even in its past, 
through the total historical tradition that this State perpetuates in the 
present, and in its future, sincefrom now on thefuture [Favenir] no longer 
differsfrom the present in which Man is alreadyfully satisfied). 59 
This does, however, pose an immediate problem. How can this reading of Hegel 
have had such a massive impact upon even those, such as Bataille, who found 
themselves in radical opposition to its presentation of philosophy as a totalising, 
systematic 'Work"? As we have shown in our preceding analyses, Kojeve's 
avowedly propagandist 'explication' of Hegel possesses an irreducibly double 
thread: it is radical as an attempt to bring Hegel to bear upon the movements and 
problems of the contemporary world; yet it is equally violent in the pusuit of this 
task, as Kojeve obliterates complex and subtle details of the Phenomenology. In 
our close reading of the schematic movement from love and friendship to 
recognition, we have traced the conceptual core of his reading of Hegel. As a 
result, we can draw the conclusion that what 'works' in this reading of Hegel is 
the way that a few motifs or figures are brought into a dynamic and 
confrontational relation with contemporary 'problems' (political action, historical 
and technological progress, State and totalitarianism, philosophical nihilism). 
Koj&ve's philosophical response to the contemporary is his thesis of 'the end of 
History', a thesis whose ontological and metaphysical structure, as we have 
shown, was rooted in the paradoxes and oppositions which formed the movement 
from love to recognition. From this perspective, it is now possible to connect and 
survey the conceptual, political and historical terrain upon which Bataille places 
the relation of friendship, and to understand its import for the 'sovereign 
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operation' which he opposes ( ... Hegelianly"') to the work of philosophy, to the 
thought of philosophy as 'work'. 
3.2 - Bataille, sovereignty and friendship 
We have read Bataille's 'complicit friendship' as a guiding thread - 'un fil 
d'Ariane' - through the complex interconnections of concepts and themes which 
are gathered together under the rubric of the 'sovereign operation'. Under the 
heading of La Somme ath6ologique, his work subsequent to "L'Amitie" extends 
those themes of sacrifice, incompletion, contestation, and eroticism, into a kind of 
system whose labyrinthine, continuous interrelations he steadfastly opposes to 
what he refers to as the discontinuous systematisation of philosophical discourse. 
In this chapter, the conceptual terrain of this 'operation' has been traced back to 
Kojeve's reading of Hegel: death as the 'labour of the negative; the dialectical 
'suppression' of feeling and animality into the dialectic of recognition; and the 
completion [Tachevement] and 'end' of human historical existence in terms of 
'the Work'. In the wake of this reading of Hegel Bataille's question is simple. 
What happens to 'us' - this 'we' in whose name the completion of philosophy 
takes place - at the end of history? how are we, today, to think this 'we', now that 
(we' are at the end, today? what has happened to the force of negativity of which 
this 'end', this 'work', is the ultimate result? 
In retrospect, then, we can now see that Bataille, in writing "L'Amitie", had 
already begun to insert himself into the conceptual terrain of Koj eve's 'dialectic of 
Recognition' as a way of contesting and inverting it. And it is perhaps a fortuitous 
chance that this piece by Bataille, which will form the opening section of the first 
volume of La Somme atheologique, originally appears in the same journal that had 
published Kojeve's quasi-introductory 'annotated translation' of B-IV-A. The 
naming of friendship is, at least, an expression of this inversion. It offers itself to 
be read as a sign of clandestine alliance or 'secret society'. Yet the significance of 
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Bataille's "L'AmitiO' also lay in distancing his thinking from those earlier 
4; projects' which were concerned with founding a 'religious community' 
(Acephale, the College). Bataille turns instead towards a more dispersed form of 
thinking community or "'being-in-relation"'. Hence, the figure of a 'complicit 
friendship' comes to express 'the idea of negative community': a relation to others 
oriented by solitude, abandonment and absence -a 'community of those who have 
no community'. 60 The word 'Famitie' becomes unfamiliar in Bataille's hands, as 
if the accustomed proximity of friends had given way to reveal the possibility of a 
relation of dislocation across vast distances: 
[A] state of profound friendship requires that a man be abandoned by all 
his friends, free friendship is detached from close, intimate bonds. Far 
beyond the shortcomings of close friends or readers, I now seek friends, 
readers that a dead man can find and., in advance, I am faithfal to them, 
innumerable, mute: stars of the heavens! 61 
Friendship now appears under the sign of an experience marked by 'the 
impossible' or 'the extreme'. In this way, the activity of writing is increasingly 
traversed by the question of communication and of a 'literary community', as with 
the following comment on Proust and poetry in LExperience int6rieure: 
I would add friendship, for his way of forgetting, of suffering, a feeling of 
sovereign complicity. 62 
Yet this 'feeling' is far from unambiguous, for complicity necessarily expresses a 
relation of hostility as much as any relation of community. If one simply reads 
Bataille as positing Proust and Nietzsche against Hegel; poetry contra philosophy; 
the ecstatic loss of self in opposition to the labours of the philosopher -, one must 
then ignore the necessary complexity of Bataille's relation to Kojeve-Hegel and 
philosophy. This is precisely the problem encountered in the second chapter, 
where Bataille contested 'completion' by 'incompletion', 'satisfaction' by 
'dissatisfaction'. To grant authority to one over the other is to ignore the origins of 
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these concepts within Koj&ve's dialectic of 'a-nthropogenesis', which, as we have 
seen, takes place through the oppositions and reversals of detenninate negativity. 
This relation proves to be far from unambiguous. Bataille does not understand his 
inversion of Hegel as a clear-cut reversal or opposition: he opposes Hegel, as he 
says, "'Hegelianly"'. In a very important sense, then, opposition does not go far 
enough: his intention is take Kojeve's reading further than it allows itself to go. 
What his thinking of friendship allows for is a way of giving expression to, or 
figuring, this 'operation' and 'method' of his own thinking. 
If friendship indeed serves a strategic role in Bataille's 'inversion', it is a 
paradoxical 'strategy', for it is inseparable from this contestation of authority and 
of the teleological operation of value. Yet friendship is consistently presented in 
the name of a 'demand' and a 'rigour': 
What chance demands of men: friendship. 63 
I have proposed: the friendship of man for himself, the effacement of ego 
in the evidence of pride, a "desert" where solitude gains access to the 
"innumerable",, and the greatest possible rigour in the exercise of life. 64 
This presentation of friendship contests the very possibility of akpperative strategy 
by selecting 'chance' as it's only viable goal or value, insofar as 'chance' is, at the 
same time, equally non-viable, the absence of every goal and sustainable value. 
However, to return to the figure of complicity, if the name of friendship 
necessarily posits the fact of being the accomplice of someone (in a crime, for 
example), this relation is oriented by an equally necessary sense of being 
complicit against an other, or others. A 'complicit friendship' may leave 
unspecified the identity (or number) of the first, but it cannot but presuppose the 
existence of the latter. Moreover, if 'sovereign complicity' is the contestation of 
every value, as directed against the Kojevean values of 'the work' and 
'Recognition', then in the name of what is Bataille a friend or accomplice? That is 
to say, when Bataille proclaims that his friendship is 'for the impossible that is 
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man', or that it responds to the 'demand' of chance, does not the teleology and 
authority which he contests return, with all the more force for being unrecognised 
assuch? 
In the discussion which follows, therefore, we will turn to Bataille's post-war 
writings in order to trace the extent of the strategic relation between his 
presentation of the 'work of friendship' and his efforts to exceed or invert the 
Hegelian 'philosophy of work'. Bataille's use of the word 'complicity' 
accentuates a certain bivalency in his thinking of friendship: the inseparability of 
fhendship and conflict, of friendship and hostility, articulates another sense of 
ccomplicity' - an irreducible relation of involvement in that from which one has 
removed onself, and rejected. If the movement of excess and inversion always 
remains vulnerable to the very system which it overflows or overturns, if his 
opposition to Hegel 'only makes sense... "Hegelianly"', it is not because Bataille 
understands Hegelian philosophy as the doctrine of a simple 'unity of opposites'; 
but rather because he locates the possibility of systematic philosophy, after 
Kojeve, in relation to the 'struggle for recognition' between master and slave. In 
fact, his adherence to Kojeve's schematic of self-consciousness provides the 
building block for all thought: the dialectic of the master and the slave 'is, so to 
speak, the comer-stone [la pierre angulaire] of all thinking, since in it thought not 
only finds the explication of things, but of itself. 65 Self-consciousness thus 
remains the central point of reference for Bataille insofar as it is there that thought 
finds the 'explication' of its own operations, alongside that of 'things': thought 
thinks itself only insofar as it thinks it's relation to what opposes it. His relation to 
Kojeve-Hegel fastens and builds upon these co-ordinates, aswell as the fissures 
and paradoxes opened up by Kojeve's dualism; and it is in this way that one can 
discern another sense of Bataillean 'complicity'. It is no longer possible to praise 
or condemn Bataille for being resolutely 'Hegelian' or for being steadfastly 'anti- 
Hegelian'. As Jacques Derrida has remarked, this relation to Hegel is 'hardly 
definable', save as 'a complicity without reserve that accompanies the Hegelian 
discourse, "takes it seriously" all the way to its conclusion'. 66 Is it possible to hear 
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in this use of 'complicity' an echo of Bataille's assertion that he 'opposes Hegel 
"Hegelianly"'? His attention to sacrifice is an attempt to shorteircuit the Hegelian 
'Aufhebung' by returning it outside the economy of sense into an 'expenditure 
without return'; just as his thinking of sacred communication undermines 
Kojeve's rigid ontological opposition of human activity (the transcendence of 
consciousness) and animal passivity or inoperativity (the immanence of material 
life) by scrambling and reorganising the heirarchical distribution of power and 
necessity upon a labyrinthine network of composition and decomposition. As a 
result, for Bataille, the dialectical birth of 'Man', 'History', 'State' and 'System' is 
inextricably bound up with the suppression of that originary turbulence which is 
unproductive or inoperative negativity. Drawing upon Kojeve's emphasis on the 
finitude of 'human reality' and his critique of the inoperativity of 'Life', Bataille 
gives the name sovereignty to this experience of extreme instability. And nowhere 
is this ambiguity of restriction and excess more acute than in the figure of 
friendship. It finds expression in Bataille's formulation of 'the work of friendship' 
is an integral part of the presentation of this inversion of Hegel and philosophy: it 
is the 'hinge' that articulates this inversion as a consciousness of being complicit 
in it and against, in the same movement. 67 Thus, having already located the word 
'friendship' at the falcrum of the relation between 'sacrifice' and 
L communication', it is now possible to set out the way in which Bataille's use of 
this word deepens and exascerbates those ambiguities which emerged ftom. 
Kojeve's reading of Hegel. 
3.21 - Sovereignty 
Sovereignty is not a relation of mastery. In fact, as Bataille repeats on many 
68 
occasions in La Part maudite: 'Sovereignty is NOTHING. ' Although his own 
4personal interpretation' of the master-slave dialectic in "Hegel, Mornme et 
Phistoire" refers throughout to 'the related form [la forme voisine] of the 
sovereign', and although this figure draws upon the ontological determinations of 
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inoperativity aswell as the act of 'putting at stake' ['mettre en j eu'; 'daransetzen'] 
which constitute the appearing of mastery, Bataille insists upon a profound and 
radical difference from the figure of the master. 69 In Derrida's well known and 
exact phrase, sovereignty is 'at once more and less a mastery than mastery, [it] is 
completely other. ' 70 But how does this absolute differentiation take place? how is 
it presented? how far is it viable? and how does it relate to Bataille's thinking of 
friendship? To answer these questions we need to understand what is 'at stake' in 
Bataille's proximity to Hegel's 'philosophy of work'. 
In "Hegel, Phomme et Phistoire", Bataille follows in the steps of Kojeve: his 
approach to Hegel explicitly addresses the state of contemporary thought, 'les je 
de la pensee actuelle'. His diagnosis of a distortion wrought by the 
'misunderstanding' of Hegel's representation of 'Man and human Spirit' is, 
however, more ambiguous than Kojeve's pedagogic and propagandist intentions, 
and the implications of such distortion more complex. This 'meconnaissance' 
which characterises the relation of 'la pensee actuelle' to the representation of 
'FEsprit humain' is, on the one hand, a measure of the degree to which Hegel's 
thinking 'imposes itself as the horizon of the historical and philosophical present. 
But, on the other hand, since the prevailing relation to this horizon has 'perverted 
[fausses] the play of current thinking', 'we' have become 'complacent', even 
ýrevelling in it' ['ou' nous nous complaisons]. Hence, every attempt to think in 
ignorance of this horizon, or to sidestep ('perhaps deceitfully') it when speaking 
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of man, merely extends the reach of the perversion of 'our' own thinking. This 
horizon is nothing other than the completion of 'Man' at the 'end of history,, and 
the contemporary 'meconnaissance' is not simply a 'misrecognition' of this 
'event', but a failure to recognise it at all: 
The event is all the more grave [lourd] because no-one on either side is 
ready to look at it "in the face". Its meaning [sens] is recognisable and it is 
never recognised. Yet today a great unease [malaise] holds sway over the 
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world . 
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As a result, insofar as this 'event' is what Kojeve's 'demiere analyse' expresses in 
a 'difficult' and 'discouraging' manner, the Introduction is both a contributing 
factor to this state of 'misunderstanding', non-recognition and 'malaise', but also 
the only way of exposing them as such. This work, for Bataille, provides the only 
possible diagnosis of the contemporary condition, insofar as it allows the one who 
reads it to look this 'end' "'in the face"'. As Kojeve explains in his long note at 
the end of his Introduction, 'the end of human Time or of History' is nothing more 
or less than 'the definitive annihilation of Man in the proper sense of the term or 
of the free and historical Individual': what 'ends' is 'Action in the strong sense of 
the term', the negativity which defined every social, political and historical act of 
human becoming as such; and as a result, in marking the fact that 'Man dies as 
such' - that is, as the auto-transformative power of 'work' -, this 'end' marks the 
disappearance of wars, 'bloody revolutions' and even philosophy. 73 If Bataille's 
thinking of sovereignty remains close to, or 'complicit with', Kojevean mastery - 
'le souverain' and 'le MaRre' are, after all, related or 'neighbouring' ['voisine'] 
terms -, it is with this very proximity and familiarity that he aims to uncover 
alternate 'possibilities' for thinking the future of this 'event'. 
Bataille's essay begins by carefully shadowing the moments of Kojeve's 
narrative 'explication' of the master-slave dialectic, albeit through the substitution 
of 'le souverain' for 'le Maitre'. Sovereignty too proves to be nothing without the 
recognition of others: 
Now every man is initially sovereign, but this sovereignty is strictly that of 
the wild animal. If he didn't battle to the death against his fellow beings, it 
would be as if his sovereignty, in not being recognised, hadn't existed. 74 
This shadowing is double-edged, for right from the beginning it is a case of 
following how 'the attitude of the Master implies sovereignty', just as the idea of a 
conflict that does not pursue 'the satisfaction of animal needs' is said to 'express 
sovereignty'. 75 Furthermore, Bataille pauses this recapitulation at a number of key 
points. First, he draws attention to the internal division of sovereignty within the 
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master. The moment that the master becomes a master of slaves, this initial 
'absolutely sovereign' part of his being is 'limited'; wielding power over others 
attributes 'the value and the form of a useful activity' to the struggle between self- 
consciousnesses, even though this activity is 'always diverted towards ends 
exceeding utility [detourn6e vers des fins depassant l'utilite] in the direction [sens] 
of prestige'. It is with the advent of the master that sovereignty ceases to be purely 
impotent and without end, for his actions introduce 'an increasing power' ['un 
pouvoir croissant'] which can be wielded by a sovereign. 76 This is a vital moment 
for Bataille. The figure of the master departs from the avowedly religious 'logic' 
of sacrifice and expenditure, the sacrificial logic of sovereign as victim ('Dianus'). 
Principally, this departure marks the ascent of the 'enterprises of war' as the 
passage 'from impotence to power' ['de Fimpuissance au pouvoir'], and as 'the 
time [loisir] to refuse the ritual putting to death', or sacrifice, by substituting 
another victim in his place. 77 Henceforth, sovereignty will be subordinate to 
actions which maintain and increase the growth of such power. The moment of 
enslavement thus sparks the 'degradation of sovereignty': the instant at which a 
king pursues recognition 'for what he does, for his power [puissance], sets him 
apart from the desire for 'pure prestige', and sets 'Man' upon the path of effective 
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'Action' and the productive negativity of the 'Aufhebung' . In this way, Bataille 
complicates the rigid dualism that underpinned Koj eve's narrative of the transition 
from master to slave. His uncovering of a pre-exisiting 'logic' of sacrifice does 
not invalidate it, but, as we will see, proceeds from a simple 'supposition' shared, 
but unspoken, by Kojeve: the fact that 'Man can have lived moments of the 
Master and of the Slave in one and the same individual (or in each individual). ý79 
Before going further into the repercussions of this 'supposition', we will turn to 
the figure of the slave in Bataille's recapitulation. 
As with his repetition of mastery, Bataille's presentation of the reversal of the 
master-slave dialectic begins to question the relation of 'work' ['travail'] and the 
slave within this sequence of 'moments. Hegel's 'Knecht' is acknowledged to be 
the general figure of 'the man who is not free to do what he pleases' insofar as all 
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of his actions 'belong to others', insofar as his 'work' prepares the thing for his 
masters consumption. 80 Yet Bataille discerns 'a properly human existence anterior 
to the reduction of the vanquished in slavery'. This anteriority derives from the 
81 fact that 'work had to precede slavery' . 
What is the status of this anteriority? 
Bataille recognises that the logical 'schema' of recognition cannot be countered by 
a barrage of historical, ethnological data; indeed, he himself duly grants 
precedence to the former over the latter. Instead, it is a matter of a priori 
necessity, a different fundamental structure that has been obscured or obliterated 
by Kojeve's narrative, but which Bataille is able to draw out of concealment 
precisely because of this obliteration. Bataille claims to have arrived at a 'logical 
construction' still more primordial than that of Hegel's ... exteriorised" inner 
drama' between master and slave, and which the latter, therefore, must presuppose 
in order to take place at all. 
Man as such dwelled alongside death and worked [ ... ]. The distance from 
the formed object to the one who produced it without immediately 
consuming it (destroying it), and, in this way formed it in forming itself, 
could have been the effect of interdicts prior to the domination of the 
Master, purely religious interdicts. It is possible that Man became such, 
separated (himself) from the animal, by following other paths than those in 
Hegel's description. 92 
Moments,, concepts and figures are recognisable from this 'drama', but they have 
been re-distributed and enacted along different 'paths'. This possibility of 'other 
paths' elucidates an important aspect to his work as a whole: Bataille sets himself 
the task of thinking a counter-history of human activity and development, for the 
specificity of this counter-origin of the relation of 'work' and 'consumption' is 
central to all of Bataille's post-war writings on political economy, religion, and 
art. However, Bataille's intention is not to break away from the historical 
movement which forms the horizon and economy of meaning. Instead, he 
endeavours to show how this movement itself can only originate in such a break 
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with what existed prior to it, and hence outside the totalising perspective of 
Koi6ve's 'demiere analyse'. 
Hence, it would appear that the basic thrust in his writings against the coherent 
totality of the economy of meaning ['sens'] is inseparable from the attempt to 
reach a position, or an 'origin', more primordial or more 'primitive' than the 
schema of recognition, from which to contest it. In this way, the distribution of 
labour between master and slave is traced back to a temporal division of the 
sacred and the profane in 'one and the same' or rather 'each' individual. What 
Bataille calls ... profane time... is the time of work, securing the satisfaction of 
'animal needs' (hunger, shelter) and accumulating the 'resources' to be destroyed 
in the 'massive consumptions' (festivals, celebrations) that characterise "'sacred 
time"'. 'As a result, 'the 'Hegelian master-slave dialectic relates to this 'classical 
opposition' as its 'renversement': 
the Master is what he is not and is not what he is, he cannot have the 
autonomy of "sacred time", [for] he inserts the movement of profane time 
(in which one acts with a view to a result) right into sacred existence. 84 
The figure of the master forms the main object of Bataille's contestation of 
Kojeve's account of self-consciousness, for with it 'instability of History' is 
introduced. 'His very being introduces, because he lasts, an element contrary to 
the instantaneity of "sacred time"'. 85 Against this impersonal, momentary 
existence - 'in which the future no longer counts, in which resources are 
liquidated, in which the victim is destroyed, annihilated, where it is only a matter 
of being "sovereignly in death", "towards death" [<< pour la mort )>] (in 
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annihilation and destruction)' -, the mastery is posited as the desire to accrue 
personal power, ultimately to gain power over death precisely by transforming it 
into a power. It is by replacing the momentary, mortal opening of sacred 
'instantaneity', that it finds its 'glory' in the rewards of a victorious battle, 
rewards which prove to be 'more solid' than those of sacrifices which expend 
without return. 'Man' is, from the first, pure 'being-for-self in the form of desire 
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for recognition; he acts 'with a view to' ['en vue de'] a result or an end; that is, 
recognition as an 'absolute value' of individuality. This determination is only 
reinforced, with more successful results, in the 'work' of the slave. 
However, it is important to realise that at no time does Bataille claim to have 
changed 'anything essential' in the historical dialectic of 'Man'. In fact, he 
stresses the fact that nothing fundamental has been altered. The recourse to the 
sacred-profane opposition, and to sovereignty in the practice of sacrifice simply 
points to 'Man's possibility to negate animality in himself without acting'. He 
states that nothing is added in this recapitulation which would dispute the 'central 
perspectives' to be found in Hegel; that is, in Kojeve's Introduction. 87 To do so 
would be merely to contribute to the prevalent 'misunderstanding', and to fail to 
recognise the full implications of Hegel's thinking: the perspective of 'the end of 
history' should be seen, writes Bataille, 'as any truth, as an established truth. ' 89 
Furthermore, it is clear that Bataille's preoccupation with the sacred is not simply 
an expression of nostalgia for some prelapsarian, primitive world, nor a call for 
the abandonment of, or withdrawal from the modem world. On the contrary, if we 
are to understand the singular force of what he calls sovereignty, Bataille insists 
that we must follow the historical dialectic of 'Man' to its ultimate conclusions. 
The essential condition [of this end] is clear, it is simply the passage of 
men into homogeneous society; the cessation of the play by which these 
men opposed one another, and realised in turn different human modalities. 
[ ... ] Human 
history will cease when Man will cease to change, and in this 
way to differ from himself. 89 
The possibility of historical change and human becoming ('Man') has come to its 
end. This is what Bataille affirms as 'fundamental'. But what happens when, in 
the accomplishment of universal recognition, this process of change and becoming 
(the dialectic of recognition) has been accomplished? He acknowledges that these 
words, 'the end of history', are without doubt 'strange', even 'brutal' in their 
formulation,, but they must be given their 'precise meaning': '[i]t means that 
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henceforth nothing new will take place [rien de nouveau n'aura lieu]. ' 90 Nothing 
4new' will happen: no change, no conflict; and hence no more differentiation, 
nothing that will surprise 'us' - except, perhaps, for this very fact: that 'we' are no 
longer that which made 'us' what 'we' are. This is the 'reversal' of the very 
movement which brought us to this point, and thus the 'misunderstanding' against 
which he writes is not only the failure to recognise this reversal, it is also its result. 
If the master-slave dialectic sounds the death-knell for man's 'sacred 
existence', it is equally the case that its sole, inevitable conclusion is the death of 
'Man as such'. It presents the teleological orientation of human action towards 
'satisfaction'9 and the subordination of passivity and inoperativity. Sovereignty is 
obliterated by the desire to be recognised for what one does, rather than for what 
one is; a shift that echoes Kojeve's account of the transition from 'Love' to 
'Recognition'. Such teleology is, of course, the originary metaphorisation of 
(natural or biological) death into the operation of ('human') negativity, wherein 
death is put to work as the economic circulation of meaning and value. Finally, the 
'seriousness' of this 'work', as the historical movement of universalising negation, 
is figured by the development and completion of 'Man' as the 'Work' [TOeuvre'] 
of this becoming, the autononomous 'Individual' within the context of the 
homogeneous state. For Bataille, there is no question that this situation defines the 
present: 
The culture susceptible of bringing about the fundamental homogeneity 
and the reciprocal comprehension of those who incarnate it in diverse ways 
is technological culture. [ ... 
] It is not a question of a scale of superior 
values, nor of a systematic mistrust [mepris] of disinterested values. It is a 
question of reinforcing that which brings men together and of suppressing 
what separates them. 91 
In short, according to Bataille's re-reading of the master-slave dialectic, this idea 
of an existence in which work and sacrifice were necessarily contiguous, has 
already been 'dialectically suppressed' by the second 'birth' of Kojeve's 'satisfied 
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Citizen'. Bataille's conception of sovereignty, therefore, does not question the 
teleological and axiological deployment of the negativity of death after the fact, 
but rather at its very source. Human sovereignty is the contestation of every 
6 project' or 'work' only insofar as it contests their origi .n in the negative as such. 
Consequently, if all human productive activity, together with the entire economy 
of meaning in which it is inscribed as 'work', originally springs from the self- 
mediating power of the negative, Bataille seeks out that 'part' of this operation of 
negativity which has not been fully invested in this economy. What remains? 
Moreover, how can it remain at the 'end'? 
What remains of a devastating movement in which there is nothing that 
humanity thinks which does not pass into dust and which does not fall into 
ruins: Kojeve has underlined Hegel's hidden dissatisfaction and he has 
successfully highlighted the fact that the Wise-man names satisfaction, a 
voluntary frustration certainly, but absolute and definitive. 92 
Nothing remains. This 'hidden dissatisfaction' which, in "L'Amitie", is identified 
with the Phenomenology, is revealed by the irruption of a death which is 
irreducible and prior to the 'work' of philosophy. For Bataille, this represents a 
crelease': 
Nowadays, perhaps, Man is on the point of being released [au moment 
d'etre ldche] by the movement which had borne him forward; perhaps he is 
already released. 93 
One must note here not only the temporal markers in this passage, but the senses 
of the verb 'lacher' (to loosen, slacken; to release, unleash; to let loose, let fly; to 
leave, drop, give up; to break, give way, fail). The associated nouns, 'la lachete' 
(cowardice, lowness; weakness) and 'le ldchage' (desertion, abandonment), should 
also be kept in mind for this passage. The sovereignty of man arrives only in the 
experience of this loss, abandonment or weakening: a freedom that is not that of a 
subject, but that of the breaking apart or failing of subjectivity, a weakening of 
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power rather than an empowennent. Sovereignty is this weakening of the 'work of 
the negative', 94 the loosening and giving way of negativity; yet only in the sense 
that it is nothing outside of this negativity, for it is nothing other than the death of 
'Man as such'. 
This is precisely why it is possible to sense [sentir], as never before, what 
Man is: this force of Negativity, an instant suspending the course of the 
world, reflecting it because an instant breaks it, but only reflecting ap, 
powerlessness [impuissance] to break it. If it seemed to him really to 
break, he would only reflect an illusion, for he does not break it. In truth, 
Man only reflects the world by receiving death. At this moment, he is 
sovereign, but sovereignty escapes him (he also knows that, if he held on 
to it [la maintenait], it would cease to be what it is ... ). He says what the 
world is, but his speech cannot disturb the silence which spreads out [qui 
s'etend]. And he knows something only to the extent that the meaning [le 
sens] of the knowledge that he has evades him. 95 
If the sovereignty of a being is located in terms of this expenditure ['depense'] of 
negativity without return or result, he must act (or negate) without 'a view to' 
satisfaction in a value or goal. In a very important sense, this has no effect or 
result. 'Sovereignty can change nothing. It is no longer pure sovereignty if it 
wishes to change that which is. ' 96 Sovereignty can do nothing. Unable to 'change 
what is' - in other words, not capable of transfonning the world around it; indeed, 
not desiring to transform what Kojeve called 'la vie-animale' ['das Leben'] or 
'etre-donnee' ['das Sein] - the sovereign being cannot escape the sense of 
'inquietude' ['Unruhe'] which chacterises the subject of desire (qua 
'Fiirsichsein'), for he is never satisfied. Yet this inability to change or develop is 
presented as the opening of a possibility of liberating man from his subservience 
to 'the Work'. Bataille contests the necessary identity between negativity and 
work: the sovereign does not relate to death as to the source of power and 
possibility 'to do... '; instead, as he already insists in "L'Amitie", the sovereign 
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relation to death qua nudity or 'extreme-limit' precisely strips such activity of all 
sense. While Kojeve's presentation of mastery - in the form of the eventual 
4 mastery' of the slave through the process of work - is predicated upon 'the labour 
of the negative', wherein death has become the very production of meaning and 
value as such, sovereignty relates to death as the absence of sense. For Bataille, 
this is the true standpoint of Kojeve's 'dermere analyse': the realisation that, if 
every possibility has been brought about through the universalising movement of 
work, nothing else remains to be done. 
3.22 - Impossible ftien dsh ip and the work of art 
The relation between friendship and sovereignty lies in the fundamental role of 
communication in Bataille's concept of sovereign being. Sovereignty 'is 
NOTHING' precisely in the sense that it presupposes communication which, in 
turn, presupposes the sacrifice of sovereignty. In this way, the feeling of 
sovereignty is inseparable from that originary sense of the sharing of existence 
which Bataille had first sketched in LExperience int6rieure, as the 'labyrinthine 
composition of beings', or the complicit sense of '<< etre en rapport W. 
Sovereignty is shared: 'any subject maintaining sovereign value in opposition to 
the subordination of the object possesses his share in [en partage] this value with 
all men. 97 The thought of sovereignty is bound up with the very possibility of 
community in the same way that the notion of expenditure or sacrifice is 
inseparable from that of communication. Friendship is thus 'for the impossible' in 
the sense that, if this shared 'value' of sovereignty exists only insofar as it is 
risked or put into question, there is never any certainty that sovereignty can exist. 
The existence of sovereignty is its own impossibility. 
it is important to recognise that Bataille's engagement with Koj6ve' Hegel is 
not limited to "Hegel, la mort et le sacrifice" and "Hegel, Fhomme et I'histoire". 
These two articles are contemporary with a book on the origins of prehistoric art. 
137 
In Lascaux, ou la naissance de Vart (1955), Bataille locates the relation of 
sovereignty and friendship at the moment of the first production of a work of art, 
which he defines as the true beginning of 'Man'. Bataille writes from the same 
quasi-sociological and anthropological perspective which characterises the two 
Hegel papers, as well as the broader economic project of La Part maudite. When 
he states that his inquiry poses the question of the 'general sense that the work of 
art has for humanity', he insists that this is not a matter of choice or chance: 'the 
question imposed itself upon me since it is a matter of the most ancient art, of the 
birth of art, and not just one among many other of its developments'; which 
means, by extension, that the question of art does not present itself as just one 
among many other possible branches of inquiry into human history. 98 Bataille's 
task in this book, therefore, is directly connected to his critique of Kojeve's 
anthropogenetic reading of Hegel. His stated task is 'to underline' the point in 
time or 'moment of history' at which 'the "man of Lascaux" definitely and for the 
first time, [ ... ] resembled us, that evidently this was our resemblant [notre 
semblable]'. 99 This moment is the point at which this being begins 'making a 
work of art: it is 'the birth of art' which marks the first appearing of man's 
sovereignty; an event that Bataille calls 'the dawning of the human species', and 
the point at which 'the day is born of the night'. 1 00 However, this does not mean 
that 'the "man of Lascaux... ever intended or desired to make a work of art. In 
fact, this is perhaps the most important aspect of this event and 'our' relation to it: 
it is the fact that this being - whom Bataille acknowledges is not, strictly speaking, 
a 'man' at all - resembles us as a being who works, who makes things and is 
productive. It is this creativity, or 'creative virtue' - to use Bataille's phrase - to 
which this being 'bears witness'. ' 01 Hence, if Lascaux, ou la naissance de Vart is 
named after this event, and if what it aims to do is nothing less than 'show at what 
point the work of art was intimately bound to the formation of humanity', then 
this means that the 'event' in question - the 'birth of art' - is solely a matter of our 
recognition (of ourselves) in the work. 
138 
What are the consequences of Bataille's method? Tascaux' is an event of 
recognition insofar as we apprehend ourselves in 'the "man of Lascaux ... : he is 
our 'resemblant', the one who echoes our own self-mediation of 'Recognition' 
through the work. Yet this recognition of similarity is not the relation described 
and analysed by Kojeve. Instead, 'our' communication with 'the "man of 
Lascaux... takes place, for him, within the 'distant posterity' that we are in relation 
to his time. What 'we' receive from him, says Bataille, is 'what, in the depths of 
the earth,, leads us astray and transfigures us': what we receive from his work is 
'the vision of the most distant'; and whose 'message', whilst demanding of us 'the 
contemplation of being in its entirety', is nonetheless 'aggravated [ ... ] by an 
inhuman strangeness'. 102 In this case, then, resemblance is that which is the most 
strange, even 'inhuman', and resistant to all understanding. Resemblance distorts 
our own relation of recognition in the work. We can sense this similarity, but our 
desire for an origin is thwarted by a prior setting-into-work of everything which 
we 'are'. We are faced with a contradiction: we can recognise a simlarity in the 
'work', yet this relation is removed from the recognisably human. It is in order to 
explain how this sense of resemblance can still communicate with us that Bataille 
introduces the relation between friendship and art: 
If we go into the cave at Lascaux, a strong feeling grips us which we do 
not have in ftont of the display cases where the first remnants of human 
fossils or their stone instruments are exhibited. This is the same feeling of 
presence - of clear and burning presence - that masterpieces of every epoch 
give us. No matter what it seems, the beauty of human works addresses 
friendship, the pleasure of friendship. Is not beauty what we love? Is not 
friendship the passion, the always repeated interrogation to which beauty 
is the sole response? 103 
Bataille is making two different claims on the basis of this 'strong feeling': first, 
he affirms that it is this 'feeling', rather than any particular 'interest', which 
attracts us to the paintings at Lascaux; and second, he defines it as 'this feeling of 
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presence' which, in turn, defines 'the essence of the work of art'. 104 Most 
important of all, however, is the underlying relation between art and friendship in 
the form of the beautiful. Beauty in the work, contrary to whatever it may appear 
to, 'addresses' the sense of friendship first and foremost. The feeling of presence 
and the pleasure of friendship: this is what this first dawning of the work of art 
gives to us. It is not, therefore, a matter of our understanding of these works. In 
fact, Bataille freely acknowledges that the 'poverty' and 'inexactitude' of our 
knowledge is the reason why this feeling of friendship is so important in this case. 
Let us acknowledge it: the response that Lascaux gives us, at first, remains 
obscure in us, obscure, only half-intelligible. It is the most ancient 
response, the first, and the depths of times from which it comes are lit up 
only by the faltering light of dawn. What do we know of the men who will 
leave behind them only these ungraspable shadows, isolated from every 
background? Almost nothing. Except that these shadows are beautiful, as 
beautiful to our eyes as the most beautiful paintings in our museums. 105 
The principal difference between these works and the paintings in museums, for 
Bataille, is that 'we know the date, the artist's name, the subject, the purpose' of 
the latter. 106 The only relation open to us when faced with these ancient works of 
art is one of unitelfigibility and obscurity. We may recognise certain elements or 
figures, but what we cannot discern is the exact nature of their relations and 
setting. However, it is not simply for want of information that our understanding 
finds itself blunted. What remains in these works after such a vast passage of time 
is 6a profound, yet enigmatic communication': 
The paintings before us are miraculous, they communicate a strong and 
intimate emotion to us. Yet they are all the more unintelligible for that. 107 
For Bataille, there is no doubt that they communicate: they give something to 'us', 
as if in response to our presence; yet 'we' cannot be but at a loss to know 
precisely what it is. We are moved and affected by what we can only call their 
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beauty, even if what they are said to portray or relate (a hunt or a journey, for 
example) may leave us indifferent. Hence, it is this very beauty, devoid of context 
yet radiant, 'leaves us painfully suspended. 108 However, if we ask what 
C enigmatic communication' and 'unintelligibility' have to do with friendship; or 
why Bataille turns to this relation when 'the beauty of human works' is alreaedy 
mediated through the memory of the museum; if we ask these questions of 
Bataille's texts, it is impossible to find any answers. The entire force of this ýL- 
ev relation between friendship and 'the essence of the work of art' revolves around 
the terms 'feeling' and 'presence', which are left at the level of evidence, or 
obviousness. They are simply posited or assumed. It is this experience of 
suspension which holds this evidence together: the opening of a sense of 
uncertainty and the refusal of mastery. We will return to this sense of suspension 
in the next chapter, when we turn to examine Blanchot's writing on the museum 
and the work of art. 
What we have uncovered in this chapter is the key moment of Bataille's 
adherence and opposition to Kojeve's reading of Hegel: whether 'pro' or 'contra', rv I 
I Bataille shares with Kojeve a thought of the immanence of community and self- 
Ll< ) 
identity through the act of sacrifice. Both the struggle for recognition and 
'complicit ftiendship' posit a relation with a 'resemblant, and therefore ground 
the very thought of relation in an original and fundamental sense of similarity and 
continuity between beings. In the final chapter, then, we will return to the work of 
ýe- 
Blanchot in order to determine whether - and in what way(s) - the thought of -S- 
friendship and discretion in his work draws upon his reading of Hegel and his 
presentation 01 LnC WOFY, OJL UIA. 
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causes deep problems for Kojeve's metaphysical dualism; and once again, this theme 
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Chapter 4 
The discretion of literature: Blanchot and Hegel 
Discretion - reserve - is the place of literature. 
Maurice Blanchot 
Our inquiry into Blanchot's conception of friendship has brought us to ask about 
his relation to Hegel. In the first two chapters, we found that Blanchot and Bataille 
present friendship in terms of discretion and complicity: two contiguous yet 
incompatible figures for a relation thought on the basis of either discontinuity or 
continuity. In the third chapter, a closer analysis of Bataille's work revealed that 
his formulation of 'complicit friendship' articulated a strategic inversion of 
Kojeve's dialectic of Recognition. By presenting this relation in terms of 
incompletion and impossibility, Bataille uses it as a figure for his counter-reading 
of the 'setting to work' of death in the Phenomenology. This link between 
friendship and Hegel's 'work' leads us to ask whether there is a similar 
correspondence in the work of Blanchot. In this final chapter, then, we need to 
ascertain whether the relation of his thought of 'discretion' to Bataille's use of 
tcomplicity' is simply paraphrastic or whether - as our analyses in chapters one 
and two indicated - the apparent proximity in using these two terms as synonyms 
for ftiendship, indicates the presence of a more complex 'diff6rend'. 
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As we have argued in the Introduction, the influence of Hyppolite's translation 
and commentary of the Phenomenology, often overlooked, is in fact fundamental 
to Blanchot's own readings of Hegel. This perspective provides the context for the 
following argument: the place of Blanchot's thinking of friendship within his 
work as a whole cannot be divorced from his reading of Hegel; and that this 
(. place' is determined precisely in relation to the work of art. This argument will 
be staged in two sections. In the first section, Blanchot's reading of Hegel will be 
defined in the relation between the negative, language, and literature in "La 
litterature et le droit d la mort"; and the figure of friendship will be indicated 
within his formulation of ambiguity insofar as it sets in place a thinking of 
discretion. We will be concerned with how this word, as the gesture or the figure 
of friendship, can come to designate the 'place of literature'. The second section 
shows how, in texts ftorn LEspace litteraire and LAmitie, Blanchot follows 
Hegel indirectly by placing friendship in relation to the reception of works of art 
from the past and the concomitant appearance of these works 'as such'. It will be 
argued that, throughout Blanchot's conception of the relation between of the fate 
of art and the work as such, we can discern the double movement of discretion, 
which will allow us to grasp the sense in which Blanchot's own essays can be 
defined as a work o iendship. Or 
4.1 -A 'strange right': literature and negativity 
The interplay of negativity, language and literature underpins Blanchot's inquiry 
in "La litterature et le droit a la mort", the first piece in which his engagement 
with Hegel becomes central to his work. Indeed, this interplay 
ý is triggered by 
two citations from Hegel. The first passage is the famous description of 'the life of 
spirit' from the Preface to the Phenomenology: 
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But the life of spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself 
untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures [ertrdgt] it and 
maintains itself [sich erhdlt] in it. 2 
The second passage comes from the Jena Realphilosophie of 1803-4, one of the 
early attempts to construct a philosophical 'system', in which Hegel uses the 
example of Adam to illustrate the essential function of naming as a defining 
operation of negativity in human intelligence: 
The first act, by which Adam established his lordship over the animals, is 
this, that he gave them a name, i. e., he negated them as beings [seyende], 
and made them ideal for themselves [ffir sich ideelen]. 3 
For Hegel's philosophy, the importance of the conceptual work expressed in these 
two passages cannot be understated: it is the work of aufheben, the operationof 
negativity which uproots or destroys and preserves or maintains in the same 
moment. What concerns us in this section is the significance of these two passages 
for Blanchot. What 'work' do they perform in his inquiry into the relation between 
literature and negativity? What does it give us to understand about the general 
nature of his relation to Hegel? The rethinking of negativity by way of literature 
and literary language informs Blanchot's work as a whole; in the words of 
Frangoise Collin, the negative provides the 'ultimate' and 'inaugural' theme of his 
work. 4 In turn, by placing 'literature' in this relation to Hegel's 'work of the 
negative', Blanchot also begins to refigure the 'work'_, along the lines of 
desoeuvrement and discreti-o-n. 
First of all,, a remark about the structure of Blanchot's essay. It originally 
appeared in two parts with separate titles, "Le r&gne animal de 1'esprit" and "La 
litterature et le droit a la mort". 5 These two parts constitute a single work; the 
latter is described as 'la suite et la fin' of the former. 6 There is no sign of this 
division when the essay is reprinted, italicised throughout, at the end of La Part 
du feu (1949). Even in this form, however, the original division remains, for the 
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two 'halves' of the essay treat of two distinct topics in quite different ways. In "Le 
regne animal de Fesprit", Blanchot explores the contradictions Of the writer and 
the act of writing by running through and rearranging a series of 'moments' 
selected from the Phenomenology: the spiritual-animal kingdom; the dependence 
and indepedence of self-consiousness; freedom of self-consciousness (stoicism, 
scepticism, and unhappy consciousness); and absolute freedom (the Terror of the 
French Revolution). These moments are recognisable, but their sense and order of 
dialectical unfolding are manipulated in accordance with Blanchot's focus on the 
literary work as 'the work par excellence. 7 Why this privilege of the (Hegelian) 
work as a work of art? Is it justifiable? It is to this end that in the second part he 
develops an account of the relation of literature to language in general. This 
account seeks to describe this exemplarity of the literary work on the basis of an 
irreducible ambiguity which is conceived as the most minimal, incipient state of 
language. This doubling of sense is at work in the simplest act of naming, as the 
operation of the most basic and primeval component of language. 
In this way, the second half sketches out the paradoxical condition for the 
contradictions analysed in the first. This means that in effect the second half cuts 
back beneath those categories (such as 'work', 'writing', and 'experience') whose 
paradoxes are unfolded in the first half, by refashioning 'literature' as a form of 
research into the (as yet unnamed) movement of desoeuvrement as that 'space' 
within which the 'work' appears as such. It is in this second half of the essay that 
we will look for Blanchot's rewriting of Hegel; in particular, his appropriation of 
the two passages from Hegel which figure the work of negativity within the 
development of consciousness and spirit. Of these two passages only the Jena text 
is formulated by Hegel in explicitly linguistic terms. However, Blanchot takes 
both the 'life of spirit' and Adamic naming as figures for the most basic structure 
of language; and he situates literature as the form of research into the relation 
between language and negativity. In this way, these Hegel citations form the 
conceptual and thematic bridge which unites the two halves of Blanchot's essay. 
(Indeed, we shall see that they are interwoven in a decisive passage on literature as 
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a form of 'recherche'. ) The 'life of spirit' passage, prior to the second half, is first 
cited as a kind of conclusion, at the end of "Le regne animal de 1'esprit": 
Literature glimpses itself in revolution, it justifies itself in it, and if it has 
been called the Terror, it is because it's ideal is indeed this historical 
moment, the moment when "life bears death and maintains itself within 
death itself' in order to obtain from it the possibility and the truth of 
speech. Here is [C'est la] the "question" which seeks to accomplish itself 
in literature and which is its being. 8 
Up to this point, Blanchot has followed the relation of 'writer', 'literature', and 
'world' through a series of irreconcilable contradictions, which culminate and 
coalesce in the moment when literature 'sees itself in the 'historical moment' of 
absolute freedom, 'the Terror'. 9 Thus, the 'passage from nothing to everything' 
which characterises revolutionary activity is mirrored by the writer, whose literary 
activity proceeds 'without pause and almost without mediation. " 0 The citation of 
the 'life of spirit' figures this moment of reflection; and so it is used to gather up 
the preceding movement of contradictions, and to maximise their contradictory 
force. The question of literature is inverted. 'C'est U la << question)) qui cherche a 
s'accomplir dans la litterature et qui est son &tre. ' The question asked 'about' 
literature becomes what literature 'is about. In "Le regne animal de 1'esprit" this 
final enigmatic line formed a solitary new paragraph, as if it stood apart from the 
main body of the text, pointing out the question's arrival, 'there' ['la'], in this 
'moment' of ideal identification. How should we understand this tentative 
("question... which does not appear to ask anything? Does it announce the arrival 
of something new, perhaps, the result or the truth of preceding contradictions? On 
the contrary, his caution about this ... question... lies in its 'being' literature. It is 
less a new shape or result of previous contradictions than a stumbling block that 
exposes literature as such, for the first time: it marks the point - 'la' - at which 
literature has become a question that concerns itself with its own origin, with 'the 
possibility and the truth of speech'. 
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Blanchot does not present this correlation between the 'right to death' and the 
'life of spirit' as an interpretation of the Phenomenology. So what does this 
citation of Hegel do here? It shows literature to itself. In the following sections, it 
will be argued that this correlation draws upon and draws our attention to the 
question of language in the Hegelian text. It is because this question is already 
present within the very structure of the Phenomenology that Blanchot, in the 
course of his essay, can rewrite the 'life of spirit' as language: 'language is the life 
which bears death and maintains itse4f within it. ' 11 In this gradual rewriting of 
perhaps the most famous passage from Hegel, Blanchot not only inscribes the 
operation of determinate negation at the centre of his analysis of language and 
literature; but more importantly, he places literature at the heart of our experience 
of negativity. In this first section, then, we will examine the way in which 
Blanchot rewrites Hegel around the question of language by exploiting the 
fundamental and unstable sense of 'disquiet' (which Hyppolite identifies as the 
motor of Hegel's dialectical scepticism). In this way, he opens up the relation of 
language, memory and negativity in the passage from Hegel's Realphilosophie. 
Then, in the second section, we will see how his treatment of this passage about 
Adamic language opens onto the 'ultimate ambiguity' of literary language. 
4.11 - The disquiet of language 
Recall that it is an inversion by which the 'question of literature' turns into its very 
'being' that allows Blanchot to present literature as the relation to an origin. The 
origin in question is nothing less than that of meaning and communicability in 
general. This shift in focus from the writer's experience of writing to the 
ontological condition of language is fixed in the opening lines of the essays 
second half - the original "La litterature et le droit a la mort" as it appears in 
Critique: 
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Literature is bound to language. Language is at once comforting and 
disquieting. When we speak, we make ourselves masters of things with an 
ease that satisfies us. I say: this woman, and immediately she is available 
to me, I push her away, bring her close, she is everything that I desire her 
to be, she becomes the place of the most surprising transformations and 
actions: speech is the ease and security of life. We cannot do anything with 
a nameless object. 12 
Blanchot announces here the main theme for the second half of this essay: the 
essential ambiguity which is lies at the heart of language. 'Langage est a la fois 
rassurant et inquietant. ' It is the simultaneity of 'comfort' and 'unease' that 
defines our relation to language, and so informs the literature that is 'bound' to it. 
But what is it 'in' language that comforts us? And what is it that disquiets us? Is it 
the same thing? The final sentence signals a latent anxiety which returns to haunt 
Blanchot's inquiry: 'D'un objet sans nom, nous ne savons rien faire. ' This 
'disquiet' in the face of the 'nameless' arises from the very aspect of language 
which provides our unconcerned 'comfort' and 'savoir faire': 
The word gives me the being, but it gives it to me deprived of being. It is 
the absence of this being, its nothing [neant], that which remains of it 
when it has lost being, that is to say the sole fact that it is not. From this 
point of view, to speak is a strange right. 13 
Hence, the 'lack' ['d6faut'] of any immediate relation between words and things 
does not represent a lacuna in the operations of speech. On the contrary, this 
'fault' or 'gap' is the origin of all its 'ease and security'. Our mastery and our 
unease share this same root: the power of the negative; the 'sole fact that it is not'. 
For Blanchot, it is this constitutive 'nothing' that makes the act of speaking a 
4 strange right. 
in unfolding this constitutive relation of language and the negative he draws 
himself ever closer to Hegel, who conceives of language as the expressive 
156 
medium of universality, or the external existence of an inner conceptual 
intelligence. Hegel's first attempt to work out a speculative account of the 
development of spirit, the Jena Realphilosophie (1803-4), begins with language, 
'die SpMehe'. Language is conceived as the first stage of this development: the 
transition from the 'dumb signification' which characterises (merely empirical) 
'imagination' to the first 'existence of consciousness' which emerges through 
memory and the production of names. 14 For Hegel, all thought begins with the 
name. Consciousness first exists insofar as it exists in a nomenclature. Hence his 
example: the giving of names to the animals is Adam's 'first act', the original 
mark of man's relation to himself and to the world. 15 This conception of language 
as the initial form of negativity in name-giving memory, or 'Geddchtnis', is one 
that Hegel allies to 'the Mnemosyne of the ancients', the mother of the muses. 16 
He sets himself against the idea that the intellectual operation of memory is 
reducible to the recollection and maintenance of a sensible intuition identified as 
'something past'. On the contrary, the 'true meaning' of this memory lies in the 
way that it performs an irreversible transformation on the content of every 
intuition, making it into a 'matter-of-memory' ['GeddchtnipSache'], into 
something 'thought' ['gedanken'l. 17 All thought begins with this 'thinking 
memory' of names because everything that takes place in consciousness comes 
after this 'Aufhebung'. 'Es ist in Namen, dap wir denken. ' ['It is in names that we 
think. '] 18 In this way, Hegel's concern is not with the origin of language, but with 
the origin that language is for thought. What is the significance of this origin in 
the Phenomenology? 
The figure of Adam passes ftom Hegel to Blanchot via Hyppolite, who uses it 
to link the most basic characterisation of language in the Phenomenology - what 
Hegel calls 'Beschreiben', a 'description' that is 'a superficial extraction of the 
universal ftom the sensible' - with the later introduction of art and poetry in the 
"RELIGION" chapter. 19 Although Blanchot's citation is not an exact transcription 
ftom Genese et structure, the discussion here is important for an understanding of 
his approach to Hegel in "La litterature et le droit a la mort". On the one hand, 
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Hyppolite (unlike Kojeve, for example) accords language a properly originative 
role in the Phenomenology. He states that the presupposition of communicability 
in the opening dialectic of sense-certainty is the reason why Hegel 'returns [to it] 
ceaselessly throughout the course of this work': it is the very 'fact that things can 
be said' that bears within it 'the sign' of the concept, the identity of nature and 
spirit in the 'human Logos. 20 On the other hand, he underlines the fact that such a 
presupposition is just that, a preliminary position: the word is already, but not yet 
the concept; it is still 'merely a sign' which remains external to the concept. In 
short, he reaffirms Hegel's dictum that language is 'das Dasein des Geistes', 'the 
(external) existence of spirit'; a phrase which, for Hyppolite, defines the 'function' 
of language that 'accompanies the principal developments' of this work. 21 This is 
also how Hegel defines the activity of the poet in (implicit) contrast to the work of 
the philosopher. 22 It is to illustrate this point that Hyppolite explicitly ties this 
most primitive and external beginning of thought to the language of poetry: 
Like the poet, particularly the epic poet, who by speaking things gives 
them the stamp of universality and the form of thought, so in naming 
things we raise them from the sensible to thought. In the first philosophy 
of spirit [ ... ], Hegel lay great stress upon this memory of things, which 
is at 
the same time a memory of words, the Mnemosyne of the Ancients. Purely 
sensible intuition is overcome. "In the name,. the empirical being is 
suppressed... it becomes something ideal. The first act by which Adam 
constituted his domination over the animals is that in which he gave them 
,, 23 a name, negating them as being and making them ideal for themselves. 
The significance of Adam's 'first act' is that the name can give things only 'the 
stamp of universality' or 'the form of thought'. It is this superficiality of the 
spoken or written word with respect to the concept that defines language in terms 
of an 'already'/'not yet". For Hyppolite, the poet is the Adamic figure of the 
Phenomenology: it is 'particularly the epic poet' whose naming can 'raise' 
['clever'] a thing from sensuous intuition into simple thought. When he appears in 
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"'Kunstreligion", the 'epic poet' or 'bard' ['der Sdnger'] presents the transition 
from the 'living' to the 'spiritual' work of art insofar as he is the 'individual and 
actual spirit', or the subject of the world, in whom this world 'is produced and 
borne'. 24 In this way, the ... pathos... of the poet-subjeýct marks the existence of the 
cearliest language' ['die erste Sprache], the first and most primitive form of 
25 linguistic representation: 'the epic as such' . 
The production of the epic is not an 
immediate feeling for nature, but the work of mediation and spiritual 
interiorisation which requires distance and the passing of time, This work too is 
carried out under poetry's muse, 'the Mnemosyne of the ancients': it is this 
'memory of words' aswell as 'of things' which triggers 'the awakening of 
consciousness [Besinnung] and a gradually developed inwardness, the 
26 remembrance [Erinnerung] of previously immediate essence' . What links Adam 
and the epic poet is (the muse of) memory. It is their receptivity to Mnemosyne 
that makes them both figures of a double beginning: the first language, and 
language as thefirst 'existence of spirit'. 
So how should we characterise the relation of language and dialectic in the 
Phenomenology? 27 Unlike the Science of Logic, Hegel does not aim to begin from 
a state of presuppositionlessness; and unlike the Realphilosophie, language is not 
consigned to a specific moment in consciousness' development. Hegel purposely 
begins in medias res: the first chapter begins with the slipperiness of the words 
'this', 'here', 'now'. Thus, the Phenomenology presupposes the existence of (a 
complex) language. The relation of language and dialectic thus lies in this 
presupposition of communicability and mediation. (The fact that neither is given 
any explicit explanation in the text is a mark of their ubiquity. ) One can step 
outside of language as little as one can step outside of the dialectic of history. 
Hence, language permeates the historical development of consciousness in the 
Phenomenology, whether in the fonn of the speculative proposition or the epic 
poem. By beginning with the language of immediacy, Hegel allows its very 
givenness - the fact that there is language; the fact of communicability - to 
confront us with our own immersion in mediation. It is this very givenness of 
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language that is expressed in the 'already'/'not yet'. The dialectic of sense- 
certainty enacts this immanence in language, which is what he means by saying 
that language itself is always 'more truthful' than consciousness' unthinking use 
of words. 28 In this naYve form, consciousness claims to 'represent' ['vorstellen'], 
here and now, this particular being ('I say: this woman'), without realising that 
what it 'expresses' ['aussprechen] every time is a pure, empty universal . 
29 Its 
claim to unmediated truth is undone by the gap between what it 'means' 
['meinen'] and what it says. 30 The truth of language, for Hegel, lies in this 
mediation: by exposing the meaning invested in it, language always alters it. In 
the Hegelian text, the ensuing contradictions are not deficiencies of language, but 
result from consciousness' misconceptions of it. What 'we' need to grasp, Hegel 
claims, is what consciousness cannot: the 'divine nature' of language, which lies 
in 'directly reversing the meaning of what is said [die Meinung unmittelbar zu 
verkehren], of making it into something else, and thus not letting what is meant 
get into words at all'. 31 This instability of language is pivotal in Hegel's text as a 
whole for two reasons: first, it is only through language that the self-certain 
subject can express itself and be recognised as such by others - that is, self- 
consciousess 'finds a voice'; and second, because it is through its use of language 
that consciousness runs up against its own errors, this process illuminates, for the 
first time, the state of internal contradiction in which consciousness exists 'for us' 
- 'we', the readers, who can grasp this incessant reversal and transfiguration as the 
truth of language. Thus, Hegel relies upon this 'divine nature' - which, by his own 
definition, is an unwieldy component to rely upon - to introduce 'us' to the 
movement of dialectical inversion. 
The structural ambiguity of meaning and expression, which is in the 'nature' 
of language, sets theform of dialectical inversion in the Phenomenology. In the 
Introduction, this process of repeated inversion is described as 'a thoroughgoing 
scepticism'. 32 At every stage of its knowing, consciousness finds that what is most 
'real' and most familiar becomes 'un-real' and un-familiar; its experience is a 
state of constant unrest, a becoming without respite. Hegel calls the movement of 
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this negativity, which constitutes the subject as such, 'die Unruhe' (translated 
equally well as 'unrest', 'unease, 'disquiet', or 'restlessness'). The transition by 
which consciousness always exceeds its own limits, spoiling its 'own limited 
satisfaction', is not without pain and struggle; it does not freely welcome such 
traumatic disturbance, even preferring to remain in a state of quiescence and 
untruth. 
Yet consciousness can find no peace [keine Ruhe]. If it wishes to remain in 
a state of unthinking inertia, then thought troubles its thoughtlessness, and 
its own unrest [Unruhe] disturbs its inertia. 33 
At the heart of this scepticism, 'Unruhe' forms the pivot for Hegels account of the 
distinction between death as the event which ends all natural life and as that which 
is proper to consciousness. It describes this effort and effect of thinking; what 
Hegel calls 'the work of the negative'. Hence, when we read that it is 
consciousness' unrest ['seine Unruhe'], it is important to remember that, for 
consciousness, this experience is nothing less than its own death; and if it must 
resist this impersonal force of its own dialectical unfolding, then 'its own unrest' 
can only appear as such to us. In "Sense-Certainty", natural consciousness may 
learn from its experience, but it is 'always forgetting it and starting the movement 
all over again. ' 34 This difference in perspective, therefore, lies between the 
forgetful 'inertia' of natural consciousness, and the 'Unrahe' of phenomenological 
recollection; in short, natural consciousness lives in a state of oblivion, whilst its 
4own unrest' is already the work of this recollective consciousness as yet 
unrecognised within it. The impersonal restlessness of this memory is what 
dispossesses and disorients natural consciousness, forcing it to outstrip its own 
conception of things and of itself. Yet this sense of disequilibrium is only 
discernable 'behind the back' of consciousness. It is 'our' perspective on events, 
our reading of the text, which is detennined by this remembering. In this sense, 
the double perspective of 'Rir es' and 'ftir uns' is determined by memory. Only 
from 'our' perspective can the 'subject' of the Phenomenology be seen to be 
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oriented by its own disorientation. 35 If such disorientation pushes consciousness 
from moment to moment, it is always driven towards recollecting its orientation in 
the whole, in the identity of concept and object which is the 'goal' of absolute 
knowing. 
It is the movement of 'Unruhe' that prompts this recollective structure, insofar 
as it forms the movement by which the subject undergoes the dissolution of its 
'identity' in order, ultimately, to find it again in its other. Once again, it is Jean 
Hyppolite, perhaps more than any other commentator, who is at pains to place this 
'Unruhe' at the heart of the Hegelian conception of dialectic: 
The epithet that returns most often in the Hegelian dialectic is unruhig. 
This life is restlessness, restlessness of the Self which loses itself and finds 
itself again in its alterity; yet it is never coincidence with itself, for it is 
always other in order to be itself; it always posits itself in a determination, 
and always negates itself in order to be itself, because this determination, 
as such, is already its first negation. This is the being of man "who is never 
what he is, and is always what he is not". 36 
This 'life' is the 'life of spirit'. To say that one must think 'spirit' as 'subject' 
means that one must think in terms of 'Unruhe'. If Hyppolite's interpretation of 
Hegel possesses a 'key' of any kind, it lies in 'Finqui&tude'. At the beginning of 
his translation of the Phenomenology, he notes that 'the dialectic of human 
disquiet is perhaps one of the fundamental intuitions of Hegelianism; and again 
in Genese et structure, he states that this 'unruhig' subject forms the 'point of 
departure of Hegelian speculation' from the earliest attempts at a systematic 
philosophy at Jena. 37 What kind of claim is being made here? Recall that Kojeve 
posits 'Recognition' as the 'key notion' of Hegelianism, the final 'satisfaction of 
Desire' and 'end of History'. 39 Like Kojeve, Hyppolite emphasises the sense of 
violent conflict inherent to the historical development of spirit; the negativity of a 
subject that is never 'coincidence with itself; and the central importance of 
intersubjectivity and community in the Phenomenology. But instead of lifting out 
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one 'moment' to stand for the whole, Hyppolite foregrounds the immanent 
structure of the text which Hegel had outlined in the Introduction. He locates 
unrest at the dialectical heart of experience: 'It is this unrest or this instability of 
natural consciousness which is the dialectic of experience. ' 39 In this way, he 
recognises that if spirit is to be conceived as subject, then the Hegelian epithet of 
ýL- 
'unruhig' cannot describe an attribute of a self, as if were a matter of adding to 
some pre-constituted personality or identity. Instead, the restlessness of the subject 
is 'existential' in the sense of an infinite, impersonal movement that passes 
through all the 'moments' of the text, whether it (the subject) appears as 
consciousness,, self-consciousness, community, a society, or 'world-spirit,. 40 That 
which is 'subject' is 'unruhig' in the sense that it 'is' nothing apart from this 
ceaseless movement of becoming, in all of its historical and cultural forms, which 
eventually joins all of them together as a recollected whole. 
If the act of naming marks the co-belonging of memory and language at the 
origins of thought, and if thinking is defined by the sense of disquiet experienced 
in the uprooting and abandonment of meaning, then it is interesting that Hyppolite 
explicitly locates Hegel's figure of the poet as the instance of this origin. In the 
following section, then, we will show how these elements of Hyppolite's 
exposition - Adamic naming; the epic poet; Tinquietude' - both inform and are 
transfonned by Blanchot's presentation of literature and literary language in "La 
litterature et le droit a la mort". 
I 
4.12 - The ambiguity of literature 
After this detour through Genese et structure, it is possible to read Blanchot's 
41 
description of language in terms of Tinquietude' in its proper context . In fact, 
Blanchot uses this word in "La litterature et le droit a la mort" to describe not only 
language in general, but also to denote an 'authentic' or 'essential' experience of 
literature. In this way, Tinquietude' yields an important clue about the nature of 
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the relation to Hegel in his work as a whole. In spite of his 'distance' from 
Hegel's text, he borrows from it what is (for Hyppolite, at least) a 'fundamental' 
concept, and diverts it in another direction. So what does Tinquietude' mean for 
Blanchot? Hyppolite defines it as the structuring movement of, and therefore 'our' 
perspective on, the becoming of consciousness. Blanchot seizes upon this relation 
of disquiet and the negative in order to describe the constitution of literature: 
[L]iterary language is made of disquiet, it is also made of contradictions. 
42 Its position is hardly stable and hardly solid . 
Literature has a precarious state of existence. Indeed, for Blanchot, it is a wonder 
that it exists at all, as the title of an earlier work testifies - "Comment la litt6rature 
est-elle possible? ', 43 This fragility is linked to a sense of impersonality. Just as 
Hyppolite discerns that Hegel's restless scepticism carries out an existential 
intensification of experience only 'for us, and not for the consciousness that 
undergoes it, so Blanchot too locates inquietude at a level that is constitutive of 
literary experience as such. But what kind of 'experience' is this? 
It is to this end that the two Hegel passages are Juxtaposed with references to 
Hblderlin and Mallarme. 44 At first, the two poets appear to function as mediators 
of Hegelian concepts insofar as they are said to bear witness to 'la merveille 
inquietante' concealed within the Adamic act of naming. 45 Yet they are much 
more than 'literary' or 'poetic' examples of a philosophical discourse, for it is this 
testimony that makes them representatives of 'all those for whom poetry has the 
essence of poetry for its theme'. 46 In the determination of this 'essence' the 
identity of literature (as well as its relation to philosophy) is under negotiation. 
Literature has been placed at the heart of our experience of negativity in a way 
that prefigures Blanchot's later claim, in LEspace fitt&aire (1955), that 
MallarmCs 'Hegelian vocabulary would merit no attention if it were not animated 
by an authentic experience, [ ... ] that of the power of the negative. ' 
47 Like 
6essence', the word 'authentic' here causes the relation between literature and 
philosophy to hang in the balance. If Blanchot borrows from Hegel in defining 
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language in terms of '; unrest' and 'contradiction', these terms also pass by way of 
the poets' experience of poetry. It is only after positing poetry as an investigation 
into its own 'essence' that Blanchot introduces the passage about Adamic naming 
from the Realphilosophie. Indeed, one question that arises from this presentation 
is why Hegel, in this passage, is described as the 'friend and fellow-spirit' of 
1461derlin. (Blanchot locates this relation 'here', 'en cela'. ) This reference to 
HdIderlin gives him a certain purchase upon Hegel's text, enabling him to rewrite 
this passage from that 'point of view' to which both H61derlin and Mallarme are 
said to bear witness. Let us read the passage in context: 
From this point of view, to speak is a strange right. Hegel, in a text from 
before The Phenomenology, here the friend and fellow spirit [prochain] of 
H61derlinY wrote: "The first act,, by which Adam made himself master of 
the animals, was to impose a name on them, that is to say that he negated 
them in their existence (as existents). " Hegel means that from this instant, 
the cat ceased to be a uniquely real cat, in order to become an idea as well. 
The meaning of speech demands, therefore, as a prelude to every word, to 
all speech, a sort of immense hecatomb, a preliminary flood, plunging all 
creation into a complete sea. God had created beings, but man had to 
annihilate them. It is in this way that they take on a meaning for him, and 
he creates them in his turn on the basis of this death in which they have 
disappeared; only that, in place of beings [Wes] and, as we say, existents 
[existants], there was only being [Fetre], and man was condemned not to 
be able to approach anything and live anything save through the meaning 
that he had to create. 48 
It is no exaggeration to say that the entire second half of "La litterature et le droit a 
la mort" unfolds from this passage. A number of aspects, therefore, are worth 
noting. The theme of biblical allegory is taken up in the description of language 
arising from out of 'un deluge pr6alable'. The process of signification in the 
'Aufhebung' of naming is imagined a priori and en bloc. The repetitions of 
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apnonty and totality - 'prelude', 'preliminary', 'on the basis of; 'all creation', 
gevery', 'complete sea', 'immense' - convey the sense of language as an originary 
fact: the very fact that there is language. In another essay from the same year 
Blanchot states that it is the 'example of poets like Mallarme and H61derlin' that 
gives us access to 'the originalfact of language', from which each interlocutor 
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and every act of communication takes its 'sense and existence' . This 'original 
fact' also echoes the sense of impersonal necessity expressed by 'Mnemosyne' in 
Hegel's example. Blanchot makes this sense explicit in the schema of Genesis: 
'God had created beings, but man had to annihilate them. ' The act of destruction- 
creation is the double imperative of our being finite. When he refers to a 
'hecatomb% a sacrifice of huge proportions, it is as if what language gives man, in 
the wake of this necessary and prior oblivion, is already dead, sacrificed to the 
meaning 'that he had to create'. 50 If words give us access to the 'sense' of things, 
it is only on the condition of the prior absence of every determinate 'thing', for the 
existence of the name, as Hegel shows us, must involve the passing of the thing 
into meaninglessness. It is the moment of sheer universality, originary yet empty. 
For Hegel, let us recall, the memory of names has nothing to do with indicating 
'past-ness' of an intuition or with resuscitating a past present as something 'in- 
itself. The 'true meaning' of 'Gedachtnis' is simultaneously that of a thinking 
constitutive of names and their empty, mechanical repetition. In this sense, both 
allegories - the flood and Adam's 'first act' - portray a moment that is primordial 
and prodigal in equal measure. Blanchot seizes upon this dual determination as a 
way of extending Hegel's argument, with all logical necessity, into the sphere of 
literature. 
Indeed, it is by repeating and deepening Hegelian negativity that Blanchot 
begins to displace the terms of Hegel's original argument. This fundamental 
determination of memory draws together language and finitude, binding the act of 
speaking and the fact of dying to one and the same movement. Blanchot suggests 
that the fundamental interrelation of language and mortality announces itself in 
the movement of exchange, such as dialogue and conversation. If an intimation of 
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death lies at the origin of all communication, binding together speaker and listener 
as well as words and things, then any apriority of language must lie in this 
articulation of discontinuity. Death is what comes 'between us as the distance that 
separates us'; yet at the same time it is that which 'prevents us ftom being 
separated', for it contains within itself 'the condition of all understanding'. 51 The 
condition of finitude is nothing other than this constitutive separation of beings: it 
is the interval which irrevocably separates and individuates beings, whilst in that 
very separation it also makes possible every form of interpersonal relation and 
interaction. (In this respect, recall that Hegel's most famous figure for the power 
of mediation is the act of 'looking the negative in the face'. ) Thus, death is 'in' 
language as the communicability of communication, as the spacing of all relation. 
In our opening chapter, we noted this kind of formulation in "L'amitie", when 
Blanchot defines discretion as the 'pure interval' which measures out the distance 
'between' friends: 'this fundamental separation on the basis of which what 
separates becomes relation. 52 What the ultimate event of the friend's death brings 
is of course the effacement of this communicating distance. Between these two 
deaths Blanchot locates the paradox of giving expressive form to the fundamental 
condition for expression, of communicating 'communicability', or of speaking 
about that 'on the basis of which' something like speech can take place. What we 
approach in such formulae is the limit of expression or communication - that is, 
the limit of sense which is its condition and origin. He repeatedly states that 
nothing dies as a result of being spoken, but rather that speech always signals the 
'possibility of this destruction'. The idea that death lies embedded within the word 
means that our speech is 'a persistent allusion to such an event; and because we 
always speak from such a vast reservoir of memory, so when we speak 'death 
speaks' in us. 53 The fact that there is language is itself a sign; every act of speech, 
an indication and a warning; every name, an allusion to the finite being of the one 
who speaks, of that which is named, and of everyone who hears these words. 
'Possibility'; 'allusion'; 'sign': it is not a personal or direct threat of death that 
disturbs us when we speak. What 'disquiets' us in language is rather its 
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indirection. Even in the "Preface", when Hegel looks the negative 'in the face', it 
is not a matter of an uninediated face-to-face relation. One cannot 'look the 
negative in the face' nor 'tarry with it' any more than one can hold death at an 
arm's length. This most famous figure of speech in the Phenomenology installs a 
discourse on mediation by rhetoricizing death. The originariness of our relation to 
death must be articulated in the element of language, even as this relation is itseýf 
this originary element. Death becomes a rhetorical figure or trope with the same 
stroke that locates it at the origin of all figuration and troping. In this case, it is the 
trope of prosopopoeia that loans to the negative a 'face' into which we can 'look' 
['ins Angesicht schaut'], as well as a certain presence 'by' which we can 'tarry' or 
'dwell' ['bei ihm. verweilt']. 54 What is abstract and inanimate is thus given human 
characteristics. This ventriloquism opens a subtle rhetorical gap into which the 
negative is able to slip and to slip away, for in the name absence and unreality are 
transforined into being and presence: 'This tarrying is the magic power which 
turns it (back) into being [die es in das Sein umkehrt]. ' 55 Hegel knows that the 
ambiguity of reversal [Umgekehrt] remains whether one calls it 'the negative', 
4magical power', 'death', 'deterininate negation', or 'unreality'. In short, one only 
succeeds in lending 'it' another 'face': whatever name we may 'want' to give it, it 
is still just another (human) mask, just another substitute presence for what is not 
there. The negative remains inextricably bound to the inversions of language. 
Hegel introduces the theme of negativity through prosopopo'eia. Only through 
this figuration can death 'speak', can it 'face' or show itself to us as the 
(possibility' of destruction. But what can it say? What can it show us? It says and 
shows precisely nothing. For death is no thing: it is not something that can be an 
object for consciousness; yet it is precisely from this 'nothing' that speech and 
consciousness first spring. If the task of determining the originary relation of 
language and negativity itself requires words, metaphors, and figures, then these 
tropes (by which it turns to gaze upon itself) form an inextinguishable remainder 
(for which there is no word) which will always confront us at the reflexive limit of 
language. Speculative thinking lives off this remainder within linguistic 
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reflexivity: the 'life' of spirit lives on through this relation to death. Hyppolite 
displays such a rhetorical turn when he refers to the limitation of language as the 
C sign' of 'the human Logos: the relation of sign to concept is that of the word to 
'the Word'. Thus, Hegel cultivates and incorporates the aporia of language as the 
power of the sign. This is the 'speculative spirit' or 'divine nature' of language 
which intimates the essential reversibility of 'being' and 'nothing'. If nothingness 
is always 'of something' - that is, if it takes on a determinate meaning in the 
interaction between speakers, sign, and referent - then the word is also more than 
a sign referring to 'something' absent. With the word, meaning is present. To posit 
something (to speak) is to suspend, in advance, everything except the movement 
of positing as such. For Hegel, it follows that every sign is posited as a meaning 
and is itself 'the process of meaningfulness'. 56 Speculative inversion marks every 
instance of language as the process of pure subjective presentation itself With the 
birth of meaning, this movement of inversion never ends. 
This is the lesson that Blanchot draws from Hegel. If he states that literary 
language is made of 'unease' and 'contradictions, it is because the infinite 
restlessness of the negative, which is at the root of all language, is exposed most 
acutely in our relation to the literary work. How? Is this incessant reversibility of 
the negative what he has in mind when he locates the 'disquieting marvel' in the 
act of naming? Is this the 'essence of poetry' to which H61derlin and Mallarme are 
said to bear witness? What is clear is that an answer to these questions is no longer 
possible in ten-ns of a substantial essence or a stable identity. Literature itself 
comes to be defined in terms of an anonymous, impersonal existence which 
precedes any such determinations: ambiguity. Indeed, it is when Blanchot states 
that literature 'is language turning [se fait] into ambiguity' that we realise quite 
how far his reading of Hegel has taken us. 57 Whereas Bataille sought to repeat and 
invert KojeVe's dialectic of Recognition in order to collapse it back into a 
previously discarded 'moment', Blanchot's technique of repetition is to force the 
entire structural movement of the Hegelian text to stutter and open onto another 
direction. It is by understanding the interplay between memory, language and 
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negativity within Hegel's dialectic in terms of ambiguity that Blanchot carves out 
a place for literature. Thus, the relation of negativity and language's 'divine 
nature' is repeated in the form of an 'ultimate ambiguity' which is both the 
opening of meaning and the 'unstable point' at which literature exposed to an 
'indiscriminate change of meaning and of sign. '8 This exposure occurs, and 
remains, as the condition for any determinate signification. Hence it is not simply 
a matter of being unable to decide between two (or more) conflicting meanings: 
ambiguity is not reducible to a polysemy that would operate according to the 
structural laws of a given symbolical system. Instead, as Serge Doubrovsky 
correctly observes, ambiguity is existential in the sense that 'it announces the very 
being of man'. 59 For Blanchot, ambiguity describes the condition of man haunted 
by the effort to remember what is was that disappeared in order for language - his 
'admirable power' - to appear. 
Ambiguity is the source of the 'infinite disquiet' that man finds in language. 60 
When one asks after what has been lost 'in the beginning' in order for there to be 
communication and understanding, one touches upon the 'torment' of all 
language: this is the necessary 'lack' which makes language what it is, and which 
haunts us because we 'cannot even name it' without turning it into 'something' 
(else). 61 But in that case, how is it possible to name 'ambiguity'? Blanchot 
repeatedly refers to it in terms of 'an unstable point' or 'a point of instability, yet 
this solution only appears to throw up yet more problems, becuase to describe this 
'unstable point' as 'something present in the work' risks fixing ambiguity as a 
substantial or determinate 'presence'. However, this sense of ambiguity within the 
work Regardless of the form, content, or subject-matter of the work, ambiguity is 
the fact that there is 'something present in the work' which, without being 
dependent upon any of its qualities or characteristics, is always 'at work' altering 
and transforming its values. This 'point of instability' represents a relentless 
oscillation between negative and positive values, between 'distress' and 'hope', 
'disintegration' and 'construction': 
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Would there be, hidden within the intimacy of speech, a friendly and 
hostile force, an arm made for constructing and for destroying, which 
would act behind signification and not upon it? Must one suppose a 
meaning of the meaning of words [un sens du sens des mots] which, whilst 
determining it, would envelop this determination with an ambiguous 
indetermination poised between the yes and the no [en instance entre le oui 
et le non] ? 
62 
If 'instability' is what accompanies meaning in the word, at once protecting its 
exact signification and yet exposing it to the ever-imminent possibility of a 
change of meaning and value, what meaning or value does it possess? It is 
precisely this 'meaning of the meaning of words' which has been the elusive 
'object' of Blanchot's questions since he introduced the 'disquieting marvel' of 
naming. Ambiguity designates a reserve of excess meaning, 'a meaning of the 
meaning of words' which introduces the possibility of determination only 
alongside its negation in 'indetermination': 'a friendly and hostile force'; 'an arm 
made for constructing and for destroying'; 'poised between the yes and the no'. 
Ambiguity represents the simultaneous opening and suspension of meaning, and 
in this it gestures towards what Blanchot will later think under the heading of 'le 
neutre', but only by way of the 'work' of discretion which will concern us in the 
final section of this chapter. 
4.2 - 'Almost friendship': discretion and the work of art 
In the previous section we have shown why Blanchot's treatment of Hegel is not 
as reliant upon Kojeve as Bataille's inversion of the dialectic. Indeed, it is at times 
difficult to see whether Blanchot actually has what one could call a 'reading' of 
Hegel. If it is possible to trace 'Hegelian' concepts, figures or motifs within his 
work - as in "La litterature et le droit a la mort", where many of these elements 
appear for the first time - it is in the recognition that they are subject to a certain 
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displacement, or rewriting. By the same token, however, these 'borrowings' from 
the Phenomenology (and from Hyppolite's commentary in particular) demonstrate 
how deeply Blanchot's own thinking is immersed in the language of Hegel's 
dialectic. In fact,, this immersion seems to deepen even as his explicit distance 
from Hegel is extended during the 1950's and early 1960's - essays which will 
comprise LEspace litteraire and Le Livre a veni . r, as well as appearing in 
L'Entretien infini and LAmitie. It is to this subsequent work that we will now 
return in order to show how extensive this process of rewriting Hegel becomes, 
and to unravel further the link between friendship, discretion and the work of art. 
So far we have intimated that H61derlin's influence upon Blanchot is, in some 
way, central to this process. It will be argued here that Blanchot's reading of 
Hegel is best described as 'H61derlinian'. 63 It is no coincidence that he returns 
time and again to H61derlin as the figure of 'literary' discretion. Indeed, if 
Blanchot's appropriation of Hegel is accompanied by a figuration of Hblderlin, we 
may note that Hyppolite already sketches such a parallel in his discussion of 
"Kunstreligion": 'The gods, the poet H61derlin said, acquire not existence but self- 
consciousness from the fact that man names them. ' 64 In fact, this parallel runs far 
deeper, for Hyppolite goes on to argue that if Hegel's dialectic of religion as art 
'looks to recover the spiritual sense of Hellenic fantasy and myths', it is because 
his interest in 'the religious sense of ancient tragedy' must be traced to the 
influence of H61derlin, 'his co-disciple and friend'. 65 Consequently, when 
Hyppolite points to the continuity between Hegel's examples of Adam's naming 
of the animals and the epic poet (the one who 'names the gods') in terms of 
'Mnemosyne', one has to acknowledge an implicit reference to H61derlin's hymn 
of that title. This reference is echoed by Blanchot's comment that 'here', in the 
Realphilosophie, Hegel is H61derlin's 'friend andjellow spirit'. What, if anything, 
do these remarks by Hyppolite and Blanchot tell us about the way in which either 
one reads Hegel on the question of the artwork? Indeed, if this echo is to have 
anything more than emblematic significance we will have to dig deeper into the 
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way that Blanchot treats the Hegelian text, and in particular the narrative of the 
pastness of art that it presents. 
The epic poet is, of course, an integral moment of Hegel's dialectic of religion 
as art. This linkage of art and religion dominates his thesis on the artwork as 'a 
66 thing of the past' ['ein Vergangenes'] in Aesthetics . In this section, however, our 
attention will be drawn by a passage from the Phenomenology in which Hegel 
places a speculative figure of the museum, a muse-like figure of 'Er-innerung', at 
the centre of this relation. It is this memorialisation of art in the museum that 
draws Blanchot into a subtle rewriting of the dialectic presented in 
"Kunstreligion"; but it interests us above all because, by indirectly calling 
attention to the mediating role of the museum in our present relation to works of 
art from the past, Hegel deploys an enigmatic confluence of friendship and the 
work of art. So where does friendship lie in Hegel's dialectical ordinance of art, 
religion, and philosophy? The answer is simple. It lies firmly on the side of the 
recollected and memorialised 'pastness' of the work of art; it's spirituality is 
bound up with the externality of representation. Does Blanchot pick up on this 
aspect of Hegel's dialectic? Although not analysed for itself by Blanchot, this 
confluence of art and friendship can be traced from Hegel's text through 
Blanchot's account of the museum in relation to the modem fate of the work of 
art. In this way, the memorial figure of the museum allows us to open up the 
relation between friendship, discretion and the work in Blanchot's oeuvre. What 
we have been working towards in the course of the preceding chapters is an 
understanding of the centrality and repetition of this figure of friendship. The 
'work' of friendship qua discretion passes by way of this confluence of memory, 
death and the fate of art which Blanchot finds in Hegel. 
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4.21 - The friendly destiny' ofpresentation 
The theme and scope of this final section are given by a lengthy passage from the 
Phenomenology which, written well in advance of his lectures on aesthetics, 
addresses precisely this relation with the work of art as 'a thing of the past'. The 
passage in question holds a pivotal place in the dialectic of religion: it gathers 
together and unifies the moments which lead up to the appearing of "The 
Revealed Religion" (Christianity) and the subsequent accession to "ABSOLUTE 
KNOWING" (and the advent of philosophy). Placed at the beginning of "Revealed 
Religion", this passage gives an account of the dissolution and re-incorporation of 
"Religion in the Form of Art" through the moments of the 'abstract', the 'living', 
and the 'spiritual' works of art. In this way, it addresses our relation to art as a 
relation with 'a thing of the past' insofar as the end of art is shown to be 
inextricably bound up with the end of this form of religion. We will cite the 
passage in three parts, in order keep track of the principal questions which concern 
us. 
In the condition of right, therefore, the ethical world and the religion of 
that world are submerged and lost in the comic consciousness, and the 
unhappy consciousness is the knowledge of this total loss. It has lost both 
the worth it attached to its immediate personality and the worth attached to 
its personality as mediated, as thought [gedachten]. Trust in the eternal 
laws of the gods has vanished, and the oracles, which pronounced on 
particular questions, are dumb. The statues are now only cadavers 
[Leichname] from which the living soul has flown, just as the hymns are 
words from which belief has gone. The tables of the gods provide no 
spiritual food and drink, and in his games and festivals man no longer 
recovers the joyful consciousness of his unity with the divine. The works 
of the muse now lack the power of the spirit, for the spirit has gained its 
certainty of itself from the crushing of gods and men. [ ... ] 
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At this point, Hegel's recapitulation becomes a matter for 'us', 'now'. But when is 
this 'now'? It is after the realisation of this 'total loss' of the artwork which can no 
longer 'live' nor replenish us with any spiritual sustenance. Hegel locates this 
moment 'in dem Rechtszustande% in the world of merely abstract right and 
individualism which comes after the 'ethical world' ['Sittlichkeit'] of the Greeks, 
and which represents its descent into unhappy consciousness. Yet the 'we' that 
identifies these structural moments of the text as 'for us' - 'we', the readers of the 
Phenomenology - is not figured by the 'grief and longing' of this forrn of self- 
consciousness. 67 Hence, when the work of art falls away from the grace of spirit - 
from the muse, Mnemosyne, who originally gives the epic poet his voice - it is not 
without the possibility of a 'higher mode' (or a greater depth) of self- 
consciousness. But what becomes of these works of art? 
[ ... ] Now they have become what they are for us - beautiful fruit already 
picked from the tree, which a friendly destiny has offered us [ein 
freundliches Schicksal reichte sie uns dar], as a young girl might present 
[prdsentiert] us with fruit. It cannot give us the actual life in which they 
existed, not the tree that bore them, not the earth and the elements which 
constituted their substance, not the climate which gave them their peculiar 
character, nor the cycle of the changing seasons that governed the process 
of their growth. So destiny does not restore [gibt] their world to us along 
with the works of antique Art, it gives not the spring and summer of the 
ethical life in which they blossomed and ripened, but only the shrouded 
recollection [die eingehiillte Erinnerung] of that actuality. Our act of 
en oying them is therefore not an act of divine worship through which our 
consciousness might come to its perfect, fulfilled truth; rather, it is an 
external activity - the wiping-off of some drops of rain or specks of dust 
from these fruits, so to speak - one which erects an intricate scaffolding of 
the dead elements of their outward existence [auBerlichen Existenz], the 
language, the historical circumstances, etc., in place of the inner elements 
of the ethical life which environed, engendered and inspired them. And all 
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this we do, not in order to enter into their very life but only to possess an 
idea of them in our imagination [in sich vorzustellen]. [ ... ] 
With every passing moment and every additional historical fact, we get further 
away from the 'life' of such works. We remain outside them, whilst the sole path 
of access at our disposal - memory and imagination - only conceals their 'actual 
world' with a complex structure of 'dead elements'. Such 'external activity' 
includes every form of historical and linguistic representation; everything that 
may be put 'in place of ['an die Stelle'] or 'stand for' the 'inner elements' of its 
originally creative 'life' and 'truth'. This knowledge we have of works of art from 
the past is precisely the death of these works, whatever our intentions or 
techniques: they are always already dead in our living relation to them, and 
already forgotten (or 'shrouded') through the very act of recollection. But things 
are never so melancholic for Hegel. There is still work to be done. 
The opposition between 'Vorstellung' - the external existence of language - 
and the inner inspiration ['begeistenden'l and fruition of the work of art governs 
this entire passage, even as it comes to be inverted. The figures of a 'friendly 
destiny' and the young girl at first correlate with the externality of representation; 
yet the very superficiality of this 'friendliness' will lead to the 'gathering' or 
csumming up' ['zusammenfaBen'] of the artwork into a higher mode. It is the 
moment when these works, for the first time, appear in their own right simply as 
works of art. This is where the passage turns back to the future, back to the 'now' 
and to 'us': 
[ 
... 
] But, just as the girl who offers us the plucked fruits is more than the 
Nature which directly provides them - the Nature diversified into their 
conditions and elements, the tree, air, light, and so on - because she sums 
all this up [zusammenfaBt] in a higher mode, in the gleam of her self- 
conscious eye and in the gesture with which she offers them; so, too, the 
spirit of the destiny that presents [darbietet] us with those works of art is 
more than the ethical life and the actual world of that nation, for it is the 
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interiorisation and recollection [die Er-innerung] in us of the spirit which 
in them was still only outwardly manifested; it is the spirit of the tragic 
destiny which gathers all those individual gods and attributes of the 
substance into one pantheon, into the spirit that is itself conscious of itself 
as spirit [als Geist selbst bewuBten Geist]. 68 
This 'But... ' marks the moment of inversion. That which is limited to Vorstellung, 
to the external representation of works, turns out to be 'more' in relation to these 
works than the 'inner' life from which they took their inspiration and sustenance. 
But 'more' what, precisely? In offering us what is external, this 'destiny' stands as 
the repetition and re-incorporation of what was expressed in the works of art; and 
as a result, these works are no longer limited to a being a particular expression of 
an immediate 'life' or 'world". They are brought together in a new relation: they 
are gathered into a single spirit that is now internally mediated and conscious of 
itself as such. In short, the work is 'more' itself. it is offered to 'us' as a work, as 
something mediated. But this change is far from a simple revelation of essence. It 
is just that mediated relation is, by definition, more than the immediate. The 
'friendly destiny' is this 'gesture of offering' ['der darreichenden Gebdrde'], this 
process of mediation in which the work is 'presented' or held out as such, for the 
first time. 
We can break down this lengthy passage, then, into three distinct moments: 
the forgetful dissolution or 'total loss' of spirit; external representation in 
imagination; and interiorising recollection of presentation. These three moments 
constitute the development of this 'friendly destiny' whose eventual recollection, 
gathering and unifying of divine substance into a single 'pantheon' marks the 
'tragic' self-consciousness of spirit as spirit. So how are we read the epithetic 
addition, 'freundlich', which first qualifies this 'tragic' destiny of self-conscious 
spirit? How is this gesture at once more superficial and more profound than the 
actual life which gave rise to the work? What is the relation between this 'friendly 
destiny' and friendship? Is it even legitimate to translate 'freundlich' as 
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4 ? 69 
-triendly' Answering these questions requires care since with 
Hegel it is never 
a matter of a random juxtaposition of the ethical and the aesthetic. Art and religion 
are fundamentally interwoven in the form of the work: the 'aesthetic' here can 
only bear an ethical content in the shape of a 'universal work' ['das allgemeine 
Werk' ]. 70 Hegel writes: 'If we ask which is the actual spirit that has the 
consciousness of its absolute essence in the religion of art, we find that it is the 
71 
ethical or the true spirit' . Just as this spirit likewise finds its true expression only 
in the work of art,, so the externalisation of the ethical exposes it to the same 
process of dissolution. 
There are two principal issues at stake here. First, there is the link between the 
appearance of this 'friendly destiny' and the 'loss of art', that moment when art 
becomes a 'thing of the past' for us. How can Hegel's epithet help us understand 
the nature of this 'loss'? Second, this figure brings with it the institutional 
72 memory of the museum. This 'destiny', then, would be the self-consciousness of 
the death of art. But why might such self-consciousness be 'fteundlich'? Does it 
stand for some kind of recollective love or devotion? One thinks of the 'gallery of 
images' at the end of the Phenomenology, where Hegel retrospectively places 'Er- 
innerung' at the heart of the self-presentation of spirit, a 'slow-moving succession' 
['Aufeinanderfolge'] of shapes whose presentation grants us our perspective ('Mr 
uns )). 73 How are these figures of the museum and the gallery linked? It is this 
presentation of the work of art over time that connects the loss of art and the 
museum. Indeed, it might be pointed out that the museum is what Hegel means by 
'a hiendlY destiny": the museum conceived as a liberal accomodation and 
prodigious accumulation of works of art, or artifacts, divorced from their 'living 
world', lost to one another and to us save as 'something past'. Such a fate is 
indeed both 'friendly' - gracious; genial - and 'tragic'. Hence, it is not simply a 
matter of uncovering what Hegel meant by 'afriendly destiny', but a question of 
exploring how this figure feeds off the idea of a relation between friendship and 
the presentation of the work of art. 
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4.22 - The museum, friendship and the work of art 
The concept of 'the work', or rather the concept as 'the work of the negative', in 
the Phenomenology (and the Realphilosophie) installs the question of the work of 
art deep within the structure of Hegel's speculative thought. 74 The figures of 
Adam and the epic poet both figures stand for the first, external existence of spirit. 
They are both linked to the 'earliest' form of language, the act of naming; and so 
both represent the work of representation and productive memory carried out 
under the sign of 'Mnemosyne'. It is in the figure of 'friendly destiny', as the 
presentative gesture which gives us the work of art as such, that a relation between 
the work, memory and friendship is revealed in Hegel. As we discovered in 
Chapter 3, the relation of friendship has a transitional role both as a moment 
within the dialectic of spirit and with respect to the development of Hegel's 
philosophy as a whole. For the later Hegel, friendship and love represent the fully 
articulated and actual concept of freedom as it is expressed in the 'form' of 
feeling: they are the sign that we 'already possess' this fTeedom, albeit in a less 
realised form. 75 It is by reversing this diminuition of friendship as a limited form 
of 'Recognition' that Bataille exploits and underinines Kojeve's 'Hegelianism'. 
Yet he can do this only by drawing upon Hegel's earliest work on love and 
religion, which portray friendship as an essential aspect in the birth of 
Christianity. In "The Positivity of the Christian Religion", for example, the 
communion of the Last Supper is the gesture of a 'voluntary friendship' ['der 
76 Freundschaft freiwillig'] between men and their god . In these texts, love and 
friendship are purely positive insofar as they represent the spontaneous expression 
of feeling, the overriding of moral duty and reflective judgment, and ultimately 
form the principle of human community which possesses the dialectical power of 
absorption and unification. 
77 This becomes Bataille's 'general' dialectic of the 
6sovereign operation'. Moreover, we can see that Hegel identifies friendship with 
the unification of the gods into a pantheon and the absorption of these pantheons 
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as modalities of the same divine love. is it to this movement of gathering and 
offering -a collective interiorisation of merely external differences - that the 
epithet 'friendly' refers? Perhaps. Almost certainly. If anything, it is in the figure 
of 'friendly destiny' that something in the order of this relation of friendship and 
religion still remains in the Phenomenology. 
The status of the Phenomenology of Spirit itself is open to dispute. It occupies 
a place at once apart from and at the heart of Hegel's work as a whole. Bataille 
was right to refer to its project as 'only a beginning and hence a definitive failure', 
for although it was first conceived as the first volume of a 'System of Science', 
and in spite of plans for editing the text, Hegel was never able to reintegrate it into 
his later philosophical system. 78 This ambiguous status is never more apparent 
than at the end of the text, when the final chapter, "ABSOLUTE KNOWING", opens 
onto these lines from Schiller's poem, "Die Freundschaft": 'aus dem Kelche 
dieses Geisterreiches / schdumt ihm seine Unendlichkeit. ' 79 What should we make 
of this citation and its placement? These words from "Friendship" are given a 
privileged position in the Phenomenology, for they appear precisely at the moment 
when the entire dialectic of spirit is recollected and unfolded as its own absolute. 
Furthermore, Hegel famously alters Schiller's verse by replacing the concept of 
divine Being as an eternal, transcendent alterity ('Freundlos'; 'kein Gleiches') 
with the temporal self-mediation of spirit: the final line, 'Schdumt ihm - die 
Unendlichkeit', is rewritten to show that the infinity of spirit is a product of time, 
'schdumt ihm seine Unendlichkeit'. 80 That which, in Schiller,, is 'friendless' and 
'without equal' (save 'eternity'), is no longer 'lifeless and alone' for Hegel: 
absolute spirit becomes historical and history absolute. This identity is nothing 
less than the 'goal' of the Phenomenology: 'absolute knowing, or spirit that knows 
itself as spirit'. 81 Even if Hegel's 'friendly destiny' indicates a certain refusal of 
friendship on his part, this perverse quotation throws up two further problems. 
First, it uncovers a residual ambiguity in the relation of philosophy (qua the 
prosaic presentation of 'scientific knowing') to poetry and literature. Second, it 
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binds the idea of friendship into the relation of memory ['Erinnerung'] and 
representation. 
If there is a relation between the poet's muse, 'Mnemosyne', the 'friendly 
destiny' of the museum, and the concept of friendship in general, it lies with 
memory. It is the very 'friendliness' of the destiny of art, the very benevolence of 
the gesture of presentation that defines 'our' relation to the works of art from the 
past as 'more than' that of the culture which produced them. They are present as 
such for the first time in human memory. In this way, the museum lies at the heart 
of Hegel's conception of the modernity of art. Blanchot takes up this question of 
the museum in three essays published between 1950 and 1957: "Naissance de 
Fart" (1955), "Le musCe, Fart et le temps" (1950-1), and "Le mal du musCe" 
(1957) are collected together at the beginning of LAmitie. The collection ends 
with a coda - "L'amitie" (the 1962 essay with fori-ned the focus of our first 
chapter). It is not by accident that the structure of Blanchot's book is bracketed by 
questions of art and of friendship. But what, if anything, links the fate of art to 
'the death of the friend' in this collection? 
The first essay in the book, "Naissance de Fart", is a review of Bataille's 
Lascaux, ou la naissance de Vart. Blanchot introduces his discussion of the book 
by repeating the following passage, to which we referred in the previous chapter: 
If we go into the cave at Lascaux, a strong feeling grips us which we do 
not have in front of the display cases where the remnants of the first 
human fossils or their stone instruments are exhibited. It is the same 
feeling of presence - of clear and burning presence - that masterpieces of 
every epoch give us. 82 
Blanchot asks why we have this 'feeling of presence': do these first works of art 
reveal to us the 'first man' for whom we always seem to be searching? He goes on 
to show that the reason why 'this need for the origin' cannot be satisfied is bound 
up with the fact that art puts us in relation to a fundamental absence of an origin. 83 
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He does not, however, continue to quote Bataille's immediate linking of this 
feeling of presence to friendship as the passionate 'interrogation' of the work: 'the 
beauty of human works addresses friendship, the pleasure of friendship'. 
84 Why 
does Blanchot erase, or at least elide, these lines about our love of beauty? A clue 
would seem to lie in the way that he refers to another mention of friendship in 
Bataille's book. When Bataille posits the evident yet unverifiable link between the 
C procession' of animal figures on the cave walls and 'some magical intention... a 
profound, but enigmatic communication', he gives this relation, too, the name of 
85 'friendship' . Blanchot in turn refers to this 'mysterious relation' as a 'relation of 
interest, of conspiracy, of complicity and almost friendship [presque d'amitie]'. 86 
Almost friendship. Recall that Bataille attributes a direct relation between 
friendship and the work of art: friendship is nothing less than the 'feeling' of 
'clear and burning presence' through which the beauty of the work of art 
addresses us. Blanchot not only distances his own text from this identification of 
friendship with the immediacy of presence, he withdraws it ('almost) from 
Bataille's. The relation of friendship and the work of art is indirect, in a manner 
that echoes the sense of discretion defined in 'Vamitie". 
The question of friendship arises in this group of three essays on two counts: 
they are assembled as the first texts in a work called LAmitiý; and insofar as this 
relation is half-withdrawn from Blanchot's opening commentary of Bataille. Yet 
what they all share with Bataille's book is a thoroughgoing negotiation with 
Hegel's dialectic of art. In the original version of "Le mal du musee", for example, 
Blanchot states that his review of Malraux's Le Musee imagýinaire is simply a 
way of addressing its unacknowledged debt to Hegel: 
There appears to me no doubt that Malraux's endeavour takes place within 
the Hegelian perspective, via the ambiguous search for all that art wants to 
be for itself and of which the Museum is like the impersonal 
consciousness,, a realised and yet unreal consciousness. Hence this research 
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is not carried by Malraux's own force alone, but by everything today 
which still seems to open our times to Hegel. 87 
When Blanchot writes (of) 'Malraux', therefore, there can be 'no doubt' that he 
reads his work, as he writes in "Le musee, Fart et le temps", in terms of 'the 
movements of a thought whose principles are belong to Hegel'. 88 Why bother with 
going through Malraux to get to Hegel? It is undoubtedly Malraux's position of 
influence upon contemporary French culture - he had served as a minister of state 
in General de Gaulle's post-war government - which makes him the locus of 
Blanchot's analysis. 99 However, 'this research' into the sense and place of the 
museum is no more a question of Malraux's work representing a collective will or 
national identity, than it is a matter of his 'own' intentions. Instead, Blanchot 
states that the possibility of this work is 'carried [ ... ] by everything today which 
still seems to open our times to Hegel'. The contemporaneity of Hegel is linked to 
this comparision of the museum with 'an impersonal consciousness', and not to an 
individual personality or a collective identity. How should we understand this 
c consciousness 5? Is it the force of history, or 'the End of History'? Is he referring 
to technology, perhaps? What is at stake in this sense of impersonality? 
Blanchot's reference to the contemporaneity of Hegel's thought does not entail 
that his own work is 'Hegelian', or 'anti-Hegelian' for that matter. On the 
contrary, he sets out to trace the movement of thought which determines the art of 
cour times', and which returns 'each one of us' (including Malraux) to Hegelian 
(principles'. This 'thought' is the dialectic by which the total impoverishment of 
art coincides with the unveiling of its true 'essence'. Tt is laid bare in "Le musee, 
Fart et le temps": 
When one indicates that today, for the first time, art has somehow doubly 
unveiled itself, the words "for the first time" have an obvious authority: 
they indicate that a conclusion has been reached, and this conclusion, even 
if it does not shut down time, nonetheless permits the observer who speaks 
in the name of this first time to speak of time as an enclosed truth. 90 
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That which defines the position of art 'today' is this uninterrogated determination 
of historical closure: the art of 'our epoch' is set apart from every other epoch as 
'the radiating world of "the first time"' . 
91 When we speak 'in the name of such an 
event - whether it is ... the first time... or 'the End of History' - we give ourselves a 
position of authority on the basis of what is 'obvious' or '(self-)evident'. Blanchot 
readily grants that we can all grasp the idea that the work of art appears as such, 
'for the first time', only when it becomes, in Hegel's words, 'ein Vergangenes', 'a 
92 thing of the past' . It is that moment 
in history when art no longer fulfills a divine 
service or even worldly function; when it no longer means 'for us', today, what it 
had meant to our predecessors. This is the sense of 'our epoch' which Hegel sets 
out in the figure of 'friendly destiny'. For Blanchot, too, this is the evidence 
brought forth by the modem work of art, cut off from its religious vocation, cut 
off from the world, and prey to the demands of ideology and the market alike. But 
it cannot be admitted without questioning its very evidence. 
Blanchot's central question is deceptively simple: why is it that, 'at the very 
moment when the absolute tends to take the form of history', at the very moment 
of it's disappearance, 'art appears for the first time as a search [une recherche] in 
which something essential is at stake'? 93 What can this state of affairs tell us about 
the nature of the work of art? And where does this nature or 'essence' lie? 
And where - other than in the divine, other than in the world - will the 
work find the space in which it might take root [s'appuyer] and reserve 
itself? This is also the question which awakens the work to the experience 
of its origin, as if, in the research of art whose essence has become its 
concern [souci], it hoped to find henceforth its support [appui] and its 
94 reserve. 
Such questions admit of no straightforward answers to such questions, for if it is a 
matter of understanding what has never existed before (for the first time'), it is 
just as much a matter of grasping what has always existed behind the work, as it 
were; that is, the 'space' in which it finds its 'reserve'. Like the "'question"' of 
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literature in "La litt&rature et le droit a la mort", the question of the work of art 
becomes the very mode in which the work 'is'. The 'search' for what comes 
before it, and gives birth to it, defines the very existence of the work of art. Does 
this form of ontological displacement avoid the question by folding art back into 
itself? The idea that art is concerned with its own 'essence' certainly prompts such 
suspicions. But it is worth noting the caution with which Blanchot defines this 
'experience of its origin': it is 'as if the work had 'hoped' to place itself, or 
'reserve' itself in this reflexive movement of 'research'. When he goes on to 
describe the ontological condition of the work of art, in LEspace litteraire, in 
terms of 'etre en souci de I'art', he does not mean that art is only concerned with 
itself, but rather that the work 'is in a condition of concern' about what makes it a 
work. 95 Why is the work concerned with its own status as a 'work'? 
At the heart of his writings during the 1950's is a deepening of the 
interrogation of the concept of 'the work' which characterised La Part du jeu. It 
draws on his claim,, in "La litterature et le droit a la mort", that the writer or the 
artist 'works'just like everyone else, only 'to an eminent degree', insofar as what 
he produces is 'the work par excellence' . 
96 The Rip-side of this statement is 
revealed to be the inescapability of history. If we wish to think of the artist as one 
who works against contingency and the ephemeral, it also must be the case that 
this effort of memory lies at the heart of all 'human work [which] has the same 
power of becoming historical'. 97 In these three essays on art, Blanchot asserts that 
the artist does not exist beyond his work, and that if the one who dedicates himself 
to art belongs to it in some way, it is only insofar as art belongs to itseýf alone. In 
this way, he counters Malraux's persistent privileging of the artist as the very 
model of the creator. Instead, the artist is produced by the work, the doer by the 
doing. The concept of the work cannot escape it's Hegelian determination. It is 
vital, then, to hear in this phrase, '8tre en souci de Fart', an echo of the 'disquiet' 
analysed in "La litterature et le droit a la mort". The restless becoming of art 
appears to be what the museum communicates to us: 
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Art is no longer to be found in the "perfection" of a work; it is nowhere, 
and if the Museum has meaning, it is because it seems to be this 
44 nowhere" whose disquiet [Finquietude] and powerful negation it 
conveys. 99 
What has happened in order for art to be 'nowhere' ['nulle part']? What happens 
to this 'disquiet and powerful negation' when it is mediated by the 'meaning' 
['sens'] of the museum? To answer these questions we need to follow Blanchot's 
re-writing of Hegel's dialectic of art. 
When he treats of Malraux'sconception of the 'imaginary Museum', Blanchot 
follows it's 'analogy' with Hegel's narrative of the fate of art qua religion. 
Although a relation to Hegel's historical thesis on art is not yet made explicit in 
the analyses of the literary work in La Part du feu, it was already implicit in the 
way that he introduced Hegel (in "La litterature et le droit a la mort") as 'a man 
who had the highest idea of art that one can form of it, since he saw how art can 
become religion and religion art'. 99 We can acknowledge Hegel's claim that art 
first appears in the form of religion; or rather, that art is religion. But what does 
this identity entail? The meaning and function of work of art lies in the service of 
the 'invisible realities around which the community perpetuates itself. 1 00 For 
Hegel, this relation was consummated by the Greeks, and is denied to us, for we 
can only grasp these works if we uproot them from the meaning of a community. 
However, Blanchot points out that a different conception of the 'life of the work' 
is already in place within it. This is the abstract 'life of spirit': the 'admirable 
power' of change and transformation that puts death to work in a movement of 
dissolution and resurrection. In other words,, it is the work of the epic poet who 
names the gods because he is already separated from them. Even when art is 
religion, and not yet 'only itself, it is still irreducibly bound to a process of (self- 
)estrangement which already 'puts it closest to its own truth (without art knowing 
it) '. 101 The process of estrangement does not represent the end for art, therefore, 
for this relation to exteriority is an 'essential' part of the presentation of the work 
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of art from its very beginnings: it is simply not yet recognised as such. But the 
question remains: does art become impoverished or deficient to the extent that it is 
C only itself', removed from its religious function? 
If the manifestation of the work of art as such is inseparable from that of the 
museum, it is because the impoverishment of art is also the unveiling of itself to 
itself in its totality: art is 'reduced to itself [ ... ] it abandons everything that it was 
not and it extends itself to everything it has been'. 102 Therefore, if the museum is 
the site of art's memory, it is a fundamentally ambiguous one: on the one hand, it 
gathers together artworks into an 'eternal present', giving them the 'meaning' and 
'direction' ['sens'] of historical spirit in its self-presence (in the form of the 
History of Art); yet on the other hand, it also affirms an incessant reworking of art 
as a whole, giving it over to a movement of transformation and becoming. 103 As a 
result, this site of memory is not simply a place in which one encounters works of 
art from every age and epoch. Instead, it is in the fundamental nature of this site 
that it both conserve and transform art as a whole in a movement of repetition and 
becoming. It is for precisely this reason that the museum is the site of the 
impoverishment and the innovation of modem art, often vilified in equal measure 
for destroying art and for shoring it up against such destruction. 
This doubleness is perhaps the most important characteristic of the museum. It 
stands as the image for the new (absolute) freedom of the work of art, the 
'absence' of any 'world' or 'history'; and at the same time, it also constitutes art 
as a whole and 'gives birth to a history'. 104 Indeed, the entire premise for "Le mal 
du musee" is the idea that the historical development of techniques of 
reproduction - ranging from the postcard to the CD-Rom - has raised the museum 
to the level of 'a new category'. 105 This is Malrauxýs 'musee imaginaire': the sum 
total of such reproductions of works of art, which Blanchot describes as being 
endlessly enriched by an irreversible and 'prodigious generosity'. 106 This 
technological 'destiny' of the museum, for Blanchot, renders both lamentation and 
celebration inappropriate, for technology 'gives us art' on the basis of 'a power of 
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domination that frightens some people, excites others, but cannot be halted by 
anyone. ' 107 Yet hostility to the 'imaginary museum' finds its justication in a 
suspicion of technology which Blanchot traces back to the Plato's disdain for the 
image and the written word. 'It is not a question of printing, but of writing. '108 In 
an argument that prefigures Derrida's work on this question, Blanchot shows that 
writing, like the machine, is mistrusted as that which merely 'repeats' or 
cprolongs'. It is this 'mistrust' which reappears as a fear for 'the destruction of 
art': the regret that if only the work was intimately bound up with 'the non- 
repeatable essence of being', it would lie beyond the technological reach of 
reproductions. 109 In a sense, this mistrust is well-placed, insofar as the 'imaginary 
museum' does not have any 'real' place. It represents 'art' in the n th degree of 
abstraction: 'this space which is not one, a locality without location [un milieu 
sans lieu], a world outside the world'. ' 10 Yet, for Blanchot, regardless of whether 
this disorientation of art is to be feared or celebrated, the new technologies of the 
museum demand to be thought because they force us to ask again what constitutes 
a work of art, what makes a work a work. 
What the technological advent of the 'imaginary museum' brings with it - the 
dissolution of the 'original, organic link between work and painter; the possible 
disappearance of the 'artist' himself into an 'anonymous, impersonal power of 
"creation"' - is the possibility of recognising that the work of art is already 
haunted by this lack of place and absence of origin. ' 11 What it calls into question 
is precisely that relation of 'presence' which Bataille ascribed to the 'feeling' of 
friendship through which great works of art address us; and the very sense of 
4presentation' which Hegel inscribed into the 'friendly destiny' of the museum. 
Although both Bataille and Hegel recognise that this 'presence' of art is a matter 
of memory, and that 'our' access the works of art from the past cannot overcome 
such lacunae, both thinkers nevertheless project what sometbing like 'the non- 
repeatable essence of being', the relation of presence between man and work 
which would have been 'in the work' as its 'living' world or meaning. Our 
relation to these works of art, and our conception of the work of art as such, is 
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forever fixed as a relation to the absence of something that was present. But what 
if this very 'essence' of the work were already, at its very core, subject to the force 
of repetition? What if this appearance of the work as such, "for thefirst time"', 
was not possible except on the basis of an 'again'? 
This is the question posed by technology. For Blanchot, it is at the very 
moment when the museum finally removes itseýf from any sense of being a 'place' 
in the world, when it becomes 'imaginary', that we can no longer fall back upon 
the lost presence of an origin. It exposes 'our illusion: 'the deceptive belief that 
what is there is there as it was whereas, at most, it is there as a "having-been": an 
illusion ofpresence. ' 112 It is by becoming this absent 'place' of a 'locality without 
location' that the museum reveals the extent to which such an absence already 
constitutes the work as such. 
The work is its own absence: because of this it is in perpetual becoming, 
never finished, always done and undone [toujours faite et defaite]. 113 
This means in fact that the museum does not show us anything 'new', but rather 
puts us in relation to this fundamental and enigmatic belonging of absence and 
repetition at the heart of every work. In the final chapter of LEspace litteraire, in 
which he continues his commentary on Malraux, Blanchot defines the work of art 
as 'always new "now"', a definition whose tension between the temporality of 
eternity ('always') and that of the ephemeral ( ... now ... ) articulates the relation 
between the work and repetition. But what is this paradoxical force of repetition 
'at work' in the work? 
The work is always new "now" [<< maintenant >>], it renews this "now" that 
it seems to initiate, to render more contemporary [actuefl, and finally it is 
very ancient, terrifyingly ancient, that which is lost in the night of time, 
being the origin that always precedes us and which is always given before 
us, since it is the approach of what allows us to withdraw: thing of the 
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past, in a different sense from Hegel's saying [chose du pass&, en un autre 
sens que ne le dit Hegel]. 114 
The work of art is a 'thing of the past' in the sense that it belongs to an origin that 
'always precedes us', a power of beginning which cannot itself begin because it is 
this movement of incessant beginning-again. Blanchot calls this abject power of 
repetition - which is 'at work' in the work anew each time, and yet is 'terrifyingly 
ancient' - 'le ressassement eternel' or Teternel recommencement'. 115 We may 
recall that he used the same term to describe the way in which literature, in asking 
the question of its origin, opens up language to an 'inquietude infinie', the restless 
ambiguity that forms its own negativity: 'un ressassement interminable de 
paroles'. 116 The negativity exemplified in the act of naming and the work of art 
unravels; in fact, it begins to unravel in the work at very moment it 'begins'. The 
work of the negative is already stamped with the mark of a beginning-again, a 
repetition which never begins and thus never ends. 
Like Bataille's sovereignty, Blanchot's 'ressassement' speaks of a weakening 
in Hegel's 'admirable power' of negativity. Its work is 'unworked' ['deoeuvree'] 
in being exposed to its own 'inexhaustible depths' in repetitoon: it is not the 
determination and mastery of our own death that faces us in the work, but the 
'dark, um-nasterable powerlessness of death as a beginning-again. ' 117 Blanchot 
does not blindly repeat Hegel's dialectic of art, nor does he blindly oppose it. It is 
worth noting that in the original version of the passage cited above, instead of 
saying that the work of art is a thing of the past 'in a different sense from Hegel's 
saying' ['en un autre sens que ne le dit Hegel'], he writes: 'chose du passe, comme 
dit Hegel. ' 118 The turning that takes place in this space of time, which is the period 
spanned by these essays, is subtle yet profound. So what happens to the 'friendly 
destiny' from the Phenomenology, or to the 'passion' of friendship from Lascaux? 
Blanchot's depiction of the museum as a profoundly ambiguous site - the destitute 
non-place from which every world is abstracted; one which supposedly shelters 
and conserves works from the vagaries of time, only to subject them to an endless 
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becoming - introduces a discreet change in the 'friendly destiny' of the museum. 
This is 'le mal du musee' of Blanchot's title: the 'self-consciousness of spirit as 
spirit' becomes indissociable from the sheer 'will to spectacle' of art. ] 19 The work 
is suspended in a uncertain movement where 'everything recurs to infinity because 
nothing has really taken place there': the imaginary museum shelters such works, 
insofar as it echoes a sense of eternity - 'Fetemel, peut-&re' - and yet never allows 
the work to reveal itself in its entirety. It is as if Hegel's narrative of the 
dissolution of art had become frozen at the very point when it oscillated between 
the positive and negative values of its 'friendly destiny'. Hence, it is not certain in 
what sense the destiny of art is 'friendly', nor in what way friendship can be 
addressed by the work of art. Unlike Bataille and Hegel, Blanchot withdraws 
friendship from any relation of presence with the work. Yet in the movement of 
withdrawal there is revealed the fundamental relation of the work to its own 
nu absence of origin. This is what Blanchot formulates in terms of the 'reserve' or the 
'discretion' of art and literature. In other words, he withdraws or reserves the 
relation of friendship by revealing the 'work' of the very thing which makes it 
possible as a relation: discretion - 'the pure interval'; 'the interruption of being'; 
'this fundamental separation on whose basis that which separates becomes 
relation'. Furthermore,, this movement of withdrawal is nothing other than 
discretion; and its revelation as such in the 'absence' of the work marks the 'work' 
of discretion. By effacing all presence of friendship from the texts of both Bataille 
and Hegel, he reinscribes it, discreetly, as this very relation of effacement. 
The discreet relationship between friendship and the work of art brings us full 
circle back to the same doubling of discretion which emerged in our reading of 
'Vamitie". Indeed, in the year after Bataille's death, Blanchot encodes these two 
strands of friendship and the work of art - in this case, the literary work - in the 
following definition of discretion: 
Discretion is not merely a courtesy, a social comportment, a psychological 
ruse, or the address of one who would like to speak intimately about 
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himself without declaring himself. Discretion - reserve - is the place of 
literature. 120 
Discretion in this case is ambiguous and uncertain, 'unruhig' even. This very 
gesture of withdrawal, by which he displaces discretion from what is 'merely' a 
matter of 'comportment', begs the question: does not Blanchot posit the value of 
the (universal) concept over and above the (accidental) biographical conditions of 
the work? Or, inversely, does it not remain bound to an intentional act of a 
subject, such as a writer's choice to leave something out of the work? In short, we 
either risk discretion falling back into a calculable effect of a writing subject, or, if 
we resist this, we simply repeat the philosophical gesture par excellence. Yet, as 
we argued in the first chapter, discretion is double: the separation it introduces is 
constitutive of the relation to the other; it is never completely identical with itself, 
for it opens itseýf up as a fundamental discontinuity in being without being able to 
reserve itself or calculate itself in advance. 121 Peter Banki identifies this reserve of 
discretion - the discretion of discretion, as it were - in terms of uncertainty: 'It is 
not certain that discretion exists. ' 122 Thus, the word discretion can no more 
confirm the impersonal, nameless 'place' of literature than it can assure the 
integrity of personal silence, or even the essence of friendship, for that matter. It 
would be precisely because of this ambiguity within the status of discretion that 
the work can still take place in relation to an absent origin. Discretion is 'of the 
work': it names that reserve, or reservoir, which is necessary in order for the work 
to maintain and present itself-, yet discretion itself, as this reserve, must always 
efface itself in the movement of its own 'work'. 
* 
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One may conclude that Blanchot simply repeats Hegel, whether unwittingly or 
not. He finds the dialectical reversibility of language, or the presentative figure of 
'friendly destiny' in the relation of the work of art to its origin in 'eternal 
recommencement'. Even the 'perhaps' which marks this relation of 'the eternal' is 
never far from Hegel's temporalising rewriting of Schiller's 'eternity' as 'seine 
Unendlichkeit'. But it is not the same relation. The change in the 'pastness' of art, 
from 'as Hegel said' to 'a different sense from Hegel's', is like Blanchot's 
'distance' from the Phenomenology: it responds to the possibility of rethinking the 
thought of mediating negativity in the work in terms of an always prior relation of 
'un-working' or 'desoeuvrement'. If something happens from Hegel to Blanchot, 
it is this location of 'an always other possibility' which disperses the work. It is 
the idea of a turning (away from Hegel) which is never certain, and a work that is 
never completed. 123 Blanchot has a pair of interlocutors discuss just such a turning 
in "Sur un changement d'epoque" (1960), when one asks the other: "'Do you 
accept this certainty: that we are at a turning [un tournant]?... The other replies: 
If it is a certainty, it is not a turning. The fact of belonging at this moment 
in which a change of epoch (if there is such) is underway also affects the 
certain knowledge that would wish to determine it, rendering both 
certainty and uncertainty in appropriate. We are never less able to circle 
around ourselves [nous contourner] than at such a moment: the discreet 
force of the turning lies first in this fact. , 124 
The force of the turning is 'discreet' precisely because it is not certain, and never 
affords us our total presence to 'ourselves'. Blanchot's work continually addresses 
this experience of maintaining a relation with that which is impossible to 
experience, and resists being 'got around' ['contoumee']. Resisting melancholic 
nostalgia as much as apocalyptic declamation, he maintains a rigorous, perhaps 
belligerent affirmation of impossibility in the face of all attempts to finally have 
done with questions. This is the work of discretion. Whereas Bataille deploys the 
concept of 'friendship for the impossible that is man' as a reversal within 
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Kojeve's dialectic of Recognition, Blanchot moulds his thinking of friendship to 
an experience of the work which, above all, is marked by a writer's sense of 
discretion and self-effacement before the work, but only insofar as it remains 
without any point of stability. In the effects of Blanchot's writing of discretion, 
the thought of friendship can be seen to remain, discreetly and restlessly, at every 
point in his work. 
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Mallarm6an reference, which Blanchot also repeats in full, is Ue dis. - unefleur! 
from "Crise de vers", in Mallarme, Oeuvres completes, Paris, Gallimard-Pleiade, 1945, 
368. For further examples of this echoing of Mallarm6, see Jean-Philippe Miraux, 
Maurice Blanchot. Qui6tude et inquietude de la littirature, op. cit., 16. My own 
discussion in this chapter will focus upon the relation between Hegel and H61derlin in 
Blanchot's work. 
45 PF, 312; WF, 322. The relation between these three proper names in Blanchot's work 
is as consistent as it is complicated. Some thirty years later in LEcriture du disastre, 
Blanchot sets out the task of the writer in terms of a necessary recognition of the lexical 
'horizon' demarcated by philosophy: 
To write in ignorance and rejection of the philosophical horizon, punctuated, 
assembled or dispersed by the words which delimit this horizon, is necessarily to 
write with facile complacency (the literature of elegance and good taste). H61derlin, 
Mallarme, and many others, do not allow us this. 
See ED, 160; WD, 103. What H61derlin and Mallarm& do not allow 'us' is the ease of 
writing within this horizon without knowing it, without taking into account the 
language in which one writes - even in opposing 'philosophy', 'system' or 'Hegel' 
(who is an unnamed yet implied presence here). It is just such a 'philosophical horizon' 
that Gerald Bruns runs the risk of ignoring in his overdetermination of the word 
'refusal'; see Maurice Blanchot: The Refusal of Philosophy, passim. See also note 4, 
above. 
46 PF, 312; AT, 322. 
47 EL, 136-7; SL, 109. 
48 PF, 312-3; AT, 322-3. 
49 , La main de Pascal" (1947), in PF, 249-62; 254, Blanchot's emphasis. This original 
'fact' is manifested in the work of poets because it is in 'its poetic claim' that language 
c affirms itself as an absolute'; it is 'spoken [se parle] without anyone who speaks it or 
at least without depending upon the one who speaks. ' In this way, the argument in this 
essay is strictly identical with that in "La litt6rature et le droit A la mort". 
50 Strictly speaking, for the ancient Greeks, a public sacrifice of a hundred oxen. See 
OED: 'hecatomb' [Gr. hekatombi, f, hekaton hundred, bous ox]. Here Blanchot touches 
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upon, as he does a number of times in the essays collected in this book, the sense of Va 
part du feu': literally, that part which is sacrificed in order to maintain the whole; for 
example, the cutting of a fire-break, in which an area of forest is burnt clear in an 
attempt to limit the progress of an advancing fire. The phrase, 'faire la part du jeu', 
means 'to make a deliberate sacrifice', 'to cut one's losses'. It bears the double sense of 
a destruction whose purpose is to preserve; another figure, perhaps, of the speculative 
ambiguity that Hegel cherishes in the word, Aujhebung. It articulates the same sense of 
a 'both-and'l'neither-nor' which recurs in "La litterature et le droit a la mort" as the 
ultimate ambiguity of literature; and foreshadowed in the two epigraphs from H61derlin 
and Heraclitus. 
51 PF, 313; AT, 323. 
52 AM, 328. See the discussion of this essay in Chapter 1, Section 1.23, above. 
53 PF, 313; WF, 323, emphasis added. 
54 PhG, 36; PhS, §32. See OED: 
prosopopoeia n. M16. [L f. Gk prospopoiia representation in human form, f. 
prosopon face, person + poiein make. ] I Rhet. aA figure of speech in which an 
imaginary or absent person is represented as something speaking or acting; the 
introduction of a pretended speaker. M 16. bA figure of speech in which an inanimate 
or abstract thing is personified or given human characteristics. L16.2 transf. A person 
or thing as the embodiment of a quality. E 19. 
The fundamental role of prosopopeia in Hegel's "Preface" has been drawn to our 
attention by Werner Hamacher. See "The Second of Inversion", in Hamacher, 
Premises. - Essays on Philosophy and Literaturefrom Kant to Celan, translated by Peter 
Fenves, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1996,340. 
55 Ibid., translation modified. Note that the verb 'umkehren' bears the sense of return 
('to turn back or retrace one's steps') as well as inversion ('to reverse or overturn'; 'to 
turn inside out or upside down'). 
56 See Werner Hamacher's extended analysis of this characteristic in "The Second of 
Inversion", op. cit., 341. 
57 PFý 328; WF, 341. 
58 PF, 329; VVT, 342. 
59 See Serge Doubrovsky, "Critique et existence", in Georges Poulet (ed. ), Les Chemins 
actuels de la critique, Paris, Union g6nerale Aditions (10/18), 1968,143-57; 149-50. 
He goes on to add: 'The experience of language therefore does not translate a 
metaphysical experience: it is this very experience. This is the essential point that 
Blanchot's meditation takes up and goes over again and again. ' (Ibid. ) As I have 
already argued, the terms for this 'metaphysical experience' are to be found in Jean 
Hyppolite's 'transcendental' reading of the Phenomenology. 
60 PFý 316; WF, 327. 
61 PF9 316; WF, 326-7. 
62 PFý 330; WF, 343. 
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63 This phrase is Paul Davies' characterisation of the development by which, he argues, 
Blanchot during the 1950's begins to 'step away' from his focus on the work (which 
would define "La litterature et le droit a la mort", for example) towards the idea of the 
oeuvre solely within dýsoeuvrement, as presented in LEspace litt&aire and 
L'Entretien infini. See "The work and the absence of the work", in C. Bailey Gill (ed. ), 
Maurice Blanchot. - The Demand of Writing, op. cit., 91-107,94. However, Davies does 
not make clear exactly what is at stake in the phrase, and its approximative prefix: the 
discussion in this chapter is intended to offer a possible elucidation of this phrase. 
64 GeS, 11,532. 
65 Ibid., 512, emphasis added. Even if Hegel becomes sceptical about the possibility 
and desirability of any such 'recovery', the traces of this reflection on the aesthetic 
sense of religion are imprinted on the development of Hegelian thought as a whole. 
However, it is worth noting that H61derlin had already disavowed such a project before 
his friend's arrival in Jena. We will discuss the nature of this relationship with respect 
to the end of "Kunstreligion", in Section 4.2, below. 
66 Hegel, Werke. Band 13. Vorlesungen fiber die isthetik I, Frankfurt am Main, 
Suhrkamp, 1970,25. 
67 PhG, 549; PhS, §754. 
69 PhG, 547-8; PhS, §753. 
69 Jean-Luc Nancy offers an interpretation of Hegel's 'friendly destiny' in "Portrait de 
Fart en J eune fille", in Nancy, Le Poids d'une pensee, Les editions Le Griffon d'argile / 
Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1991,33-63. Whilst he postpones what he says 
would otherwise be 'a very lengthy commentary' on the motif of friendship in Hegel, 
he does give a brief account of the meaning of this adverb which helps to bring our own 
inquiry into relief Hegel's phrase evokes 'an obliging, cordial sympathy' (ibid., 55). 
Citing Hyppolite's translation - 'un destin amical nous les a offertes, comme unejeune 
fille pr6sente ces fruits' (PhE, 11,26 1) - he notes that fireundlich' does not necessarily 
bear the sense of 'amical', or 'friendly', but signifies 'aimable' or 'gracieux', 
'amiable', 'genial', or 'gracious'. 
70 PhG, 325; PhS, §439. 
71 PhG, 512; PhS, §700. 
72 Jean-Luc Nancy draws attention to this identification when he defines Hegel's figure 
as 'the interiority of the "museumish" [museal] or archeological exteriority to which art 
is dedicated'. See "Portrait de Fart en jeune fille", op. cit., 50. 
73 PhG, 590-1; PhS, §808. 
74 Jacques Taminaux gives a careful examination of the relation of art and speculation 
in his essay, "Speculation and Difference", in Taminaux, Poetics, Speculation, and 
Judgment. The Shadow of the Work ofArtfrom Kant to Phenomenology, translated and 
edited by Michael Gendre, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993,41-54. 
75 Hegel, Elements o the Philosophy of Right, translated by H. B. Nisbet and edited by ýf 
Allen W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, §7, Addition. 
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76 Hegel, "Der Positivitat der christlichen Religion" (1795-6), in Werke. Band 1. Frahe 
Schriften, edited Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 
1971,128-9. 
77 For a partial examination of this role of friendship in Hegel's early writings on 
Christianity, see H. S. Harris, Hegel's Development. - Towards the Sunlight, 1770-1801, 
, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972,413-14. 
78 Bataille, "L'Amitie", VI, 294; see Chapter 2, Section 2.1, above. Jean-Luc Nancy 
presents a discussion of its status as a 'written text' in "Portrait de Fart en jeune fille", 
op. cit., 39-40. Michael Inwood is more representative of many Hegel scholars, 
however, when he states that the Phenomenology is 'a rich, if chaotic, work', valuable 
only for that 'material' which does not appear elsewhere. See the entry for the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, in Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary, Oxford: Blackwell, 
1992,216-19,219. 
79 PhG, 591. Miller's translation gives: 'from the chalice of this realm of spirits / foams 
forth for him his own infinitude. ' (PhS, §808. ) 
80 See William Desmond's account of this alteration, in Beyond Hegel and Dialectic. - 
Speculation, Cult, and Comedy, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992,78- 
9. Although I have drawn on his book in my own comments here, 1 have drawn quite 
different conclusions regarding the reducibility of the friendship to a thinking of the 
absolute: where he reduces all relation of alterity to the self-mediation of an 'erotic 
absolute', I remain unconvinced that all further ambiguity and contradiction can be thus 
' silenced'. 
81 PhG) 591; PS, §808. The original reads: 'Aus dem Kelch des ganzen Seelenreiches / 
Schdumt ihm - die Unendlichkeit. ' "Die Freundschaft" (1782), in Friedrich Schiller, 
Werke. Band I. Gedichte 1776-1799, edited by J. Peterson and F. Befflner, Weimar: 
Hermann 136hlaus Nachfolger, 1943,110-11. Hegel's free adaptation of Schiller here 
compares with Blanchot's appropriation of lines from H61derlin. 
82 Bataille, Lascaux, ou la naissance de Vart (1.955), IX, 13. 
83 Blanchot, "La naissance de Fart", AM, 10. 
84 Bataille, IX, 13. See the discussion of this passage in Chapter 3, Section 3.22, above. 
85 IX, 14. 
86 AM, 11; FS, 3. Note that Elizabeth Rottenberg translates 'et presque d'amitie' as 
'and even of friendship'. 
87 " Le mal du musee", in Nouvelle revuefranCaise, 52, April 1957,696. 
88 "Le musee, Fart et le temps", AM, 21-51,26. 
89 On 27 July 1958 Malraux takes up the position of Minister of State, charged with the 
I influence and expansion of French culture', in the government of de Gaulle's Fifth 
Republic. It is worth noting that it is de Gaulle's 'assumption' of power in 1958, and in 
particular his escalation of the conflict in Algeria, which triggers Blanchot's own return 
to politically directed writing. One such piece, "Le refus" (1958), reprinted in L'Amiti6, 
bears the affirmation: 
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At a certain moment, in the face of public events, we know that we must refuse. [ ... ] Those who refuse and who are linked by the force of refusal, they know that they are 
still not together. 
In default of a political community - any sense of which had been removed by this 
quasi -dictatorial seizure of power - Blanchot locates a sense of solidarity and unity in 
the irreducibility of shared refusal; what he calls 'the friendship of this certain, 
unshakeable, rigorous No. ' (AM, 130. ) The issues of Blanchot's politics will need to be 
addressed in a separate study; nevertheless they press through the conception of 
friendship in the works under discussion. 
90 AM, 26. 
91 AM, 26-7. 
92 See G. W. F. Hegel, Werke. Band 13. Vorlesungen Oer die Asthetik 1, Frankfurt am 
Main, Suhrkamp, 1970,25. 
93 EL, 292. 
94 EL, 311. 
95 ELý 313. 
96 PF, 305. 
97 AM, 4 1. 
98 AM, 50. 
99 PF, 295. 
100 AMý 25. 
101 AM, 33. 
102 AM, 27. 
103 AM, 39. 
104 AM, 45. 
105 AM, 52. 
106 Ibid. 
107 AM, 52. Blanchot's relation to technology presents another point of difference with 
Bataille, for whom 'technological culture' remains within the confines of Koj&ve's 
4universal, homogeneous State'. Blanchot sets himself against this Heideggerean 
tendency to reduce technology to a geo-political value alone. In one of his preparatory 
texts for the failed project of a Revue internationale - on the recent 'conquest of space' 
- he writes: 
Certainly, technology is dangerous, but less dangerous than "spirits of place". There 
is something to be said, perhaps, against the paganism in which anti-Christianism 
voluntarily takes cover - Heideggerean paganism, a poetic paganism of enrootedness. 
Truth is nomad. 
See Blanchot, "Textes preparatoires, lignes, definitions de la << Revue internationale W' 
(196 1), in Lignes, n. 11, September 1990,179-91,189. 
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AM, 53. 
109 AM, 56. At this point in LAmW6, Blanchot refers to his own essay, "La B&e de 
Lascaux", originally published in 1958, in which counters Plato's Phaedrus with the 
idea that 'impersonal knowledge' (represented by the book) is in fact essential to the 
development of truth 'in the world of everyone'. It is this very impersonality which, he 
claims, 'is tied to the development of technology in all its forms and it makes speech, 
writing, a technics'. See "La Bete de Lascaux" (1958), reprinted in Ren6 Char. Cahier 
de I'Herne, Paris: tditions de I'Herne, n. 15,1971,71-7; esp. 71-2. 
110 AM, 59. 
III AM, 56. 
112 AM, 60. 
113 AM, 48. 
114 ELý 305. 
115 AM, 44; 6 1. 
116 PF, 320. 
117 AM, 5 1. 
118 Blanchot, 'Vart, la litterature et 1'experience originelle (1)", in Les Te=s 
modernes, 79, May 1952,1921-5 1; 1947, emphasis added. 
119 AM, 56. 
120 Blanchot, "Le fire des dieux" (1963), AM, 192-207,194. 
121 At this point, another path of inquiry begins to address the importance of H61derlin 
in Blanchot's work on the 'reserve' of the work of art. It soon becomes clear that the 
full extent of this topic far exceeds the remit of this present study. It is worth noting, 
however briefly, that he describes the poet's exemplarity in terms of discretion. In a 
short article on H61derlin, written a year after the publication of La Part du feu, 
Blanchot himself asks why we identify the name of 1161derlin with the 'essence of 
poetry': 'Why is H61derlin so present to us today? Why does his voice seem to us to be 
the poetic voice par excellenceT He grants that these questions cannot be answered 
satisfactorily, nor are they illuminated by the facts of the poet's life. Indeed, for 
Blanchot, it is the biographical fact of H61derlin's mental collapse, his 'madness', that 
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the expense of the work. See Blanchot, "H61derlin", in L'Observateur, n. 17,3 August 
1950, emphasis added. 
122 Peter Banki, "o La discr6tion - la reserve - est le lieu de la litterature W', in Ralentir 
travau , n. 7, 
hiver 1997,41-6; 45. His account of 'the discretion of discretion' is close 
to my own in this chapter and Chapter 1. 
123 PF, 330. 
124 Blanchot, "Sur un changement d'epoque: l'exigence du retour", in EI, 394; IC, 264. 
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Conclusion 
The discretion of the work 
It is as if he had said to him, saying it in such afriendly manner: 
friendship withdrawsfrom us [I'amitie se retire de nous]. 
Maurice Blanchot 1 
At the beginning of this study, we posed the central problem of how to read 
friendship in Blanchot's work We asked: how and where does it 'take place' in 
Blanchot? Is there a 'place' at all for friendship in his work? Or is friendship, by 
definition, excluded from all 'work', belonging instead to that which originally 
opens the space of the work, and yet at the same time already ruins it? 
In the reading which followed, unfolding in four distinct stages - two on 
Blanchot, two on Bataille -, we have proposed that in order to respond to the full 
implications of this problem it is necessary to go by way of Bataille's thinking of 
friendship and complicity; and also, therefore, by way of his relation to a certain 
Hegel. This detour has been decisive for the orientation of our reading of Blanchot 
in general, insofar as it has allowed us not only to see that fundamental differences 
remain between them concerning, amongst other things, the status of the work of 
art; but also to observe that these differences are integral to the ways in which they 
206 
figure the relation of friendship - as discretion or as complicity; as the demand for 
discontinuity or as the desire for a continuum. However, it was also made clear at 
the beginning that this detour through Bataille (and Hegel), although necessary, 
does not end with him (or them), nor puts an end to Blanchot's thinking 'in 
proximity' to him. 
Indeed, as we have seen throughout this enquiry, the problem of ftiendship 
already points in other directions: directions which one might call 'political', such 
as the 'friendship of a rigorous No' with which Blanchot makes an intervention 
into the quasi-militaristic events of October 1958, or the affirmation of the 
'fraternally anonymous and impersonal movement' of the 'events' of May '68; 2 
but also other directions indicating the importance of his relationship to other 
thinkers, such as Emmanuel Levinas. Indeed, only the relation to Levinas seems to 
have had such a great, eventually perhaps even greater, impact on the 
development of Blanchot's work. At the end of "Pour Famitie" (1993), an essay 
which prefaces a collection of work by Dionys Mascolo, and which Blanchot 
dedicates 'To all my friends, known and unknown, near and distant', it is Levinas 
to whom he turns, 'le seul ami - ah, ami lointain - que je tutoie et qui me tutoie'. 
3 
As a guide to this other direction, it is possible to cite another essay which 
Blanchot addresses to Levinas, "Notre compagnon clandestiný' (1980), in which 
he writes of their friendship as passing by way of an encounter with philosophy: 
Philosophy would be our companion always, day and night, whether by 
losing its name, becoming literature, knowledge, unknowledge [non- 
savoir], or by absenting itself, our clandestine friend whom we respected - 
loved -, and which did not allow us to be bound to it, even whilst 
forewarning us that there was nothing awakened in us, vigilant to the point 
of sleep, which was not due to its difficult friendship. Philosophy or 
friendship. But philosophy is precisely not an allegory. 4 
The friendship of philosophy, 'its difficult friendship', 5 pennits 'us' neither to 
bind ourselves to it nor to have done with reading and thinking in its wake. This 
207 
rings strangely in with our preceding examinations, if one recalls that Blanchot's 
discretion in the naming of friendship articulates the discontinuity which first 
4 puts into relation' by spacing and interrupting. It is at this point, when 
'discretion' as such comes to figure friendship at the heart of Blanchot's thinking, 
that TamitiC returns to the question of philosophical discourse, a discourse which 
calways loses itself at a certain moment: it is, perhaps, nothing but an inexorable 
way of loss and of losing itSelf., 6 By locating this 'certain moment' of 
'inexorable' loss (of itself) as the definitive moment of philosophy, Blanchot 
brings this essential powerlessness - it is 'sans droit [ ... ] un possible sans pouvoir' 
- into relation with the movement which he had traced in the 'discreet force of the 
turning': what philosophy 'supposes' or 'demands' [exige'], before all else, is 
'the effacement of the one who would support it or, at least, a change in the 
position of the philosophical subject'. 7 Yet 'effacement', aswell as the 
'impersonality' to which it attests, is never sufficient. For both philosopher and 
writer, who are, says Blanchot, 'very close', any such anonymity must remain 
'suspect'; otherwise, it soon ceases to be anything other than 'a game to conceal 
the name and finally to exploit it [le faire valoir]. ' 8 It is possible to hear this dual- 
edged 'demand' in terms of Blanchot's thinking of discretion. 
Consequently, further work in those directions indicated above, particularly 
paying attention to the way in which Blanchot's writing, already during the late 
1950's and early 1960's, but specifically after 1962, begins to move away from 
Bataille and further towards Levinas and philosophy, would be necessary. What 
we have attempted to do here is to show how far Blanchot's thinking of friendship 
saturates the way in which he himself sets out the demand for thought as such. 
Thus, in having limited the scope of this study, both to the relation with Bataille 
and to specific texts, we have been able to follow how the figure of the relation of 
incompatibility, the double relation of the possible and the impossible, brings with 
it a thinking of friendship that is in no way reducible to either an 'inter-personal' 
or 'inter- subjective' relation. Instead, Blanchot calls friendship, using a phrase 
borrowed from Levinas, a 'rapport sans rapport': a relation without being related 
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to anything ultimate, only taking place as the 'pure interval' that separates finite 
beings; and yet also a relation of indirection, or without horizon, which always 
introduces the third person ('impersonality') precisely as this interruption. 
What we have brought forth from Blanchot's work, then, is the way in which 
friendship never allows one to read it with ease (either as an ethical, political 
concept, or even as an emblematic, exemplary figure). It is not bound to any fixed 
value or end, even that of 'itself. Blanchot's presentation of fiiendship in terms of 
discretion is difficult to read precisely because it affirms, and communicates, the 
impossibility of thought coming to rest at any such value, 'sufficiency' or 
(meaning'. The always singular experience of friendship does not suit it to any 
theoretical or practical 'purpose' or 'end'; it is not assigned a 'place' as such by 
Blanchot, but instead it is presented in terms of what demands to be thought 
outside of any final value and meaning. It is in this sense that Blanchot refers to 
friendship as a relation which is inseparable from the the movement of discretion 
(in dying, for example). Discretion names that form of relation in which thinking 
af firms that which interrupts and unsettles it ('Finquietude'), thus withdrawing 
itself from the satisfaction of a reconciling 'presence' asmuch as from the abyssal 
supremacy of the 'nothing'. Yet at the same time, this effect or 'work' of 
discretion is always subject to itself- it is never certain - and never can be if it is to 
remain discreet. 
Therein lies the true difficulty of friendship, for it is part of the nature of 
Blanchot's writing that it is always tempting to read 'J'amitie' as simply another 
way of naming 'le desoeuvrement, or even the originary namelessness of 'le 
neutre'; and thereby to read the latter as unproblematic conditions of possibility 
for experience in general. This reading must be resisted. Such a movement of 
identification would fail to read the caution with which Blanchot names 
friendship: it would be to make it the centre of one's thinking, or the essential 
condition for the work, without such 'thinking' or 'work' being altered and 
displaced by this experience. At the same time, however, it is also clear that the 
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very difficulty of friendship is intimately bound up with Blanchot's thinking of 
the latter, insofar as this conflictual movement of withdrawing and manifesting 
& acts' or 'works' discreetly: the 'neutre' is, always and already, to be thought as an 
unpresentable movement of reserve. To think this relation of discretion is always, 
therefore, to run a risk, to expose oneself to the 'demand of friendship'. What is at 
stake, therefore, in Blanchot's formulation of this other 'demand', 'the demand of 
friendship', is precisely this double movement between the 'naming the possible' 
and 'responding to the impossible', between the 'political demand' and the 'poetic 
demand'. 
It is true, therefore, that Blanchot never explains what friendship means to 
him. This meaning nevertheless infon-ns his work as a whole. Friendship is 
4present' in these texts only through this thought of discretion. Equally, discretion 
is never allowed to become a concept in his work. It is performed there as that 
movement which makes the work a work. As a result, we can say that, through 
this double movement of discretion,, friendship is a part of 'the reserve' of 
literature; it is there in 'the demand of discontinuity; it is there in the conflicting 
demands of 'naming the possible' and 'responding to the impossible'; it is there in 
'the discreet force of the turning'. This jý'does not mean that ftiendship somehow 
provides an answer to all of the questions which Blanchot poses about the work of 
art,, literature, or the relation to the other. To borrow a phrase from "L'amitie"': 'it 
would be crass, even to consider that'. Friendship is not meant to answer anything 
in Blanchot's work. It only provides a way of holding open these questions and of 
maintaining a relation to that which still demands to be thought within them. We 
might venture that friendship brings with it a way of affirming the intractability of 
contradictions without absolving their tension; a way of maintaining thought 'in 
suspense between the yes and the no'. The demand of friendship lies in this 
balance (which is also a slippage) between the demand of the naming the possible 
and of responding to the impossible. 
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Notes to Conclusion 
I PA, 117. 
2 See "Le refus" (1958), AM, 130-1; and CI, 55. 
3, Pour Famitie", in Dionys Mascolo, A la recherche d'un communisme de pensie, 
Paris: fourbis, 1993,5-16,16. 
4, Notre compagnon clandestine", in Frangois Laruelle, Textes pour Emmanuel 
Levinas, Paris: tditions Jean-Michel Place, 1980,79-87,80. 
5 Paul Davies has shown us how to read this passage between Blanchot and Levinas, in 
"Difficult Friendship", Research in Phenomenology, v. 18 (1988), 149-72,170. 
6, Le 'discours philosophique"", in Larc, 46 (1971), 1-4,4. 
7 Ibid., 1. 
8 Ibid. 
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